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
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

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forum

THE SOVIET UNION AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The debate in recent years about strategic defenses has focused on the Reagan administration's strategic defense initiative, in particular on its technical feasibility and on its implications for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and for crisis stability. Much less attention has been given to the Soviet Union's efforts to modernize and expand its network of defensive systems and protective measures. Yet, an understanding of the issues surrounding the debate on SDI cannot afford to ignore the Soviet Union's programs to improve its defensive posture in the strategic arena. In the current "ORBIS Forum," the strategic defense efforts of the Soviet Union and their implications for arms control are examined by **Keith B. Payne,** *Director of National Security Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and author of the recent book* Strategic Defense: "Star Wars" in Perspective; **Sayre Stevens,** *President of the National Security Research Group of the Systems Planning Corporation; and* **William R. Harris,** *a member of the New York and California Bars, who is presently at the Rand Corporation.*

THE SOVIET UNION AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE: THE FAILURE AND FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL*

By KEITH B. PAYNE

Criticism of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) often is predicated, implicitly and/or explicitly, on particular assumptions concerning Soviet objectives and policy. This is particularly true of the long-standing "arms control" argument against ballistic missile defense (BMD). The U.S. BMD programs of the 1960s and early 1970s were criticized on arms control grounds, and SDI has inherited the same critique. This brief analysis will examine those assumptions about Soviet objectives and policy that inform the arms control argument against BMD and the SDI; determine the extent

* The author wishes to express his thanks to Rebecca Strode for her thoughtful assistance in preparing this essay.

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to which the integrity of this argument depends upon the validity of the assumptions; and assess the validity of these assumptions.

The general thrust of the arms control argument is familiar: BMD will ruin any basis for progress in arms control because the deployment of defenses will only provide incentives for the superpowers to enlarge their offensive arsenals in order to counter the defense.[1] As several former senior officials stated recently:

> Star wars, in sum, is a prescription not for ending or limiting the threat of nuclear weapons, but for a competition unlimited in expense, duration and danger.
>
> . . .it is possible to reach good agreements, or possible to insist on the Star Wars program as it stands, but wholly impossible to do both.[2]

It should be noted that the authors are unconditionally certain of this particular expression of the argument. The alternatives are clear-cut: the United States can either pursue strategic defense or it can pursue arms control; it cannot do both. These two objectives are held to be mutually exclusive. The rationale for this position must be examined and its validity tested.

The arms control argument against the SDI is based entirely upon the offense-reliant arms control theory that has provided the basis for U.S. policy for almost twenty years. This "traditionalist" theory is not the only possible approach to arms control. It is, however, the point of view underpinning the entire SALT process and, as the above quotation indicates, it continues to pervade much public debate over U.S. strategic policy.

The SDI, as the potential prelude to BMD deployment, is in direct variance with the policy prescriptions stemming from this traditionalist, offense-dominated theory of arms control. Consequently, it is easy to understand why the arms control traditionalists who put that theory into practice during SALT I and II are so critical of the SDI. It threatens their arms control "worldview."

In the traditionalist view, offensive limitations are considered possible because both sides can deploy adequate strategic offensive forces based on assured retaliation requirements. BMD is thought, therefore, to cause arms race instability — it might bring into question the retaliatory

[1] This "arms control" argument against BMD was outlined almost two decades ago. See, for example, Abram Chayes, Jerome B. Wiesner, George Rathjens, Steven Weinberg, "ABM Deployment: What's Wrong With It?" in *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System*, edited by Abram Chayes, and Jerome Wiesner (New York: Signet Books, 1969), p. 27; W. K. Panofsky, "Roots of the Strategic Arms Race: Ambiguity and Ignorance," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1969, pp. 15-20; and George Rathjens, "A Breakthrough In Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1969, p. 5.

[2] McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1984/85, pp. 273, 277.

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potential of each side, compelling an increase in offensive forces. In short, BMD, according to the offense-reliant theory of arms control, undermines confidence in the adequacy of currently deployed forces to ensure deterrence, thereby providing powerful incentives for additional forces and undercutting the prospects for offensive arms control.

The underlying assumption here is that the Soviet Union deploys forces according to a theory of deterrence similar to that popular in the West. This assumption leads to two conclusions: that offensive arms control is facilitated by the absence of strategic defense because the incentives for further force expansion are minimized; and that the deployment of BMD will destroy that basis for arms control.

The arms control theory underlying this position — put into practice in SALT I and II — has been shown to be extremely doubtful. Developments since 1972 have demonstrated that the traditionalist arms control/deterrence paradigm is an inadequate basis for U.S. arms control policy or for expectations concerning the arms competition. The weaknesses of this theory can be summarized briefly.

First, for the offense-reliant theory of arms control to bear fruit, the Soviet Union would have to abandon its strategic policy objective of achieving a damage-limitation capability through combined offensive and defensive capabilities. The traditionalist approach assumes that the United States and the Soviet Union have roughly similar theories of "how much is enough" vis-à-vis strategic forces and deterrence, i.e., "enough" to ensure a devastating second-strike. The traditionalist approach further assumes that Soviet arms control policy and force deployments can be driven by a theory of deterrence based upon a definable and limited offensive force requirement. Once the Soviets achieve that level of capability, unless provoked by U.S. defenses that might "threaten their deterrent," they can agree to offensive limitations. This concept of arms control is predicated on the supposition that both sides believe that stability lies in a condition of mutual vulnerability. The presumption is that the Soviet Union can agree to offensive reductions without violating the Soviet view of its own self-interest.

Yet, the Soviet Union has demonstrated that it perceives great value in those types of offensive strategic forces with the potential to destroy U.S. retaliatory forces — the mutuality of deterrence. The Soviet strategic arsenal is composed primarily of large, MIRVed ICBMs tailored to this counterforce mission. The Soviet Union has proven most reluctant over the course of negotiations since 1969 to accept effective constraints on such systems, which is primarily what the United States has tried to achieve through offensive arms control since 1969.

The traditionalist arms control theory is incompatible with the

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Soviet drive for a strategic damage-limitation capability — because, in the absence of effective BMD technology, that drive mandates robust Soviet "counterforce" capabilities. To accommodate the traditionalist offense-reliant approach to arms control would require either that the United States give up its secure retaliatory capability, which Washington would prefer not to do in the absence of an alternative means of security, or that the Soviet Union give up its damage-limitation objective.

In short, the Soviet Union perceives a need for an offensive damage-limitation capability, and the U.S. perceives a need for a survivable retaliatory capability. The two sides are working at cross-purposes that virtually ensure a continuation of the offensive arms competition. There is no room in such a strategic environment for the Soviet Union to agree to U.S. notions of "deterrence adequacy" in offensive forces, and scaling down forces to that "stable" level. The validity of the traditionalist "anti-BMD" argument appears to be highly questionable because it mistakes the fundamental objectives of the Soviet Union. As Winston Churchill noted, "Occasionally you must take the enemy into consideration."

This offense-reliant theory of arms control is not an adequate basis for addressing the arms competition because it mistakes the dynamics behind that competition. The developments in SALT / START since 1969 demonstrate that fact. The Soviet Union deploys strategic forces largely to contribute to its damage-limitation potential; deterrence is held to inhere in such capabilities.[3] The failure of the traditionalist, anti-BMD theory of arms control to account for the Soviet Union's commitment to damage-limitation led to the "failure" of the SALT process.

This "failure" can be demonstrated by comparing the expectations of those traditionalists who negotiated SALT I — based on their theory of arms control — with the reality of the arms competition following SALT I. For example, with the ABM Treaty cap on BMD expected to facilitate offensive limitations, it was said at the time that SALT was "stopping [Soviet] momentum in the offensive weapons area."[4] And,

[3] See, for example, Fritz Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security,* Fall 1978, pp. 138-55; Robert Legvold, "Strategic 'Doctrine' and SALT: Soviet and American Views," *Survival,* January-February 1979, pp. 8-13; Peter King, "Two Eyes for a Tooth: The State of Soviet Strategic Doctrine," *Survey,* Winter 1979, pp. 45-56; Benjamin Lambeth. *How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine,* P-5939 (Santa Monica, Calif. Rand, February 1978); John Erickson, "The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General Survey," *Survival,* November-December 1982, pp. 242-51; William Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," *Problems of Communism,* July/August 1985, pp. 6; Stephen Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programmes and the U.S. SDI," *Survival,* November/December 1985, pp. 274-92; and Michael Deane, *Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, July 1980), pp. 17-22.

[4] Melvin Laird, in, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,* Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Forces, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1972), p. 545. (Hereafter referred to as *Military Implications).*

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SALT I was expected to lead, in two to five years, to a "definitive" offensive agreement (i.e., SALT II), the purpose of which was to "reduce on a long term basis threats to our respective strategic retaliatory forces." [5] Note the assumption that, in the absence of BMD, the Soviet Union would have an interest in reducing its threat to American retaliatory forces, and would participate in such an arms control regime. That assumption has been demonstrated to be incorrect — and with it the basis of the traditionalist offense-dominated theory of arms control. Nevertheless, adherents to this approach continue to assert — against overwhelming evidence to the contrary [6] — that the Soviet Union really has no serious damage-limitation objective,[7] and that their theory about the relationship between arms control and BMD is correct.

In recent congressional testimony, Ambassador Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. SALT I delegation, argued that the traditionalist view of the arms competition and arms control has been "partially confirmed" by SALT I and II.[8] That claim clearly is unfounded. During the SALT/START negotiations, *and in the absence of U.S. BMD,* the Soviet Union increased the number of its destabilizing, counterforce ICBMs from 308 in 1972 to over 660 in 1985, with a related increase in countersilo warheads of from roughly 300 to over 5,000.[9] The result of this increase is that U.S. retaliatory forces, especially ICBMs, have become increasingly vulnerable since SALT I. As the Scowcroft Report noted in 1983: "The Soviets nevertheless now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047 U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM force." [10]

If, in SALT I, the Soviet Union had agreed to the notion of deterrence through an adequacy of mutually survivable retaliatory forces, this massive Soviet counterforce expansion ought never to have taken place. And indeed, Ambassador Smith's own words at the time of SALT I

[5] See Paul Nitze, "The Objectives of Arms Control," *Survival,* May/June 1985, pp. 102-103. Quote from Unilateral Statement A by Ambassador Gerard Smith, May 9, 1972, attached to the ABM Treaty.

[6] The Soviet "doctrinal" writings concerning damage-limitation are matched by Soviet offensive and defensive deployment programs.

[7] See Raymond Garthoff, "SALT I: an Evaluation," *World Politics,* October 1978, pp. 1-25; and "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *Strategic Review,* Fall 1982, pp. 36-51.

[8] See "Statement of Gerard Smith" before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Strategy, BMD, and Arms Control, November 12, 1985, p. 1.

[9] These and all numbers concerning Soviet strategic weapons are found in John Collins and Peter Glakas, *U.S./Soviet Military Balance, Statistical Trends, 1970-1982,* Report No. 83-153 S (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 1983); and John Collins and Patrick Cronin, *U.S./Soviet Military Balance, Assessments and Statistics,* Report No. 85-89 S (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Spring 1985).

[10] See *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces* (the Scowcroft Report) (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 1983), p. 4.

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demonstrate clearly that he believed such an expansion would not take place.[11]

If the United States government had understood the dynamic behind Soviet force deployments, that which has happened would have been expected to happen: the Soviet Union has continued to improve those active and passive defenses unconstrained by treaty (and, to some extent, those constrained by treaty); it has expanded its BMD R&D program; it is modernizing its operational BMD capability; and it has engaged in a major counterforce buildup to exploit the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory forces to ballistic missile attack.

These developments were predicted by some SALT I participants and commentators who were not persuaded by the traditionalists' offense-reliant arms control theory.[12] However, the logic of the traditionalist arms control theory does not provide for the possibility that the Soviet Union could seriously be interested in a damage-limitation potential. Such a possibility would preclude consideration of arms control. Yet, it is this driving force behind Soviet behavior that has made a mockery of U.S. arms control objectives under the traditionalist approach. Below is a summary of how the participants interpreted, according to their offense-reliant theory of arms control, what had happened in SALT I, and what would happen in SALT II. These expectations are juxtaposed to a review of what actually has happened.

Predictions/Claims

Claim. "By setting a limit to ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates one area of potentially dangerous defensive competition, but it reduces the incentive for continuing deployment of offensive systems. As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive." [13]

Reality: In the context of strict BMD limitations, Soviet ICBM warheads increased from 1,547 in 1972 to 6,420 in 1985; Soviet SLBM warheads increased from 497 in 1972 to 2,122 in 1985.

[11] See Ambassador Smith's testimony in, *Military Implications,* pp. 100, 316, 332-333, 395.

[12] Several participants in the SALT I process were accurate in their relatively pessimistic estimates of what would occur over the next fifteen years. See, for example, William Van Cleave's testimony in *Military Implications,* pp. 569-92; Senator Jackson's statements throughout those hearings; Don Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review,* June 1972, pp. 685-92; and Mark Schneider, "Problems of SALT: 1972," *Survive,* July/August 1972, pp. 2-6.

[13] See testimony by Henry Kissinger in *Military Implications,* p. 121.

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FIGURE 1
SOVIET ICBM/SLBM WARHEAD GROWTH SINCE SALT I



Claim. The ABM Treaty reflected Soviet endorsement of the U.S. concept of mutual deterrence through mutual vulnerability. "This [ABM Treaty] is a general undertaking of utmost significance. Without a nationwide ABM defense, there can be no shield against retaliation. Both nuclear powers have recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain nuclear deterrence." [14]

Reality: There is a great deal of evidence demonstrating that the Soviet Union has never given up its pursuit of a damage-limitation capability in deference to the U.S. concept of mutual deterrence. Rather, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue a combined arms strategy in support of a damage-limitation objective. As Stephen Meyer recently observed:

[14] Secretary of State William Rogers, Statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 19, 1972, quoted in, *SALT I Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of American Relations, 1979), p. 99.

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FIGURE 2
A COMPARISON OF U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROCUREMENT EXPENDITURES WITH ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF U.S.S.R. PROCUREMENT



SOURCE: Department of Defense, Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, *The FY 1985 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development and Acquisition* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1984), pp. II-13, II-15.

First and foremost, Soviet military doctrine holds that the primary mission of the Soviet armed forces is to prevent the nuclear devastation of the Soviet homeland — i.e., the armed forces must deter strategic nuclear war, and yet be able to limit damage should deterrence fail.[15]

Consequently the inability of arms control to realize its objective and stop the dramatic buildup in the Soviet threat to U.S. retaliatory forces ought to come as no surprise — and indeed, it was predicted by several prescient participants in SALT I.

[15] Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programmes," p. 278. See also, Sidney Graybeal and Daniel Goure, "Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Objectives: Past, Present, and Future," in *U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense* (Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979), p. 75.

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Claim: The intent of SALT I was to enhance the survivability of U.S. retaliatory forces by controlling the Soviet counterforce threat. SALT I was thought to have achieved that objective by "freezing" the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs:

> Within this overall limitation [SALT I], the Soviet Union has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, the weapons most threatening to our strategic forces. There is also a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. . . .[16]

Reality: The number of "heavy" ICBMs and launchers, as defined by the United States at the time of SALT I, increased from 308 in 1972 to over 660 in 1985. The direct result of this increase was a significant reduction in the survivability of U.S. retaliatory forces.

FIGURE 3
SOVIET HEAVY ICBM GROWTH SINCE SALT I



NOTE: *All Heavy ICBMs by the U.S. SALT I Definition
ICBMs Counted: SS-9s SS-18s SS-19s

[16] Henry Kissinger in *Military Implications,* p. 121.

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FIGURE 4
SOVIET HEAVY ICBM THROW-WEIGHT INCREASE SINCE SALT I



NOTE: *All Heavy ICBMs by the U.S. SALT I Definition.
Counted SS-9s SS-18s SS-19s

Claim: Follow-on negotiations (i.e, SALT II) would lead within two to five years to definitive and specific restrictions on offensive forces that would provide "long-term" survivability for retaliatory forces. That was said to be the primary objective of SALT II. This objective would be realized, it was suggested, by reductions in the number of missiles, especially those with high throw-weight (i.e., heavy ICBMs):

> What we are trying to do is to set up a useful device that will hold the situation *while we negotiate, hopefully, a matching treaty; that is to match the treaty in* the ABM defense field. I think that the measures that we have succeeded in spelling out in this interim agreement with the Russians will do just that. There will be a commitment on their part not to build any more of these ICBM's that have concerned us over the years. That commitment will extend to not building such things as SS-9s.[17]

> I think they [the Soviet Union] are interested in getting a more definitive missile limitation than at present . . . I have reason — I have hope that they will reduce the numbers and, perhaps, enter into some sort of qualitative limitations affecting size, yes, throw-weight.[18]

[17] Gerard Smith, *Military Implications,* p. 100.
[18] Ibid., p. 395.

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Reality: The years of negotiations that have followed SALT I did not lead to a cap or reduction in Soviet heavy ICBMs. Indeed, the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs, according to the U.S. SALT definition, has more than doubled. As a direct result, U.S. retaliatory forces (particularly ICBMs) have become increasingly vulnerable.

Each of the traditionalist predictions/claims is a logical expectation derived from the offense-reliant theory of arms control that was implemented in SALT I and II and is now used as the basis of the arms control argument against the SDI. Indeed, to a great extent the realization of those earlier expectations is essential to the integrity of the offense-reliant approach to arms control and of the critique of the SDI.

The United States sought to ensure mutual deterrence through mutual vulnerability and to reduce the Soviet offensive counterforce threat to U.S. retaliatory forces in support of that mutual deterrence. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would have an interest in accepting such offensive restraints/reductions as long as BMD could be, in effect, banned. Yet, the Soviet Union perceived its self-interest differently and proved unwilling, even in the absence of BMD, to accept the type of restraint on its countersilo forces that would have validated the U.S. traditionalist, offense-reliant approach to arms control. A misunderstanding of Soviet interests and strategic objectives ensured that traditionalist arms control expectations would not be realized.

The traditionalist arms control argument against the SDI appears, at least in part, to be built on a theory that history has demonstrated to be flawed. The traditionalist theory, mistaking Soviet objectives, prescribes an anti-BMD arms control policy that, when implemented, could not succeed. U.S. SALT objectives were a casualty of that mistake. It is clear that, despite continuing remonstrations of absolute certainty to the contrary, the *absence of BMD* does not establish the basis for offensive arms control as predicted by the traditionalists.

The second policy conclusion of the traditionalists, that the *presence of BMD* will destroy any basis for arms control, may also be flawed. There is some uncertainty here; history, as yet, has had no chance to provide a verdict. However, the same Soviet damage-limitation objective that denied the feasibility of the U.S. offense-reliant approach to arms control may render a defense-oriented approach to arms control more successful. If so, then the traditionalists are wholly incorrect in their arms control criticism of the SDI. There is some reason to believe that a defense-reliant approach to arms control would offer more hope.

The Soviet pursuit of a damage-limitation capability through counterforce offense appears to have rendered the realization of U.S. SALT objectives impossible. This is not to say that the SALT goals would

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necessarily have been realized had the Soviet Union not pursued an offensive counterforce buildup following 1972. But that development alone certainly was sufficient to defeat U.S. purposes.

The Soviet damage-limitation objective undercuts the offense-reliant approach to arms control as pursued by the United States; however, that very emphasis on damage-limitation may provide the necessary basis for genuine arms control success through a defense-reliant approach to arms control. "Defense-reliant" arms control would constitute a reversal of the traditional SALT arms control model. Rather than prohibiting BMD in an attempt to set the stage for offensive limitations, a defense-reliant approach to arms control would allow great freedom for strategic defenses as the basis for achieving useful offensive limitations. This reversal of arms control thought concerning the relationship between arms control and offensive and defensive forces is in direct contrast with established wisdom, yet there are several reasons why it might succeed where offense-reliant arms control has failed.

First, defense-reliant arms control would not require the Soviet Union to abandon its long-standing, deeply felt desire for a damage-limitation capability. Indeed it would facilitate and encourage Soviet acquisition of such a capability. Mutual offensive limitations would facilitate the effectiveness of both Soviet and U.S. defenses — thereby helping to provide the Soviet Union with the damage-limitation capability it has thus far tried, but has been unable, to achieve through offensive force deployments.

A primary tenet of U.S. strategic policy has been to deny the Soviet Union its damage-limitation goal by maintaining a survivable retaliatory capability. U.S. success to date in maintaining a diversified triad of strategic forces has frustrated the Soviet Union's efforts to attain its damage-limitation objectives. A defense-reliant approach to arms control, however, would grant the Soviet Union its objective in a way that can never be contemplated as long as the United States remains wedded to the mutual vulnerability notion of deterrence and to the offense-reliant approach to arms control that notion has spawned.

It is clear that some in the Soviet military have concluded that the offensive counterforce approach to damage-limitation is at a dead end. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, while chief of the Soviet General Staff, stated that because of the large number of warheads now deployed by both sides and the diversity of basing modes and delivery means available, "a further build-up [of nuclear weapons] is becoming senseless."[19] Ogarkov then said explicitly that the reason that additional offensive weapons

[19] *Krasnia zvezda,* May 9, 1984; translated in "Ogarkov on Military Technology," *Survival,* July/August 1984, pp. 187-88.

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deployments made little sense is that they cannot be counted on to perform what in the Soviet view is their main mission, i.e., damage-limitation through counterforce pre-emption:

> The point is that with the quantity and diversity of nuclear missiles already achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike. A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor even by the limited quantity of nuclear charges remaining to the defender — a strike inflicting unacceptable damage — becomes inevitable in present conditions.[20]

More recently, Deputy Chief of the General Staff General M. Gareev expressed similar concern that offensive forces alone might not be able to prevent the United States from imposing unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. Gareev criticized the authors of the once authoritative Soviet strategic text, *Military Strategy,* edited by Marshal Sokolovskii, for claiming that in the missile age the concept of strategic defense had lost its significance. Such a view may have been appropriate in the 1960s, Gareev argues, but no longer. Why? Because, "the improvements in and accumulation of nuclear-missile weapons have reached such a level that the mass use of these weapons may result in catastrophic consequences for both sides."[21]

Statements such as these from important Soviet military commanders suggest that Soviet military planners are dissatisfied with the USSR's traditional reliance on offensive counterforce for achieving an acceptable level of damage-limitation. These statements do not indicate, however, that the Soviet Union has abandoned the objective of damage-limitation; rather, they imply doubt that the objective can be met through the traditional heavy reliance on counterforce offensive weapons. The United States has demonstrated that it will oppose the Soviet *counterforce* damage-limitation objective; it has also indicated that it accepts and indeed would welcome a cooperative transition to *mutual* defensive capabilities for damage-limitation.[22]

Offense-reliant arms control, to be successful, requires that the Soviet Union cease its pursuit of counterforce damage-limitation. The U.S. position has been predicated on the hope that a condition of mutual vulnerability is stable. Yet, the Soviet Union has not viewed the endorsement of such a condition as in its own best interest — with the consequent failure of the U.S. SALT arms control agenda. Defense-reliant arms control could be compatible with this fundamental Soviet emphasis on a damage-

[20] Ibid., p. 188.

[21] M. A. Gareev, *M. V. Frunze — Voennyi teoretik* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), excerpted and translated in Leon Goure and Michael Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," *Strategic Review,* Fall 1985, pp. 102-106.

[22] Address by Ambassador Paul Nitze, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "SDI and the ABM Treaty," *Current Policy,* No. 711, pp. 2-3; and Paul Nitze, "The Objectives of Arms Control," pp. 104-107.

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limitation capability. Rather than attempting to force the Soviet Union to view its self-interest in Western terms of deterrence, defense-reliant arms control would accept Soviet views of Soviet self-interest and structure an arms control regime compatible with both U.S. and Soviet damage-limitation objectives. Consequently, defense-reliant arms control would benefit the Soviet Union by permitting Moscow to achieve the damage-limitation capability it has so long pursued. To be successful, offense-reliant arms control requires the Soviet Union to accept American notions concerning strategic and arms control objectives — acceptance the Soviet Union has been unwilling to grant.

In short, defense-reliant arms control would be compatible with expressed fundamental Soviet objectives, objectives that the United States must continue to oppose in the context of traditional offense-dominated notions of deterrence and arms control. Defense-reliant arms control could, at long last, align U.S. and Soviet interests in the pursuit of offensive limitations.

Second, defense-reliant arms control could help allay Soviet fears of the SDI. It is often suggested that the Soviet Union fears that the SDI will provide the United States with a "sword and a shield" — and that the United States might be more willing to use its offensive forces first if it could then hide behind its shield. Consequently, it is argued, the SDI could frighten the Soviet Union into provocative actions it otherwise would not take.

Yet, if the United States and Soviet Union agree to offensive force limitations and relative freedom for strategic defenses, Soviet defense effectiveness could be assured and the Soviet Union would not face the prospect of an effective U.S. "sword and shield." If the Soviet Union is genuinely fearful that the SDI is a "smokescreen" for a U.S. first-strike capability, it can deal effectively with that prospect by engaging in the type of offensive force reductions that the United States seeks. The Soviet Union would thereby gain a handle on U.S. offensive forces, permitting the U.S. (and itself) only a "shield." The United States has already indicated that it is quite willing to be so constrained *if* the Soviet Union will engage in genuine mutual offensive force reductions.

Such offensive reductions, combined with freedom to pursue strategic defense, would permit neither side an effective "sword and shield." This defense-reliant approach to arms control requires "only" that the United States and the Soviet Union prefer a strategic condition wherein both can protect themselves rather than threaten the other with strategic nuclear war. It requires a clear decision to pursue a defensive capability at the expense of an offensive strategic capability. In short, it requires that the Soviet leadership prefer to protect the Soviet Union rather than target the United States. Everything in Soviet strategic thought

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suggests that *if* a choice must be made *between* the capability to inflict damage on the United States or a capability to limit damage to itself, the Soviet Union would choose the latter. A defense-reliant approach to arms control would, for the first time, compel the Soviet Union (and the United States) to make such a choice.

In summary, a defense-reliant approach to arms control would meet Soviet needs in a way that the traditional offensive approach never can. It should be more compatible with the Soviet, *qua* Soviet, definition of self-interest, and therefore provide a more realistic basis for offensive arms control.

If it is true that Soviet military planners consider damage-limitation to be the main mission of Soviet strategic forces, and if they consider offensive counterforce weapons increasingly inadequate to meet that objective, then one would expect the Soviet Union to be receptive to a transition toward strategic defense. Yet, the Soviet Union has been extremely critical of the SDI, charging that deployment of space-based weapons would produce a massive arms race and would ruin all hope for arms control.

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev said during his speech to the French Parliament on October 3, 1985: "As for space, we are for using it only for peaceful purposes, and we continually call for a treaty to that effect, for the extension of the arms race into space will make it objectively impossible to reduce nuclear arsenals."[23] First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal V. Petrov wrote in *Pravda* in December 1985 that the deployment of weapons in space, "would make the reduction of nuclear weapons impossible."[24] Soviet policy thus appears to be completely opposite to what would be expected if the analysis presented in this article is correct.

This discrepancy may be explained by considering the political element of Soviet strategic arms control policy in conjunction with its military elements. The Soviet Union would prefer to have a unilateral damage-limitation capability while also maintaining a credible offensive capability, i.e., a clear-cut domination of the "correlation of forces." Prior to President Reagan's initiation of the SDI, the Soviet Union had a very potent offensive capability against the United States — capable of destroying the military and economic power of any state that threatened the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union was steadily working to improve its as yet inadequate damage-limitation capability by a combination of offensive force modernization, and strategic defensive R&D and deployment (including air defenses, civil defenses, BMD research of all types, and modernization of the Moscow

[23] *Pravda*, October 4, 1985.
[24] Ibid., December 28, 1985.

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BMD system). As long as the United States showed little interest in strategic defense, the USSR could hope eventually to gain a significant strategic advantage. In the meantime, general adherence to and unfailing public support for the ABM Treaty served Soviet interests by maintaining constraints on U.S. BMD activity while Soviet BMD capability was not yet considered adequate for large-scale deployment.

The SDI threatens to undermine this policy. The president's March 1983 "Star Wars" speech announcing the SDI signified a potential new U.S. approach to deterrence. From the Soviet perspective, SDI poses both a strategic and a technological challenge. Strategically, the SDI threatens to deny the Soviet Union the *unilateral* advantage in damage-limitation that it has been pursuing. Technologically, the U.S. SDI challenges the Soviet Union's scientific and engineering capability, depriving the USSR of the luxury of conducting BMD R&D at the pace of its choosing. The Soviet Union has long been interested in BMD, but it has wanted it on Soviet terms, wishing to enjoy the advantage of choosing when and on what scale BMD would emerge as a major, perhaps the major, component of the strategic balance. The SDI upsets Soviet leaders not because they dislike defense and BMD R&D, but because they dislike U.S. defense and BMD R&D. They see the SDI as a further threat because it seized the BMD initiative.

Soviet opposition to the defense-oriented arms control approach outlined here is rooted in the USSR's continuing desire to have the best of all worlds — the ability to attain both its offensive and defensive wartime objectives. The defense-reliant approach to arms control would require the Soviet Union to abjure its offensive objectives in return for a U.S. guarantee, made tangible through offensive arms reductions, not to inhibit Soviet efforts to secure its damage-limitation objectives through deployment of defensive weapons. To date, the Soviet leadership is not convinced that such a choice between offensive and defensive objectives is necessary. If the United States should abandon the SDI, then the USSR could continue to pursue both offensive and defensive weapons modernization at its own preferred pace and on its own preferred scale.

The current Soviet opposition to the SDI in general, and to a defense-reliant arms control agreement in particular, probably reflects the Soviet Union's desire to undermine support for the SDI among the U.S. public. By appearing to force the United States to choose between the SDI or arms control, the Soviet Union hopes to encourage the United States to abandon its strategic defense program.

The key to removing Soviet opposition to a defense-reliant arms control regime is to convince the Soviet leadership that the United States is prepared to pursue the SDI with or without Soviet arms control

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cooperation. Only then will the Soviet Union come to perceive arms control not as a means of defeating the SDI, but as a means of channeling BMD competition into areas best suited to Soviet interests. Such a shift in the Soviet perspective would make more feasible a new arms control approach, one in which the two sides would agree to allow each other to pursue their damage-limitation objectives while constraining their mutual ability to threaten one another with offensive nuclear weapons. While this might not be the best of worlds in the Soviet view, it might be the best of all plausibly attainable worlds.

If this approach to arms control is to be pursued, the United States must convince the Soviet Union that it will not concede to the Soviet Union an unchallenged damage-limitation monopoly. If that can be done, then it is to be hoped, and there are indications in Soviet strategic doctrine which suggest, that the Soviet leadership would prefer a world in which both sides are defended from nuclear attack to a world in which both sides are vulnerable.

In conclusion, the traditionalist criticism of BMD and the SDI is part and parcel of an arms control theory that has been badly damaged by reality. History demonstrates that traditionalist, offense-reliant arms control has been incapable of achieving those objectives set out by its proponents — indeed the arms competition has gone in the opposite direction of that predicted. It appears that Soviet damage-limitation objectives were not adequately considered by the traditionalists; their offense-reliant approach to arms control simply is incompatible with this Soviet objective. Yet, that same theory of arms control is now being employed to argue against the SDI. In contrast, it is likely that the SDI and a defense-reliant approach to arms control can provide a more effective basis for achieving genuine offensive reductions.

THE SOVIET FACTOR IN SDI

by SAYRE STEVENS

One of the most intriguing features of President Reagan's strategic defense initiative (SDI) is the effect it has had on the Soviet Union whose hostility toward the program has produced an apparent role reversal between the United States and the USSR on the matter of strategic defense. These comments will consider the nature of that seeming anomaly.

Several characteristics of SDI provide a good foundation for such a consideration. They go to the heart of some deeply based pre-

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dilections of the United States and the USSR which can be observed in sustained patterns of behavior. The most striking feature of SDI is its enthusiastic turn to strategic defense as a source of leverage able to deter the use of nuclear weapons. It represents a dramatic turning away from assured nuclear retaliation by survivable offensive forces as the source of such deterrence. This change comes after a rather long period marked by a belief that offensive forces and weapons were in the ascendant and most likely to dominate any future nuclear conflict.

The presentation of SDI with its more visionary promises smacks a little of technological millenarianism, a faith in the imprecisely defined workings of science and technology to produce a new world free of the most salient sources of mankind's anguish. Much of the opposition to SDI involves a reaction to this peculiarity; it represents a striking departure from the normal practice of making very mundane decisions about weapons acquisition. Recent changes in the definition of SDI objectives soft-pedal this feature and cast the program in terms more amenable to pragmatic appraisal. But the flavor remains and it is one of the more important characteristics of SDI.

It implies a doctrine of faith that must be sustained over some period of time, able to withstand the questions and doubts that inevitably occur in pursuing objectives beyond immediate reach. Uncertainties about the likelihood of success will exist. Guarantees will be hard to find, for some time at least. As a consequence, he who pursues SDI must be of stout heart and prepared for the long-haul. To so characterize the SDI is not to assert that it should not be pursued, but that to do so successfully will require a real and sustained commitment. Concentrating on the visionary nature of the SDI's goals, its dependence on the future accomplishments of science and technology, and its reliance on the contributions of strategic defense rather than offense, let us now consider how they relate to traditional U.S. and Soviet attitudes and behavior.

In general, the United States is more given to the making of pragmatic decisions in pursuit of concrete, attainable, near-term goals than to relying on faith-based choices while awaiting the millenium. It prides itself on its accomplishments as a nation of pragmatic actors making hardheaded decisions based upon costs and benefits. Moreover, when the choices are to be made by the government, it is expected that these costs and benefits and their comparative assessment be debated and subjected to public scrutiny. Not much is likely to be taken on faith, particularly when it involves a contentious weapons acquisition program. Science in its own right is not normally glorified. Thus, it is a little surprising, to say the least, that the United States should commit itself to a long-term program rooted in ill-defined scientific promise.

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That this commitment should be to strategic defense is even more surprising. Through the years the United States has toyed with strategic defenses but has always found a reason to avoid having to shoulder the high costs associated with maintaining and strengthening them with persistence and broader purpose. U.S. air defense systems built in earlier years have been largely abandoned since they were limited in effect and could not justify their costs, particularly in the absence of ballistic missile defenses (BMD). But when the first of two BMD deployments allowed by the ABM Treaty became operational, it was closed down the next day. To persevere in maintaining such defenses in peacetime is tough; costs and required manning levels are high.

The U.S. response has been to emphasize the offensive elements of strategic forces. It has not been a difficult course to follow; offensive forces were in the ascendant, seemed to offer countermeasures to emerging defenses which put the efficacy of the latter in doubt, and by themselves offered a strategy of deterrence through assured retaliation. SDI rests upon a belief that new advances in defensive technology will reverse all these earlier judgments. And, as we have seen, endorsing that belief requires an element of faith.

It is difficult for the United States to follow such a course. Because of its commitment to pragmatic decision making based on considerations of cost and benefit, a clear demonstration of effectiveness against a severe and responsive threat is normally required. Moreover, effectiveness must be shown to give economic advantage at the margin to the United States. To claim such effectiveness and advantage on the basis of technological accomplishments still shrouded in mist challenges the rules of the game.

But it is even harder than that. One can imagine the staged pursuit of limited objectives that build up to achieving full effectiveness, but that is not the American way. The required demonstration of cost and effectiveness gives little value to damage limitation; it insists upon damage denial. Thus, air defense in the presence of an uncountered ballistic missile threat makes little sense. A limited ballistic missile defense able to protect only selected targets cannot be justified; or at least, has not been thus far. Because damage limiting has not been valued, there has been no start made at developing and deploying the full range of defense measures required by substantial levels of protection for the country as a whole. Virtually nothing has been done in the way of civil defenses or for providing for the survivability and endurance of key segments of the population beyond some limited efforts to afford survivability to selected elements of the military forces. If the goals of SDI are to be met, however, a start must be made on the full range of these

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strategic defenses. And in no case is the conceptual or technological problem of how best to deal with the full scope of the threat obvious. The concentration of the SDI program — though not the vision of its achievements — is on but one part of the threat: active defense against strategic ballistic missiles. Moreover, attempts to give a more pragmatic flavor to the program are moving toward earlier objectives and toward protecting only a portion of targets in the United States against that threat.

One is led to question the realism of expecting the United States to sustain an effort like SDI over the long-haul given past behavior and natural proclivities as outlined above. The insistence on total effectiveness and marginal economic advantage demonstrated in real terms against a projected threat armed with all conceivable countermeasures makes it very hard for any program manager, even if it is the president, to survive all the tournaments posed by the process of program review as it exists today in the United States. And then we grow tired and disillusioned in maintaining focus on objectives too distant with too few dramatic demonstrations of success regardless of what the program. Nevertheless, it is the United States that is the champion of SDI and the future it holds, not just for this country, but for the world at large.

Let us now take a similar look at Soviet behavior and predilections. The Soviet Union is, after all, the leader in the struggle to attain a state of communism, the millenarian objective of scientific socialism. While the more doctrinaire members of its population might have dialectical difficulties with the world of SDI as an ultimate stopping point in the strategic confrontation, the population as a whole is well schooled in coping with the enduring pursuit of an uncertain objective. Moreover, there is an underlying enthusiasm about the contributions that ill-defined science can make in such an effort; a preoccupation with the enabling capacities of "science" was characteristic of the nineteenth-century Russian revolutionaries and very much a part of Bolshevik thinking which glorified science in committing it to the service of the state. The setting is not altogether inimical to SDI. But pragmatic behavior is even more important.

Since the ravages of World War II, the Soviets have been committed to the development of strategic defenses; concluding the ABM Treaty represents a possible single failure in that commitment, though a contrary interpretation is possible. Soviet work on air defenses, begun right after World War II, has continued up until the present time.[1] One new system after another has come into being to fill some particular niche

[1] A detailed discussion of past Soviet strategic weapons developments with appropriate references is provided in my chapter on "The Soviet BMD Program" in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 182-220.

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in the requirements for defenses against a changing aerodynamic threat. Jet interceptor aircraft with enhanced capabilities, radar controlled anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have been developed, produced, deployed and maintained. New systems were only a part of the development, however. Continually, older systems were modified and improvements made. Deployment levels reached extremely high numbers. As many as 12,000 SAM launchers have been deployed throughout the Soviet Union. There can be no question that the Soviets learned their lesson well in World War II and have been resolute in maintaining defenses against the airborne threat to the USSR.

Defense against ballistic missiles reportedly started as early as the late 1940s or perhaps very early 1950s. By the mid-1950s, work on actual systems were clearly well under way. As was the case with air defenses, work on ballistic missile defenses benefited from the presence of German scientists with substantial experience in the development of the Wasserfall surface-to-air missile systems in Germany during the war.

The reports of returning Germans gave evidence of the fact that a Soviet ABM program was under way. In April 1960, the last successful U-2 mission over the Soviet Union took a first look at the extent and the progress the Soviets had made in developing ABM defenses at Sary Shagan near the Kapustin Yar ballistic missile test range impact area on the edge of Lake Balkhash in Siberia. A number of facilities were seen there including very large phased-array radars which represented the beginnings of the unparalleled ballistic missile early warning and space surveillance network ringing the USSR. Three major weapons systems were seen to be under development at Sary Shagon, all of which were later to have some connection with the Soviet ABM program. The first of these systems, known as the Leningrad System, was deployed around Leningrad in the early 1960s. There continues to be debate as to whether the Leningrad System actually had an ABM mission, whether it was an advanced air defense system, or if it had some capability to do both jobs. In any event, it represented a development now seen as part of the development stream that led to later ABM systems. If it was intended to be an ABM system when it was first deployed around Leningrad, second thoughts about its effectiveness apparently came into play because the system was removed by 1963. However, the developers of the system apparently continued working on advanced defensive systems.

A second system also seen at Sary Shagan was deployed around Moscow in the early 1960s. Known as the Moscow or Galosh system, it was substantially more formidable than that deployed around Leningrad. It consisted of the very large Galosh missile and substantially larger and more powerful radars. Work was begun on six defensive com-

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plexes around Moscow, about fifty miles from the center of the city. Only four of these were ultimately completed. This system continues to be operational and to provide some capabilities against limited ballistic missile attacks on Moscow and its environs. It is notable that this system was the one under construction in 1972 when the Soviets signed the ABM Treaty. Thus, it was the capabilities of this system that they appraised when they considered the trade-offs associated with signing the treaty or continuing an ABM program that by that time was well under way.

The Moscow System differs significantly from the defenses deployed earlier around Leningrad and from later systems that seem to be derived from the Leningrad System. A radar-heavy system, it was not easily deployed widely and had begun as an attempt to deal with the difficulties of ballistic missile defense. The Leningrad System and its progeny, on the other hand, seem to have been developed by giving greater capabilities to SAM systems so that they could begin to deal with the more difficult BMD mission of intercepting very small ballistic missile reentry vehicles at long ranges. These two lines of approach give evidence of the depth of Soviet effort to develop active strategic defenses and their commitment to that entire process. The Moscow System, still deployed around Moscow, is presently undergoing a substantial improvement program.

As noted above, the ABM Treaty constitutes an interesting test of the Soviet commitment, at least to the development of ballistic missile defenses. One can argue that the Soviets, in signing the treaty, yielded to some extent on their commitment to establishing ballistic missile defense. Deployment of the Moscow System was revised to be in compliance with treaty provisions and no efforts were made to extend deployment to a second location as was originally allowed by the treaty. But the Moscow System had some serious shortcomings and hardheaded thinking may have argued against further deployment of that system even in the absence of an ABM Treaty. In fact, a fairly vigorous program of ABM development continues and new systems have been investigated and deployed in the period subsequent to the signing of the treaty. The Soviets, as did the United States, made it very clear that acceptance of the ABM Treaty in no way would constrain research and development on new ballistic missile systems. Such efforts were pursued far more agressively in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Thus, the ABM Treaty appears to be a halt along the path to achieving a full range of strategic defenses rather than a step toward abandoning that goal.

We have discussed primarily active defenses, but Soviet strategic defenses consist of more than that. These active defenses are buttressed by offensive counterforce capabilities able to attack U.S. ICBMs

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still in their silos, passive defenses such as civil defense for the protection of vital portions of the population, and plans for the protection of industrial facilities and the dispersal of military and other production elements in the event of war. All of these elements of strategic defense complement one another not to deny all damage in the event of a nuclear exchange but to limit that damage and its effects to every extent possible. Clearly there is a substantial difference between this approach and that taken in the United States.

In the period since the signing of the ABM Treaty, Soviet efforts to acquire strategic defensive systems have continued unabated. As noted above, a whole new series of air defense systems have been developed. Continuing effort has been given to developing new ballistic missile defense systems. The Moscow System is now being substantially improved to overcome some of its vulnerabilities and strengthen its capacity to deal with limited nuclear attacks. New ballistic missile early warning radars have been developed and have been deployed on the periphery of the Soviet Union. A new ABM system, the ABM-X-3 system, has been developed with an advanced phased-array engagement radar and with a high acceleration interceptor missile which, for the first time, allows the use of the atmosphere to discriminate against penetration aids. This system is substantially better suited for rapid, widespread deployment than is the Moscow System.

Perhaps most relevant to this discussion of the Soviet Union and SDI is the fact that these ABM efforts have included a good deal of attention to the use of directed energy weapons, i.e., weapons "based on other physical principles," to use the language of the ABM Treaty. Work on the use of both neutral particle beams and high-energy laser weapons has been reported. This work is similar to much of the work that has been recommended for the U.S. SDI program. According to Defense Department analysis of Soviet efforts,[2] prototypes for ground-based lasers for ballistic missile defense and space-based antisatellite lasers will be available by the late 1980s. The testing of components for a widely distributed BMD system could begin in the early 1990s though initial operational deployment is not considered likely in this century. A space-based laser BMD system could be deployed sometime after the year 2000. A prototype particle-beam weapons system could be ready for testing by the late 1990s if what appears to be a vigorous Soviet program were maintained. Soviet high-energy laser weapon efforts include more than just ballistic missile defense. Attention is also being given to the development of both air defense and antisatellite weapons systems. It has been estimated that as many as 10,000 scientists and engineers are in-

[2] Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power,* April 1985, pp. 46-47.

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volved in this program at over a half a dozen major research and development facilities and test ranges throughout the Soviet Union. The Soviets are investigating both radio frequency and kinetic energy weapons in addition to directed-energy types of systems. These approaches are also a part of the American SDI program.

Finally, Soviet efforts are accompanied by a vigorous military space program which has given considerable priority to developing the capability for maintaining high launch rates, the use of space-based sensors and the development of a communications system needed to handle the command and control of a significant space-based weapons system of one sort or another.

One is driven to ask why the Soviets have found such satisfaction in this pursuit of strategic defenses over so long a time in distinction to the experience of the United States. The answer lies in the different appreciations of "damage limiting" in the two countries. The Soviets find that its benefits justify the costs of developing, deploying, and maintaining defenses year after year and technological generation after generation even though they are not fully effective against a dynamic threat. We Americans do not.

Soviet views on the matter derive from a body of doctrine, "military science," developed by the military services to guide their thinking and behavior in dealing with the possibilities of having to fight and prevail in war.[3] This doctrine treats the contingency of general nuclear war as well as conventional conflict. It is developed by the military for its own use in a domain where it has generally prevailed. Although it is the province of the political leadership to act on the world scene in such a way as to avoid or prevent the outbreak of war, it is the responsibility of the military to deal with it should it occur.

In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the military who may have to fight a nuclear war see real benefit in putting together an array of defenses able to limit the devastation certain to accompany one. Such a war is not sought, but the possibility that it might occur must be addressed. The array of defenses that the Soviet military has established includes a counterforce capability able to destroy U.S. missiles and aircraft before they are launched, active defenses to intercept them before they can deliver their nuclear weapons, and passive defenses able to protect at least selected portions of the population against those that do get

[3] Much has been written on Soviet military doctrine. For its particular relationship to BMD, see Garthoff, *Ballistic Missile Defense;* as well as Sidney Graybeal and Daniel Goure, "Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Objectives: Past, Present and Future," in Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center, *U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense,* Proceedings of a Symposium at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1-2, 1979 (Cambridge: Puritan Press, 1980), pp. 69-90.

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through. No single element of this array must do the whole job; it need only contribute to the mission of dealing in the best way possible with an unwanted contingency. Thus, the Soviets see strategic defenses as necessary tools to prevail in a nuclear war even though their doctrine asserts that offensive forces will play the dominant role.

Because the military institutionally bears this war-fighting responsibility, it is not so surprising that in the USSR it is able to generate its own doctrine and thereby to define with greater authority than in the United States, its needs to fulfill its assigned responsibilities. This relationship with the political leadership is not without its stresses and strains, and there are times when the responsibilities of the two intersect. These difficulties have been alleviated by the presence of very powerful champions of the military viewpoint within the political leadership.

One effect of this situation has been substantially different styles of weapons acquisition in the United States and the USSR. The Soviets have established a capacity for the development and production of weapons systems and have maintained that capacity with some steady growth over many years. Though cutbacks in specific programs have occurred, a high level of momentum has been maintained as cancelled programs have been replaced with new undertakings. The result has been a relentless acquisition of improved and new weapons systems over the years. Because the military can expect its needs to be met within the limits of an overall level of commitment that seems not to be fungible with other parts of the economy, a longer-term view of weapons acquisition becomes possible. Systems can be acquired with some confidence that future resources will be available to fix early shortcomings. In the United States, any identified shortcomings seriously reduce the likelihood of initial production and deployment. Their approach has enabled the Soviets to produce and deploy systems that appeared to be seriously flawed when first observed and to give them formidable capabilities with the passage of time. This is an approach to weapons acquisition that admirably complements Soviet views on the benefits of damage limitation.

But it is also an approach particularly well suited to pursuing a program like SDI. Indeed, this description of Soviet proclivities in pursuing defense programs is striking in suggesting that the Soviets have tremendous strengths relative to the United States in undertaking such an initiative. These strengths range from their basic commitment to strategic defense to the way in which they are willing to inch into high effectiveness.

The Soviets, however, have not endorsed SDI with enthusiasm as a challenge in which they enjoy great advantages over the United States. Quite the contrary, they have responded with clear expressions of fear and loathing. There are a number of reasons for such a response.

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Foremost among them is the fact that the Soviets see SDI as a basic challenge to their accomplishments in matching the strategic might of the United States and in projecting that image to the world at large. SDI threatens the foundations upon which those achievements were made. Once more the United States has tried to change the rules of the game so as to restore its eroding strategic position. If the Soviets are to take advantage of their momentum and steadfast pursuit of military programs, they need stable and predictable competition. SDI is a disturbing complication.

Moreover, the Soviets are most likely genuinely concerned by what they perceive to be an offensive, first-strike threat associated with SDI and its "space strike weapons." As U.S. spokesmen have been doing for years, Soviet commentators are making much of the advantages to a partially defended country of carrying out a first strike to limit the task faced by imperfect defenses. These concerns are heightened by the requirements that SDI be accompanied by deep offensive arms reductions.

SDI also poses a type of head-to-head technological competition that the Soviets have avoided in the past and seem to fear. It was probably this type of threat that led the Soviets to turn to the support of an ABM Treaty in SALT I. The Moscow ABM system did not seem to be a promising base on which to compete with U.S. ABM plans of the time. There is some justification for such Soviet concerns. In several key SDI technology areas — computer hardware and software, microelectronics, high reliability, and long-lived space components, for example — Soviet technology lags behind that of the United States significantly. Fear of humiliation on the international scene probably is a strong factor. The condescension with which we have offered to make our SDI technology available to the Soviets at an appropriate time almost surely exacerbates this concern.

Soviet programs to counter SDI are sure to come, though it is hard now to anticipate their full range. Efforts to stop it before it got really started were quick to come: Soviet propaganda characterized the initiative as provocative and destabilizing; Soviet scientists asserted that it was demonstrably infeasible; and Soviet spokesmen floated several remarkable arms control approaches all contingent upon putting an end to SDI.

Offensive countermeasures are almost certainly under study but until the actual structure of SDI is better defined, the Soviets are hard pressed to determine just which countermeasures offer greatest promise. It is most unlikely that they will conclude that they must abandon their offensive missile forces in the face of U.S. defenses. Surely Soviet countermeasures will include steps to make those weapons increasingly more difficult to counter. They will also result in the even more vigorous de-

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velopment and deployment of cruise missiles able to evade early SDI defenses.

But most intriguing here is a consideration of the impact of SDI on the Soviet counterpart of that program. As discussed above, the Soviets have a whole range of programs under way that constitute their investigation of defensive weapons "based on other physical principles." Because of the nature of the Soviet system and its weapons acquisition process, there was no need to give high profile to that program, to elicit a broad public commitment to it. Its demands for resources could be accommodated within the limits of the continuing Soviet program of developing and acquiring new weapons. So long as the effort could be conducted quietly without evoking a U.S. response, it was very much to the Soviets' advantage. The ABM Treaty had had different effects in the two countries; it has been far more stultifying in the United States, once again because of differences in the way weapons are acquired. In such circumstances, the Soviets could enjoy the opportunity to pursue research and development of advanced defensive technologies without having to race the United States.

SDI has changed that situation, but it has also given credibility to these Soviet programs, has undoubtedly increased their funding, and has lent impetus to the effort. It thus appears likely that we are going to have to deal with the implications of a Soviet strategic defensive initiative some time in the future.

Several implications emerge from this peculiar role-reversal on the matter of SDI. One has to do with arms control. Because the United States has found it necessary to give a very high profile to SDI in order to energize the pursuit of a visionary goal, and because the Soviets have taken such fright at the prospect as to make an all-out effort to shut it down quickly, the difficulties of dealing with arms control issues associated with weapons based on other physical principles have been greatly exacerbated. The SDI program as popularized and publicized has generated hopes and concerns about such new weapons as to make it impossible to ignore them. The drafters of the ABM Treaty had the prescience to make provision for their emergence but clearly had it in mind that accommodations in the treaty to assure their control could be made through technical interchanges in a body like the Standing Consultative Commission. In such circumstances low-key discussions over extended periods could lead to accommodations made virtually in private.

Such an approach is no longer possible. The steam behind SDI in the United States and the opposition to it in the USSR ensure that any accommodations must be made at the highest level. Moreover, such accommodations must be made, for the ABM Treaty cannot survive

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without them. The recent unilateral reinterpretation of the treaty by U.S. lawyers interested only in the language and not in its intent is an example of what lies ahead if efforts are made to preserve the treaty while sweeping the implications of SDI under the rug. To find accommodation acceptable to both sides will be hard.

A second implication has to do with the dangers of the Soviets continuing to pursue SDI in sustained, damage-limiting fashion long after we give up. The truly destabilizing feature about strategic defenses is their effect on perceptions of the balance if they are asymmetrical. As we have seen, the Soviets are far better equipped than we are incrementally to develop, deploy, and maintain strategic defenses. If we, through highly publicized SDI, have so energized the Soviet SDI program that over the long-haul such a threat might exist, then serious thought must be given to our dealing with it. While near-perfect defense may not be possible in robust, operational form in the foreseeable future, a system with significant damage-limiting capabilities against ballistic missiles surely is. And the effects of such a system on calculations of the strategic balance will surely be significant enough to have destabilizing effects.

Finally, and most important, there are some implications on the U.S. pursuit of SDI itself. We have now unleased SDI fever and it has profoundly affected the Soviets. It has also affected our allies who have made commitments of their own, dependent upon steadfast U.S. pursuit of SDI goals. While it might have been more desirable to get closer to a hard appraisal of feasibility and its limits through a less flamboyant research program before the SDI commitment was made, the die is now cast.

This means that the United States must act with commitment and rise above the simple, short-term argument that SDI will not achieve all that has been claimed for it. It is now essential that we understand with some confidence where SDI might lead and what the longer-term promises and dangers are. We cannot now turn it off and pretend it did not exist. Any arms control accommodation must allow for at least that much; no agreement that denied the opportunity to conduct such an investigation would be satisfying to either side and, consequently, would not be credible in the United States.

Meanwhile the SDI program is continuing and is, thus far at least, getting the kind of support that a long-haul program based in significant measure on faith requires. It has been said that SDI is the product of President Reagan's naiveté about strategic defense. Perhaps, but he does not appear to be so naive about the kind of unshakable commitment it takes to pursue the objectives of a program like SDI.

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ARMS CONTROL TREATIES: HOW DO THEY RESTRAIN SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS?*

by WILLIAM R. HARRIS

Before the Sverdlovsk incident of April 1979, involving the dissemination of lethal quantities of anthrax virus in a closed Soviet city, it was widely assumed that the Soviet Union did not enter into arms control commitments intending to act so as to defeat the object and purpose of treaty obligations. Subsequent to the Sverdlovsk incident, five presidential reports to the Congress from 1983-85 confirm that the government of the Soviet Union has defeated the essential purposes of some, but not all, restraints on both offensive and defensive arms.

The Soviet Union Has Selectively Violated Arms Control Agreements from their Inception

The most disturbing legal precedent — though not the most militarily important violation — involves the willful Soviet expansion of facilities for and stockpiling of agents for an offensive biological weapons program between the signing and the ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (1972-75), and the continuing expansion of the program (1975-1985) and evaluation of lethal agents used against human targets (1975-1983) after the entry-into-force of that treaty in 1975.[1]

Based upon the findings of these five presidential reports to the Congress, it appears that the Soviet Union has acted to defeat the object or purpose of roughly half of the post-World War II arms control commitments it has signed.[2] Instead of assuming that a contracted treaty is mutually restraining, it is prudent to ask: How effectively have arms control treaties restrained Soviet and American strategic defense progams? And how will ongoing arms control commitments influence Soviet strategic defense programs?

* The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Rand Corporation or of its research sponsors.

[1] See the October 1984 summary report of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, dated December 2, 1983; the Reports of the President on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, dated January 23, 1984, February 1, 1985, and December 23, 1985; and the President's Report, Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint, dated June 10, 1985.

[2] William R. Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms Control Verification," Prepared Statement, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, January 23, 1986, in *Congressional Record*, March 4, 1986, pp. S1951-S1954.

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Soviet Evasions of the Outer Space Treaty: AntiSatellite Weapons and their Deployment

Two treaties-in-force, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (together with its 1974 Protocol), directly influence strategic defense programs. The Space Registration Convention of 1974 assists in verifying launches of objects into outer space. It requires notice of, but does not restrict, space launches.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides that state parties "undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. . . ." The language of the treaty does not cover sub-orbital space launches, even if the payloads contain nuclear weapons.

In 1965, more than a year before the January 1967 treaty signing, the Soviet Union began experiments with SS-9 ICBMs and a modification of the SS-9 known as the SL-11 space launcher, both as fractional orbiting bombardment systems (FOBS), and as a co-orbital antisatellite system (ASAT). The terms of the Outer Space Treaty preserve Soviet options to deploy both FOBS and ASAT systems. The Soviets tested a candidate FOBS system, before improvements in south-facing warning systems were in place. And in the years before the SALT I accords of 1972, the Soviets tested a co-orbital antisatellite system for use against space objects in low earth orbit. During the Five-Year Defense Program for 1976-1980, the Soviets demonstrated this ASAT capability in an operational context. As a consequence, the Soviet Union has the world's only operational ASAT system and has demonstrated its utility against low earth-orbit targets.

Soviet negotiators carefully avoided significant limits upon their antisatellite system capabilities, both in the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty and in the negotiation of the SALT II Treaty. Article VII(2)(c) of the SALT II Treaty prohibits conversion of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers, but does not prohibit conversion of ICBM missiles or launching equipment into space launchers for ASAT or other purposes.[3] Neither the Outer Space Treaty nor SALT II purports to limit the conversion of several hundred SS-9 ICBM systems, once removed from declared ICBM launcher silos, into ASAT launcher systems, so long as these are not located at the Tyura-Tam Missile Test Range. Not surprisingly, the more than 300 SS-9 ICBMs removed from declared ICBM launchers are

[3] The Second Common Understanding of SALT II's Article VII(2) calls for the dismantling or destruction of twelve of eighteen SS-9 ICBM launcher facilities at the Tyura-Tam Missile Test Facility, and the conversion of six other SS-9 launcher sites at this facility. After some delay, the Soviets apparently complied with these provisions in 1983-84.

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"missing in action" without confirmation of their dismantling. If they have been converted into SL-11 or SL-14 space launchers for antisatellite operations in wartime, such wholesale conversions would evade but not violate the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the signed but not ratified SALT II Treaty of 1979.

Over the last two decades, the Soviets developed an operational ASAT system by evading, but not violating, arms control duties. During this same period the United States developed, but did not bring to operational capability, various ASAT systems, before the Congress mandated a suspension of ASAT testing in 1985.

Soviet Violations of the ABM Treaty of 1972

The Soviet Union has exercised less restraint in its development and deployment of ABM systems and components. It has recurringly violated important provisions of the ABM Treaty, rather than assuring that treaty obligations would permit those activities considered essential for national defense.

From the outset of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union disregarded prohibitions against concurrent testing of air defense components and components of ballistic missile and ABM systems. Though the Soviets never stopped testing despite the requirements of the ABM Treaty, it took the United States two years to complain. The Soviets paused in their testing, some seventeen days after a U.S. complaint in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) during February 1975. Not only did concurrent testing resume, but worse, the concurrent testing sufficed for the Soviets to deploy thousands of strategic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that have some ability to destroy incoming ICBMs. In June 1983 and October 1985 two Soviet officials admitted as much.[4] These Soviet admissions are particularly significant because of the number of strategic SAMs and radars deployed (about 12,000 and 10,000 respectively), and because of the siting of the large radar near Krasnoyarsk near the center of a large ellipse comprising strategic SAM sites, as illustrated in *Soviet Strategic Defense Programs.*[5]

Table 1 identifies Soviet activities in actual or potential conflict with ABM Treaty duties, according to the five presidential reports to the Congress on Soviet arms control compliance in the period 1984-85.

[4] See remarks of Senator James McClure, in *Congressional Record,* daily edition, November 1, 1985, p. S-14591.

[5] U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, *Soviet Strategic Defense Programs,* Washington, D.C., October 1985, pp. 12, 16, 18-21.

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TABLE 1

PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY

Issue/Report	GAC Report 12/02/83(1)	President 1/23/84(2)	President 2/01/85(3)	President 6/10/85(4)	President 12/23/85(5)
Deployment of large Krasnoyarsk radar, neither on periphery nor oriented outward, 1981 to present	violation	almost certainly a violation	violation	violation	violation; no corrective action has been taken
Testing and deployment of mobile FLAT TWIN ABM radar in 1975, and continuing development 1975 to present	violation	—	—	—	apparent testing and development of ABM components and highly probable concurrent testing; SA-X-12 may have some ABM capabilities
	violation	—	potential violation	—	
Concurrent testing of ABM and SAM components	—	—	highly probable violations	—	
Deliberate concealment measures	violations	—	—	—	—
ABM and ABM-related actions in preparation for defense of the national territory	—	—	potential violation	serious cause for concern	may be preparing ABM defense
Rapid reload of ABM launchers	—	—	classified rpt	—	serious cause for concern

SOURCES: (1) Unclassified summary report of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 10/10/84.
(2) Report of the President on Soviet Noncompliance, per FY84 Arms Control Act, 1/23/84.
(3) Report of the President on Soviet Noncompliance, per FY85 Defense Authorization Act, 2/01/85.
(4) Report of the President, Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint, 6/10/85.
(5) Report of the President on Soviet Noncompliance, per PL99-145, 12/23/85.

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Asymmetrical Strategic Defense Capabilities and Asymmetrical ABM Treaty Compliance

Soviet testing of ABM and surface-to-air defense components of supposed "air defense" systems occurred for more than a decade after the signing of the ABM Treaty, until deployment of the SA-10 and SA-12 strategic surface-to-air missile systems in the mid-1980s. If the Soviets now choose to comply with limits on concurrent testing, while deploying thousands of new surface-to-air interceptors and launchers, the exceptionality of this compliance with testing limits is perhaps more ominous than their noncompliance.

The development and deployment of strategic SAM systems and their radars, in conjunction with the modernization of the Moscow ABM system and the ongoing construction of an illegally sited ballistic missile tracking radar near Krasnoyarsk, are complemented by other developments indicative of preparations for defense of USSR territory. Since Soviet officials have admitted that strategic SAMs have anti-ICBM capabilities, it is imprudent to assume that the Soviets have not violated the quantitative limits of Article III, allowing only 100 ABM interceptors and their launchers.

In contrast, the United States has foregone a permitted ABM system to defend ICBM launchers, by a close Senate vote in the aftermath of the ABM Protocol of 1974. The United States has not deployed any system equivalent to the strategic surface-to-air defenses of the Soviet Union. And the much-heralded strategic defense initiative (SDI) is for the present limited to a more restrictive view of development rights (under Article V of the ABM treaty) than the State Department legal adviser and others opine to be allowable by the terms of all the treaty instruments (including Agreed Statement D).

Significance of Selective Soviet Restoration of Compliance with Other Treaties

There is no reason to expect a departure from the established pattern of Soviet disregard of those ABM treaty obligations that they would prefer to suspend. Nevertheless, in the period 1984-85, the Soviet Union has selectively restored its compliance with certain arms control provisions of the SALT II Treaty, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Helsinki Final Act. Table 2 summarizes public reports on areas of selective restoration of Soviet arms control compliance.

In some instances the Soviets have already harvested the fruits of illegal conduct, or the violations have jeopardized other gains through

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TABLE 2

PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS REGARDING SELECTIVE RESTORATION OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE

Obligation	Issue/Report	GAC Report 12/02/83	Interagency 1/23/84	Interagency 2/01/85	President 6/10/85	Interagency 12/23/85
SALT I PROTOCOL	Excess modern SLBM launchers	1976-1977 probably deliberate violations	—	currently in compliance	in compliance	—
SALT II TREATY	SS-16 mobile ICBMs at Plesetsk	probable violation	probable violation	probable violation	probable violation	probable removal of SS-16 equipment
	Backfire Bomber production	—	—	not publicly reported	—	evidence of decrease to under 30/yr. in 1984-85.
Geneva Protocol of 1925	Transfer and use of lethal chemicals	circumventions defeating object and purpose	violations	violations not continued in 1984	significant violations	no unambiguous evidence of lethal attacks in 1985
Helsinki Final Act	21-day advance notice of military exercises	violations in 1981 and 1983	violation in 1981	violation in 1981; improved notice in 1983	violation	improved notice in 1983; minimal compliance in 1984-85

SOURCES: GAC Report, 10/10/1984; President's reports to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, 1/23/1984, 2/1/1985, 6/10/1985, and 12/23/1985.

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the arms control process, or both. It is notable, nonetheless, that the Soviets have expended some effort to improve their record of noncompliance with arms control obligations. And it is striking that, even during arms control and summit talks, the Soviets have not ceased construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, nor halted deployment of surface-to-air missiles whose anti-ICBM capabilities have been admitted by Soviet officials.

The Soviet Union has proceeded with illegal deployments of strategic surface-to-air interceptor launchers and interceptors, admittedly with some anti-ICBM capabilities, and with construction of ballistic missile-tracking radars, including the illegal one near Krasnoyarsk. Even as the Soviet Union proceeds with illegal deployments, Soviet spokesmen brand "illegal" the research and testing program of the strategic defense initiative. But the Soviets were neither sufficiently impressed by U.S. defensive options before SDI, nor after the president's initiative of March 1983, to restrain their development and deployment programs in accordance with the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet record of arms control treaty compliance is unusually poor in connection with the ABM Treaty. This was so before President Reagan announced the strategic defense initiative, and it remains so, even while the Soviets have taken selective initiatives to improve their compliance with other arms control agreements.

This suggests that the Soviets are content to proceed with competing strategic defense programs, whether under the ABM Treaty as it stands or as supplemented by limits upon space-based strategic defenses. Since the Soviets have observed little in practical response to their noncompliance with arms control obligations across a broad front, and in response to ABM Treaty violations in particular, they have little incentive to discard the ABM Treaty altogether. The Soviets do have a continuing stake in minimizing the appearance of discrepancies between the ABM Treaty obligations and their conduct. If the Soviets are content to deploy strategic surface-to-air missile systems and other ABM components with secondary defensive capabilities, they may discourage a redirection of the U.S. strategic defense initiative to develop ABM systems that might be deployed in this century. Concurrently, the perception of Soviet quasi-compliance with the ABM Treaty might encourage an arms control agreement that would restrain U.S. development of space-based defensive technologies, before anything practical could be deployed on the U.S. side.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 has channeled Soviet ASAT capabilities, but has left that nation with the world's only operational antisatellite weapons system. The ABM Treaty of 1972 has been a less effective restraint, because it has not been accompanied by robust de-

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velopment of strategic defenses on the U.S. side, and because its violation has not resulted in responses that adequately strengthen incentives for treaty compliance. Whether arms control commitments actually restrain Soviet defense programs in the future may depend more upon the competitive posture of U.S. programs than upon the scope of legal obligations.

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THE TRANSATLANTIC POLITICS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE

by Manfred R. Hamm and W. Bruce Weinrod

The NATO alliance has weathered many crises in its turbulent history. Most have focused on defining the relationship between nuclear deterrence and conventional defense in a way that is militarily meaningful and politically acceptable to NATO members. Accordingly, it was not at all astonishing that the proclamation of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) met adverse reactions from the European allies: It struck at the heart of NATO strategy as it had been formalized in the late 1960s after long and arduous debate.[1]

European reactions were also shaped by political concerns about the impact of SDI on East-West relations, arms control, and about their own ability to assert political influence on and greater independence from the United States. The NATO allies had built many bridges with the Soviet bloc during the "era of détente," which would be endangered were military competition and political rivalry to intensify as a result of SDI. Given the increasing domestic opposition to both military spending and automatic solidarity with the United States in containing Soviet expansionism, SDI also threatened to erode political support for NATO and alliance with the United States.

These concerns were paralleled by frightening projections about SDI's economic and technological impact on Europe. SDI represented a formidable technological challenge, advancing the frontiers of science and technology with U.S. government funding at a speed that would find Europe trailing. Because Europe was already behind in many fields of high technology, SDI also posed the risk of widening the technological gap between the United States and Europe, hampering in the long term the competitiveness of the continent's export-dependent industries. U.S.-Soviet military competition in space might also interfere with European civilian uses of space. Unable to match the U.S. financial

[1] Paul Buteaux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981); and id., *Strategy, Doctrine and the Politics of Alliance* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983). Not all in Europe were unsympathetic to SDI. For further discussion, see Manfred Hamm and W. Bruce Weinrod, "SDI and America's Allies," Backgrounder No. 425, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

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commitment and the technological leap associated with SDI-affiliated space programs, European aspirations of catching up with the superpowers in space would be dashed forever.[2]

Thus far, the allies have managed the strategic, political, and economic challenges of SDI without serious repercussions for the cohesion of NATO. But SDI represents a long-term challenge, if only because several years of research are required before decisions can be made on full-scale deployment of missile defenses.

By providing a more solid foundation for allied security, SDI can strengthen NATO while it could also have a highly divisive effect on allied relations, dwarfing past allied confrontations. It has a bearing on military strategy and affects political and economic cooperation among the allies. Whether the Alliance will survive these challenges may depend less on SDI's objective opportunities than on the way the allies cope with its multiple ramifications.

General European Attitudes Toward SDI

The circumstances surrounding the proclamation of SDI certainly were less than propitious. European capitals were as surprised as were various quarters of the U.S. administration.[3] But this offered little consolation to the Europeans who again saw themselves confronted by a unilateral initiative with profound implications for their security. European leaders were indignant that the White House had ignored countless pledges by previous incumbents to consult with the allies in advance of major shifts in U.S. policy. The method chosen to announce SDI thus prejudiced the way it was received in Europe.

Moreover, timing of the proclamation was unfortunate from a European vantage point. It was revealed in the midst of a protracted confrontation between governments and strong public opposition forces in many European countries to the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The president's promise to render "nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" was received with disbelief. It placed governments in the difficult situation of having to convince their domestic publics that their security required these new weapons on their soil, while the U.S.

[2] Christoph Bertram, "Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance, *Daedalus,* Summer 1985, pp. 279-96, 285.; Walter Schutze, "SDI oder EUREKA?" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* November 2, 1985, B44/85, pp. 30-44, 36. The French have referred to the possibility of a "technological Yalta" unless Europe countered SDI research in the United States through joint programs, preferably within the EUREKA context.

[3] British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was reportedly informed by telephone only a few hours before President Reagan went on national television. Other NATO leaders learned of the SDI announcement from wire-service reports the following day. See: Wolfgang Schreiber, *Die Strategische Verteidigungsinitiative,* (Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Forschungssbericht 45, April 1985), p. 80.

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president was peddling a new concept to render those very arms impotent and obsolete.

To make matters worse from the European perspective, the president had justified SDI not only on strategic but on moral grounds. He had posited that deterrence by denial based on missile defenses was morally superior to deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Although the president was obviously reacting to debates within the U.S. churches that were undermining support for his strategic modernization program, a similar dispute was raging in Western Europe.[4] In fact, questioning the morality of nuclear deterrence was tantamount to calling into question the validity of the very foundation upon which European security had rested during the postwar years.

First, European leaders also doubted the technological feasibility of building defenses against ballistic missiles. At a minimum, the president's strategic vision was based on unproven technologies which would take years to develop and validate. Allied politicians thus challenged the wisdom of promulgating the dawn of a new strategic era that was decades away at best and may indeed turn out to be unrealizable. Much technological progress had been achieved since the allies had rejected missile defense on technical and financial grounds during the BMD debate of the late 1960s.[5] Given scant evidence of realistic concepts for the near term, European leaders found it difficult to understand why the president had thrust the debate over missile defense so prominently into an already heated controversy over NATO security policy toward the Soviet Union.

Second, the costs of research and eventual deployment of strategic defenses also worried the Europeans. Although they are as used to cost overruns in defense projects as are American defense planners, the sheer magnitude of the technological tasks defied even tentative cost estimates of SDI. A staggering $1 trillion, widely quoted by U.S. critics, raised serious questions whether missile defenses were affordable and reinforced other reservations about SDI.

Europeans were particularly worried about the impact of SDI on the U.S. contribution to NATO. By 1983 it had become apparent that congressional support for U.S. defense budget increases was dwindling in the face of mounting budget deficits. It was anticipated that fiscal

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[4] Manfred R. Hamm, "The European Church and Arms Control," ORBIS, Fall 1983, pp. 543-54; Günther Schmid, *Sicherheitspolitik und Friedensbewegung* (Munchen: Olzog Verlag, 1982), provides an excellent summary of the key issues in the debate on INF deployment and alternative models of security.

[5] Lawrence W. Martin, *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance,* Atlantic Paper No. 1 (Boulogne-sur-Seine: Atlantic Institute, 1969); David S. Yost, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Security,* Fall 1982, pp. 143-74; Hubertus G. Hoffmann, "A Missile Defense for Europe?" *Strategic Review,* Summer 1984, pp. 45-55.

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constraints would force the Pentagon to reorder military spending priorities and that funding of SDI programs might require cuts in conventional force programs of direct relevance to NATO. These reductions were bound to retard NATO conventional force improvement programs and impede progress on lessening reliance on nuclear weapons.

In view of the ongoing debate over burden-sharing in NATO and U.S. pressures that the allies assume greater responsibility for the mutual defense in the conventional field, Europeans were concerned that the United States would try to compensate for the funding shortfalls in U.S. programs caused by SDI. Some even feared the United States might demand financial contributions to SDI programs from the allies, and that any reluctance might prompt a political backlash which would weaken political support for NATO in the United States.

Third, there was also considerable confusion concerning the scope of the missile defenses the president had proposed. He had spoken in general terms, indeed had not even addressed specific technologies and basing modes for missile defenses. But once the term "Star Wars" was widely employed, SDI was equated with space-based defense. Since such defenses, if at all feasible, might not be responsive to some nuclear threats to Europe, allied leaders were ambivalent about their benefits to European security.[6]

The president had expressly declared the goal of finding ways to "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our soil or that of our allies."[7] But his emphasis on the ballistic missile threat evoked fears that an impenetrable shield over the United States would leave Europe vulnerable to Soviet aggression. Moreover, by creating different "zones of security" in NATO, it was feared that the strategic unity of NATO would be severed, decoupling Europe from the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Critics also argued that such a situation would undercut the political foundations of coalition defense based on the "shared risk" of the allies. This would weaken allied solidarity and deal a serious blow to the quality of NATO's deterrence strategy.

The danger that SDI might "decouple" Europe from the United States also undercut NATO's official justification of INF deployment. Opponents of NATO's 1979 dual-track decision denied that INFs would reinforce the strategic unity of the Alliance. They argued instead, that these new missiles might give the United States limited nuclear warfare options against the Soviet Union, enabling Washington to extricate itself

[6] *New York Times,* March 27, 1983, quoted in Werner Kaltefleiter, *The Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Implications for Europe* (London: European Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 10, 1984), p. 8.

[7] President Reagan's Speech on Military Spending and Defense, *New York Times,* March 24, 1983.

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from its nuclear commitment to Europe.[8] Such reasoning was grounded more in suspicions of U.S. motives than in sober strategic analysis. On the other hand, development of limited nuclear options had long been regarded as inconsistent with NATO's strategy of deterring aggression by posing an incalculable risk of uncontrollable escalation. Even if INF deployment per se would "decouple" Western Europe as critics predicted, a strategic situation in which the United States was protected against retaliation in return for NATO INF attacks on the Soviet Union might permit the U.S. to limit a nuclear conflict to Europe.

Proponents of neutralist thinking in Europe went so far as to suspect a sinister U.S. design, portraying SDI as a logical complement to INF deployment. They tried to construe a link between a casual statement by President Reagan about the feasibility of limited nuclear war, U.S. strategic planning expressed in PD-59, and the demand in the 1980 Republican party platform that the United States restore strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Accordingly, SDI was part and parcel of a U.S. master plan to acquire a first-strike war-winning capability against Moscow. Knowing that U.S. territory would be protected by an impenetrable shield, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union would become more confrontational, as U.S. leaders would be willing to take greater risks in dealing with Moscow.[9]

SDI is Destabilizing and Fuels the Arms Race

Not unlike many of their American counterparts, some Europeans contended that deployment of SDI would destabilize the strategic balance and, even worse, might precipitate nuclear war because Moscow would probably not permit the U.S. to neutralize its strategic deterrent. According to this reasoning, Moscow would probably take both offensive and defensive measures to counter the effects of SDI. An unconstrained arms race would spell the death of arms control and détente, destabilize the strategic relationship of the superpowers, and heighten the risk of war.

Although these fears were couched in terms of the strategic impact of SDI, they were expressions of general European disquiet over

[8] See Michael Forrestall, Rapporteur, Military Committee, The North Atlantic Assembly, November 1984, pp. 24-25 for an analysis of the "decoupling" issue; even Mr. Manfred Woerner, the pro-U.S. West German Defense Minister warned in 1984 of the destabilizing effects of detaching Western Europe from the U.S.; see DPA, April 9, 1984; FBIS-Western Europe, April 10, 1985, J1/3. Similar concerns were voiced by British Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe in a much publicized speech at the Royal United Services Institute in London, March 15, 1985, Press Release, British Embassy, Washington, D.C.

[9] Horst Ehmke, "Europa darf keine Zone minderer Sicherheit werden," *Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Bundestagsfraktion, Tagesdienst,* Nr. 450, March 8, 1985.

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the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the era of détente, the European allies had pursued a deliberate policy of accommodation toward Moscow and had forged closer economic ties with the Soviet bloc. But they were acutely aware that their ability to ameliorate the division of Europe depended heavily on the overall climate in superpower relations. The downturn in relations since the late 1970s had constricted European freedom of action and had pitted allied political and economic interests against broader U.S. foreign policy objectives.[10]

Since Europeans had come to view arms control as a vehicle for improving relations with Moscow, they were naturally dismayed by the gradual disintegration of the arms control process in the early 1980s. The SALT II agreement was moribund, and other negotiations were either deadlocked or showed little prospect of success. SDI also posed a mortal threat to the only strategic arms treaty still in effect. Indeed, the ABM Treaty had become the last vestige of détente, a memorial to a bygone era. Commitment to uphold the ABM Treaty thus became the acid test of genuine interest in arms control.

Fourth, although the president had pledged to conduct SDI research within the framework of the ABM Treaty, the philosophy of SDI clearly runs counter to its spirit and underlying strategic philosophy. Europeans consider the treaty as the cornerstone of détente and arms control; it is sacrosanct and any attempt to tinker with it encounters stiff resistance. The allies hold a view of security that accords military preparedness and arms control virtually equal priority in their overall security strategy. In defense of this approach, they adduce the Harmel Report, adopted by NATO in 1968, which enshrined arms control and détente as integral elements of NATO's politico-military security strategy to justify complaints about insufficient U.S. attention to arms control.

Europeans tend to view major technological breakthroughs more readily in political rather than in military terms. They are less inclined to regard them as a panacea for political problems and are sensitive to their political ramifications. Technology can only displace but not resolve political differences that are at the heart of the threat to national security. By contrast, Americans are more prone to look for "technological fixes," though they may be only temporary "hardware answers to political questions."[11] Given this general disposition, Europeans thus feel hard pressed

[10] See Manfred R. Hamm, "NATO's Role in Meeting the Soviet Challenge", in W. Bruce Weinrod, ed., *Confronting Moscow — An Agenda for the Post-Detente Era,* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985), pp. 19-26 for an analysis of U.S.-European disputes on relations with the Soviet Union.

[11] Christoph Bertram, "Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance," pp. 280-81; see also discussion of the notion of "technological fixes" in Thomas Henry Lefebre, Scientific and Technical Committee, *Report on Ballistic Missile Defense and East-West Technology Transfer,* November 1983, p. 10.

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to share the president's vision of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete through development of missile defenses. Their instinctive rejection of penultimate technical measures against nuclear weapons leads them to emphasize the risk that SDI may fuel the arms race as both sides try to develop countermeasures to preserve their nuclear deterrents. The ABM treaty, Europeans believe, prevents at least a defensive arms race and serves also as a brake on the offensive arms race by relieving extant fears of sudden changes in the strategic environment. They are therefore less alarmed by Soviet violations of arms control obligations than the U.S.

But Europeans also uphold the ABM Treaty because it remains a symbol of the U.S. nuclear guarantee of their security. MAD is neither a strategy nor an immutable fact of life in the nuclear age. It rests on a carefully crafted balance of terror with the ABM Treaty at its center, and arms talks are the tools with which to maintain and adapt that precarious balance to the destabilizing effects of technological progress. Europeans tend to believe their security depends on the continued credibility of MAD, although they would like to see nuclear arsenals reduced to the lowest possible levels consistent with MAD requirements. The extent of their commitment to MAD became clear when ardent opponents of INF deployment, like the West German Social Democrats, attacked SDI on grounds of eroding nuclear deterrence.[12]

The ABM Treaty if observed by Moscow also guarantees the viability of the British and French nuclear forces.[13] The conclusion of this treaty went a long way in allaying European fears that the United States might compromise European security interest in the SALT-I negotiations. Both nuclear forces assure Europeans of their ability to trigger nuclear war and hedge any lingering doubts about U.S. willingness to employ nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. Indeed, concern about U.S. reliability in the face of her growing vulnerability to Soviet retaliation was France's rationale for developing a nuclear deterrent and explains why

[12] Horst Ehmke, *Das Parlament,* Nr. 17, April 27, 1985, p. 1-2; and Statement by the SPD Parliamentary Group presented at the Atlantikbrücke Conference, Dallas, Tx., April, 1985.

[13] For a good review of the impact of missile defenses on British and French nuclear forces see Lawrence Freedman, "The Small Nuclear Power," in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense,* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 251-74. British nuclear strategy is based on the "Moscow Criterion," meaning that British nuclear forces must be capable of threatening the Soviet capital. By contrast, French nuclear doctrine refers to Soviet cities, implying a broader target set. Therefore, from a strategic point of view, the ABM Treaty was less central to the British nuclear deterrent than to the French, because it permitted Moscow to retain and modernize its Moscow BMD system. Both countries are currently modernizing their nuclear forces with MIRVed missiles of greater accuracy and carrying penaids. Once completed in the early 1990s both countries will have increased the combined total of missile warheads from 162 to nearly 1,500. Consequently, the British and French forces will remain useful for their limited deterrent goals for the indefinite future even if BMD systems were deployed on a grand scale. It is ironic that the French have openly expressed confidence in the future of their nuclear deterrent despite their opposition to SDI, whereas Britain, whose decision on buying Trident-II may hang in the balance as a result of SDI, has been much more supportive of U.S. policy.

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she cherishes her nuclear autonomy in the face of overwhelming inferiority relative to the superpowers.[14]

Concerns about the implications of SDI for the future of the small European nuclear forces are thus shared by most European countries for reasons of security and status. Without a role in nuclear deterrence, Europe surely would be relegated to a second-rank status in world affairs. Moreover, those who aspire to greater European independence from the United States see in the small independent nuclear forces the nucleus for a European nuclear deterrent. But even a fully integrated European nuclear force can undergird Europe's greater political autonomy and security only if the ABM Treaty continues to ensure the vulnerability of the superpowers. Accordingly, the introduction of strategic defense would not only deal a severe blow to Europe's ability to trigger nuclear escalation of conventional conflicts but would erect a perhaps insurmountable barrier to greater European autonomy in the context of a unified Western Europe.

Finally, regardless of their substantive reservations about SDI, Europeans have been reluctant to back it because they are uncertain of its future. Initially, they wondered aloud whether the president himself was firmly committed to SDI or had advanced the idea only to gain leverage in future arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, deployment decisions would be made by some future president whose attitudes toward SDI were as uncertain as the concept's technical feasibility, costs, and impact on arms control. European skepticism was not unfounded, given the strong immediate opposition to SDI within the United States and the record of sudden policy reversals by U.S. presidents. President Carter's change of mind on deploying the so-called "neutron bomb" in Europe remains a vivid memory and cautions the Europeans against early endorsement of U.S. policy initiatives.

These general concerns have shaped Europe's response to the proclamation of SDI. Differing geostrategic interests of the United States and the allies constitute a fundamental and recurring cause for friction within NATO, especially when Washington assumes its role as leader of the Alliance and attempts to formulate strategic or political responses to changes in the security environment of the allies. Most certainly, a reopening of the debate on strategic defense had long been overdue. Even critics of SDI concede that much. The 1985 Strategic Survey of the IISS, a frequent critic of U.S. strategic policy, stated:

> While the SDI raises a host of potential problems for the West, it can be argued that the President's call for a strategic reassessment was long overdue. No matter

[14] David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe," Part 1: Capabilities and Doctrine, *Adelphi Papers*, No. 194, (London: IISS, Winter 1984/85)

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what eventually becomes of the SDI and its related issues, the time had come to review the basic strategic assumptions which have shaped the postwar world.[15]

Because the strategic problems that prompted the United States to initiate the SDI will not go away, NATO must adapt its strategic thinking and planning to the gradual introduction of ballistic missile defenses. Otherwise, its strategy and force posture may become irrelevant to the threat the Alliance was founded to deter. Such adjustments will be painful and require consummate political skill on both sides of the Atlantic. Regrettably, this was not adequately recognized when SDI was launched.

The Transatlantic Politics of SDI

Initial European reactions to SDI were muted, partially because the INF debate dominated the political agenda in Europe and occupied the attention of both governments and publics. Its announcement was buried in a speech on U.S. defense policy meant to rally support for the president's military buildup that had run into serious difficulty in Congress. Indeed, many Europeans did not take SDI seriously, preferring to think it had slipped through the political process and would soon be relegated to the collection of extemporaneous remarks.

Only after Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger affirmed a few days later that President Reagan had indeed been serious and intended to seek a "defense that is thoroughly reliable and total" did SDI capture media attention in Europe.[16]

Putting SDI into Perspective

The most immediate governmental reaction came from West Germany, where the Bonn government expressed cautious surprise. It sought to play down the significance of the announcement by stressing that SDI was no more than a long-term research program embodying "dreams for the future." Defense Minister Manfred Woerner reportedly welcomed the idea but argued at great length that it would have no imminent impact on NATO strategy and, therefore, would not obviate INF missile deployment. A government spokesman observed that it was self-evident that the new ideas must consider Europe's legitimate defense interests.[17]

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[15] *Strategic Survey,* 1984-85 (London: IISS, 1985), p. 17.

[16] Cited in Baltimore *Sun,* March 28, 1983.

[17] Woerner Welcomes Reagan's Defense Initiative, DPA, March 24, 1983; *FBIS-Western Europe,* March 25, 1983, J1; Spokesman on Reagan Speech, DPA, March 24, 1983, *FBIS,* March 25, 1983, J4/5.

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Generally speaking, European governments took great pains to de-emphasize the importance of the announcement. Even the opposition parties reserved judgment and did not get sidetracked from their campaign against NATO missile deployment. With few exceptions, they ignored the brazen attack on SDI by Soviet leader Yuri Andropov and kept their powder dry for subsequent indictments of SDI.

Despite their circumspect response, European leaders were dismayed that the president had framed SDI as a U.S. initiative rather than a prudent and necessary response to extensive Soviet BMD programs.[18] The fact that the president omitted references to Soviet BMD research bolstered Moscow's case against SDI, fostered the impression that Washington was initiating a new round in the arms race, and contributed to pervasive misconceptions about the purpose and scope of SDI. To correct this regrettable omission and strengthen their case, allied leaders legitimized SDI research by reference to the Soviet effort. The report issued by the North Atlantic Assembly in October 1983 observed:

> However undesirable some feel an American ballistic missile defense would be, the presence of solely a Soviet system would still be less desirable. . . . Thus while the Soviet missile defense research continues, there is every reason for American research to continue also.[19]

By touting SDI as a prudent hedge against the rapid advances of the Soviet BMD program, the allies acknowledged the threat to their security posed by the emerging asymmetrical vulnerability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This vulnerability extends far beyond the eroding survivability of the U.S. landbased missiles — and its repercussions for strategic deterrence — to the European theater where the NATO defense assets are exposed to Soviet attacks by nuclear and nonnuclear means. Although this may have been tolerable as long as the Alliance commanded a wide lead in theater nuclear capabilities, its loss of escalation dominance has increased the threat of Soviet pre-emption.

The allies not only defused Soviet criticism of the SDI but laid the foundation for subsequent arguments that the U.S. research program must not automatically lead to deployment of strategic defenses, thereby establishing a clear distinction between research and deployment. Subsequently European leaders used this distinction to get Washington to accept Soviet demands for talks to "prevent the militarization of space" in the context of the so-called umbrella talks at Geneva. Moreover, the

[18] David S. Yost, "European Anxieties about Ballistic Missile Defense," *Washington Quarterly*, Fall 1984, pp. 112-29, 115; from the very beginning of the SDI debate, every West German government statement carried references to the Soviet program.

[19] Michael Feazel, "Europeans Support U.S. Space-Based Systems," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, October 24, 1983, p. 59.

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distinction has been employed by allied leaders in defense of the ABM Treaty.

Clarifying SDI and Defusing Allied Opposition

European concerns about SDI were actually heightened by U.S. officials in the course of explaining the program to the allies. The scope of SDI, unclear from the outset, became murky as time went on. The president had discussed only destroying ballistic missiles so as to transcend deterrence based on the threat of retaliation. Such a change implied that SDI would not be responsive to most threats to European security. Moreover, it embodied a profound change in the nature of deterrence with far-reaching security ramifications for Europe. A radical diminution of the role of nuclear weapons in deterring Soviet aggression in Europe raised the unpalatable risk of conventional warfare in Europe.[20]

In their attempts to reassure the allies, U.S. officials confused more than they clarified.[21] Europeans were subjected to a veritable cacophony of often contradictory explanations and justifications which did little to raise their confidence that their interests would be adequately considered. They also received conflicting signals from the domestic debate in the United States, where the administration spoke with many voices in order to rally support for the program and disarm its critics.

The president's strategic vision was supplanted by a variety of more limited objectives, largely to counter charges that the ambitious goal of a leak-proof defense was unattainable even in the distant future. Hence, officials downplayed the goal of transcending deterrence and, instead, stressed ways that missile defenses could strengthen deterrence by denying Moscow emerging warfighting options. SDI would close the ominous "window of vulnerability" that the administration had been unable to close through its offensive nuclear buildup.

Reinforcing deterrence through limited defenses was far more salable in Europe than an entirely new strategic concept and helped to assuage allied concerns. Repeated U.S. pledges not to neglect defenses against threats to allied security also had a calming effect. The most significant allied worry was focused on tactical and short-range nuclear

[20] Christoph Bertram, "Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance," p. 291; Pierre Lelouche, "SDI and the Atlantic Alliance," *SAIS Review*, Summer/Fall 1985, pp. 67-80, p. 73-74. He described SDI as a manifestation of "American faith in technology" and "nuclear isolationism" corresponding to the "trend of conventionalizing NATO strategy."

[21] The administration had to convey different messages to different audiences, but the bureaucracy was also taken by surprise and had not yet developed a coherent rationale for SDI. Indeed, the military services were initially unenthusiastic about SDI.

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missiles that do not travel on a ballistic missile trajectory and can strike their targets within minutes after launch.[22]

Only two days after his speech, the president had issued a National Security Directive (NSSD 85) establishing the long-term goal of eliminating the nuclear threat. A second presidential directive called on the Department of Defense to report by October 1983 on the technical feasibility of strategic defenses and their strategic policy implications. In June, the DOD convened study groups to examine these questions and draw up the requested reports.

The Defensive Technology Study, known also as the Fletcher Commission after its chairman Dr. James Fletcher, concluded that emerging technologies are sufficiently promising to justify a major long-term development program, and proposed a detailed research roadmap to establish options for a defensive strategy. The commission, suggesting that some components of a defense system should be optimized for space deployment, projected that a fully integrated, multilayered defensive system might be deployable after the turn of the century.[23]

The Future Security Strategy Study (FSSS), chaired by Fred Hoffman, concluded that even less than perfect defenses "can reinforce or help maintain deterrence by denying the Soviets confidence in their ability to achieve the strategic objectives of their contemplated attacks." It would thus reduce incentives for a pre-emptive strike, diminish pressures to expand offensive nuclear arsenals, and facilitate future arms control efforts. The FSSS advocated a flexible R&D program designed to offer early options for the deployment of intermediate systems.

Most significantly from the European view, the Hoffman Report investigated the utility of defenses against non-ballistic missile threats and endorsed anti-tactical missile (ATM) options particularly relevant to countering Soviet nuclear threats to the European allies:

> Deployment of an anti-tactical missile (ATM) system is an intermediate option that might be available relatively early. The system might combine some advanced midcourse and terminal components . . . with a terminal underlay. The advanced components, though developed initially in an ATM mode, might later play a role in continental United States (CONUS) defense. Such an option addresses the pressing military need to protect allied forces as well as our own in theaters of operations, from either nonnuclear or nuclear attack. It would directly benefit our allies as well as ourselves.[24]

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[22] Fred Hiatt, "Weinberger to Reassure Allies on Star Wars Plan," *Washington Post,* December 2, 1983; Walter Pincus, " 'Star Wars' Defense Widened-Europe Shielded Too," *Washington Post,* April 25, 1984.

[23] Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Study Urges Exploiting of Technologies," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* October 24, 1983, p. 50-57; id., "Panel Urges Defense Technologies," *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* October 17, 1983.

[24] Fred S. Hoffman, *Ballistic Missile Defenses and National Security,* Summary Report, prepared for the Future Security Strategy Study, October 1983, p. 2-3.

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The Hoffman Report specifically addressed allied defense requirements in a future defense-dominant strategic environment. It also articulated an explicit linkage between elements of the U.S. research program and Europe, integrating allied needs into a phased U.S. approach to strategic defense. It thus obliterated the artificial dichotomy underpinning the belief that U.S. strategic defenses and European security are mutually exclusive. Most important, it openly acknowledged the political desirability and technical feasibility of early defense deployment in Europe to reassure the allies that strategic defenses will not detract from their security.

Both reports also resolved the apparent contradiction between the goals of reinforcing and transcending nuclear deterrence. Critics had repeatedly charged that both objectives were irreconcilable. This somewhat accounts for the initial confusion stirred by U.S. efforts to sell SDI at home and in Europe by invoking different strategic rationales. Indeed, the Hoffman Report became the blueprint for joint allied studies of missile defense options for Europe and helped allay some of the most divisive allied misconceptions about SDI.

Building Allied Support: A Three-Pronged Campaign

Allied interest in SDI intensified after the president had issued a third directive (PD 119) on January 6, 1984. It ordered the "initiation of a focused program to demonstrate the technical feasibility of enhancing deterrence and thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war through greater reliance on a defensive strategic capability."[25] This subtle shift in the public description of the purpose of the research program reflected more than a clarification of the intimate link between reinforcing and transcending strategic nuclear deterrence. It indicated a deliberate effort on the part of the United States to seek active political endorsement of SDI by the European allies. Such endorsement was deemed critical for a number of related reasons.

First, after the breakdown of the Geneva arms control talks in November 1983, Washington was anxious to maintain a unified Western front against the Soviet Union. Moscow had suffered not only a tremendous loss of prestige, but its image in Western Europe had been seriously damaged. A public dispute among the allies over SDI might partially exonerate Moscow of responsibility for the collapse of the arms negotiations and rekindle the European peace movement.

[25] Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth, "Star Wars: Down to Earth, or Gleam in the Sky?" *Washington Quarterly*, Fall 1984, pp. 1-6; Keith B. Payne, *Why SDI?* (Fairfax: National Institute for Public Policy, 1985), p. 2-3.

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Second, a prolonged dispute over SDI risked allied cooperation on other common defense issues. NATO was in the midst of examining ways to improve its conventional defenses in order to raise the nuclear threshold. Strengthening NATO's conventional capabilities had been a long-standing goal of successive U.S. administrations. The dispute over INF deployment had catalyzed European interest in lessening reliance on the "early use" of nuclear weapons. It was in the U.S. interest to nurture this fickle support, and being sensitive to European concerns about SDI was considered instrumental to keep SDI from interfering at the political level with NATO deliberations on conventional defense measures. Moreover, steps to diminish the prominence of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine would reinforce the strategic thrust of the SDI.

Third, the White House realized that European endorsement would be useful in gaining congressional funding of the program. As long as SDI was perceived as a divisive issue undermining alliance solidarity, SDI opponents in Congress would try to invoke allied reservations in order to defeat the program. Therefore, European acquiescence was important for the political survival of SDI, but open support of SDI research was clearly more desirable.

The United States launched a three-pronged campaign to consolidate allied endorsement of SDI research. First, it initiated broad and intensive consultations with the allies, which were in part mandated by Congress.[26] These involved an extensive exchange of information on the SDI program. The United States also tried to bolster efforts by European governments to present SDI as a response to Soviet BMD programs by making public several reports detailing the scope of Moscow's effort in the field. Discovery of the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia in mid-1983 also furnished concrete and irrefutable evidence of Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty. This lent further credence to the U.S. claim that it was mandatory to deny Moscow a unilateral advantage in strategic defense. In light of their commitment to the ABM Treaty, European supporters of SDI argued with considerable success that U.S. SDI research would enforce Soviet adherence to the treaty by dispelling Soviet hopes of reaping a decisive benefit by abandoning it.

Second, the administration acceded to allied demands to agree to explicit parameters for the SDI program. This "SDI-Charter" was formulated at a meeting between President Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Camp David in December 1984 and has since

[26] The briefing conducted by a team of DOD officials at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Cesme, Turkey, was the first comprehensive presentation of SDI to the allies. Since then, briefings have multiplied. For a brief description of U.S.-allied consultation see Department of Defense, Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985, Appendix A.

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become the "credo" of the European allies. It consists of four general principles:

(1) The U.S. and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments.
(2) The U.S. will negotiate with Moscow prior to deploying SDI.
(3) The overall aim is to enhance not to undermine deterrence.
(4) East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. This will be the purpose of resumed U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control.[27]

The four-point statement essentially codified in writing earlier allied agreement on the scope and purpose of the program. Its importance was mainly symbolic from the U.S. point of view. European allies, however, have treated it as a yardstick by which to judge U.S. SDI policy and have used it to reassure the anti-SDI portion of their publics that SDI would not automatically lead to deployment of ballistic missile defenses.

The "SDI-Charter" was put to its first test in October 1985 when then-National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane suggested in an interview on national television that testing and development of SDI technologies based on "other physical principles" were permitted under the terms of the ABM Treaty. His offer of a more permissive interpretation of the treaty prompted allied protests. The allies charged Washington with breach-of-faith, referring expressly to the U.S. commitment to conduct SDI research consistent with the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. They reminded the White House that the president had reaffirmed the restrictive interpretation in the Camp David statement that constituted the basis of their support of SDI research.[28]

While it is arguable that the Camp David formula addressed only the issue of deployment, nonetheless Europe's reaction underscores both its unshakable commitment to the ABM Treaty and the tenacity with which the allies hold the U.S. to its pledge to observe that treaty's codification in the "SDI Charter." To forestall a divisive row on the eve of the Geneva summit, George Shultz flew to Brussels to reassure the allies of U.S. commitment to observe the restrictive interpretation of the treaty. But the political impact of this close call was unmistakable at the fall meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly only a few days later. Although a resolution endorsing SDI research passed by a wide margin, it drew an unprecedented number of dissenting votes. The dissenters persisted despite fervent pleas for support and forceful affirmation by U.S. represen-

[27] John Goschko, "Thatcher, Reagan Agree on 'Star Wars' Talks," *Washington Post,* December 23, 1985.

[28] Don Oberdorfer, "White House Revises Interpretation of the ABM Treaty," *Washington Post,* October 22, 1985; id.: "ABM Reinterpretation: A Quick Study," *Washington Post,* October 22, 1985; John J. Fialka, "Reagan Team Justifies Star Wars Plan By Claiming Loophole in ABM Treaty," *Wall Street Journal,* October 22, 1985.

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tatives that Washington would continue to observe its restrictive interpretation as a matter of policy.[29]

But the "SDI-Charter" agreed on at Camp David did not satisfy all NATO allies. While the French followed a characteristic independent line,[30] even West Germany stipulated additional conditions before being willing to support the U.S. position on SDI. Initially, the FRG had welcomed SDI for its promise of a more stable strategic future and for its positive effect on arms control. Officials even endorsed the program on moral grounds. But, beginning in early 1984, they grew more ambivalent. Evidence of this apparent change of heart was first provided by Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, who expressed fears about SDI's destabilizing impact and its effect on allied security just as the United States made a major pitch for SDI at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Cesme, Turkey.[31] Although Woerner was reportedly reprimanded by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Mr. Kohl's own support for SDI became more equivocal and conditional.

At the Internationale Wehrkunde Tagung in Munich in February 1985, Mr. Kohl stipulated goals for the arms control talks about to begin at Geneva that deviated from the objectives formulated by the allies in December 1984. He called for a ban on anti-satellite weapons and suggested that a conclusive judgment on missile defense would be precipitate. But he then enumerated West German considerations in evaluating SDI:

- A space defense system must consider the strategic unity of the alliance region.
- Strategic instabilities, especially during the transitional phase must be avoided.
- The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative requires, because of its far-reaching consequences specifically for our security, very close and confidential consultations, bilaterally and within the alliance.

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[29] Richard G. O'Lone, "North Atlantic Assembly Declares Support for SDI After Lobbying Effort," *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* October 21, 1985, pp. 18-21; Don Oberdorfer and David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Changes ABM Pact View-'Restrictive Interpretation' Set for Space Defense Plan," *Washington Post,* October 15, 1985.

[30] The French remained calm on SDI until after the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in Cesme, Turkey, in April 1984. Shortly thereafter, French Defense Minister Charles Hernu took the offensive and likened the impact of SDI on the ABM treaty to a return to the strategic jungle. On June 12, 1984, the French presented a resolution to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in Geneva that called for a ban on ASAT weapons, deployment of ground-, air-, and space-based directed energy weapons and a commitment of both superpowers to extend their 1975 agreement guaranteeing on a reciprocal basis the inviolability of their reconnaissance satellites to third parties. President Mitterrand called SDI "surarmement" (over-armament) in December 1984 and Charles Hernu raised eyebrows of delegates at the Wehrkunde Tagung in Munich in February 1985 when he referred to SDI as a plot of the superpowers to establish a global condominium. Despite repeated rejection of SDI and its decision to sponsor EUREKA in April 1985, President Mitterrand did not succumb to Soviet pressures to endorse a Soviet condemnation of SDI in a final communiqué of the Paris visit of Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1985.

[31] " 'Star Wars' Hit By West German," *Washington Times,* April 10, 1985; William Drozdiak, "Bonn Worried by U.S. Plans for Space Weapons," *Washington Post,* April 11, 1984; James M. Markham, "Bonn is Worried by U.S. Arms Research," *New York Times,* April 14, 1984.

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- Regardless of whether research will lead to the desired goals, SDI will generate an enormous push in technology innovation. Highly industrialized countries like the Federal Republic and the other European allies must not be decoupled technologically.
- The American space program is a strong incentive for Soviet willingness to negotiate.[32]

In his speech during the parliamentary debate on SDI in April 1985, Chancellor Kohl pressed these considerations as specific demands of the Federal government. He added two strategic demands: NATO's strategy of flexible response must remain valid as long as no other more promising methods have been developed to prevent war; and no new threats below the nuclear threshold must result from SDI. Though Mr. Kohl expressed his satisfaction that all these demands had been considered by the United States, the tone of his presentation was much more assertive. Indeed, he had revised the "SDI-Charter" that until then had provided the foundation of the U.S.-allied consensus on SDI.[33]

The third avenue pursued by the White House to gain allied support of SDI was a response to Helmut Kohl's concerns regarding the technological and industrial impact of SDI. Indeed, Washington tried to use economic incentives and European fears of being left behind technologically to overcome the political and strategic reservations of the allies. At the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Luxemburg in March 1985, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger formally presented an invitation to all allies to participate in SDI research. While the offer was welcomed, Mr. Weinberger's demand that the allies declare themselves within sixty days evoked consternation and charges of blackmail.[34]

Owing to French objections, the May Bonn economic summit did not endorse SDI as the United States had hoped. While security issues are not formally within the purview of the economic summit, the Williamsburg meeting in 1983 had endorsed INF deployment, thus establishing a precedent for future pronouncements on security policy. Moreover, a statement on technological cooperation on SDI would have

[32] Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Nordatlantischen Bündnis, Beitrag von Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl auf der XXII Internationalen Wehrkunde-Begegnung in München am 9. Februar 1985, *Bulletin,* (Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Nr. 19/S. 157, 14. Februar 1985).

[33] Erklärung der Bundesregierung zur Strategischen Verteidigungsinitative (SDI) des Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staates von Amerika, *Bulletin,* (Bonn: Presse- und Informations- amt der Bundesregierung, Nr. 40/S. 341, 19. April 1985).

[34] Michael Weisskopf, "Allies May Join Research-Weinberger Extends 'Star Wars' Invitation," *Washington Post,* March 27, 1985; Rupert Cornwell, "Extreme Caution in Bonn over Star Wars," *Financial Times,* March 28, 1985, p. 3; William Drozdiak, "NATO Allies' Concerns Fuel Debate on 'Star Wars'-High Tech Hopes, Strategic Qualms Clash," *Washington Post,* April 4, 1985. Don Oberdorfer, "Allies Fear Political Impact of 'Star Wars'-Weinberger's 60-Day Partnership 'Ultimatum' Irritates Some Europeans," *Washington Post,* April 1, 1985.

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been far more germane to the summit than the INF endorsement at Williamsburg had been.[35]

The U.S. attempt at Luxemburg to coopt the Europeans by offering the commercial incentives attending cooperation in exchange for allied political support has been largely unsuccessful. France and six other NATO allies, including Canada, have rejected the invitation, although this does not preclude participation of private industry from these countries. Their rejection of formal cooperation on SDI research dealt a major blow to U.S. endeavors to secure broad political endorsement of SDI. An agreement on cooperation has been reached only with the United Kingdom, and only after arduous negotiations.[36]

West Germany has moved closer to a formal agreement with the United States for SDI research. A delegation of thirty government and industry officials headed by Chancellor Kohl's trusted foreign policy adviser, Mr. Horst Teltschick, toured the United States in September 1985. Mr. Teltschick reportedly favors entering a government-level framework agreement to safeguard the interests of German industry and boost its chances of receiving a share of contracts commensurate with its technical ability to contribute to SDI research. Perhaps more important, however, he contends that only by joining SDI research would Germany be positioned to exercise "control" over the future direction of SDI research.[37]

But the coalition has been deeply divided on the issue. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the former chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the junior but powerful coalition partner, has been a steadfast opponent of any formal West German declaration that it will collaborate in SDI.[38] He is a staunch advocate of a joint European response to SDI and has been an outspoken champion of EUREKA, the European Research Coordination Agency sponsored by France as a civilian European alternative to a U.S.-dominated SDI program. But his commitment to EUREKA may be less genuine than it appears, perhaps no more than a smokescreen concealing his fundamental rejection of SDI.

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[35] William Drozdiak, "Mitterrand Rejects SDI Research Role," *Washington Post,* May 5, 1985; Michael Dobbs, "Mitterrand Isolated at Bonn Summit but Likely to Win Points at Home," *Washington Post,* May 5, 1985.

[36] William Drozdiak, "U.S., Britain Agree on SDI Participation," *Washington Post,* October 31, 1985; Karen DeYoung, "British, American Officials Hit Snags on SDI Cooperation," Washington Post, October 26, 1985. The U.K. had initially demanded a contract volume commitment of about $1.5 billion and very liberal technology-sharing arrangements in exchange for signing on to SDI. Apparently, they did not receive any contractual commitment as part of the agreement.

[37] "Bonner SDI-Erkundigungen in Washington," *Neue Züricher Zeitung,* September 5, 1985.

[38] The depth of disagreement between Mr. Kohl and Mr. Genscher was first revealed publicly in an article in *Der Spiegel,* May 13, 1985; *FBIS-Western Europe,* May 16, 1985, J2. But Mr. Kohl does not even have his own troops in line. Minister for Research and Technology Dr. Heinz Riesenhuber, a Christian Democrat, openly criticized the civilian spin-off rationale for German interest in SDI, stating: "SDI cannot be justified in terms of civilian research policies." *Financial Times,* September 10, 1985.

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Mr. Genscher's deep commitment to détente and arms control is well known. He regards SDI as an undesirable obstacle to arms control and is anxious not to upset his delicate balancing act between Moscow and Washington. The Soviet warning that joining SDI would make the FRG an accomplice of the U.S. in "militarizing space" and breaking the ABM Treaty appears to have convinced him that the political costs associated with support of SDI outweigh the commercial gains and political leverage West Germany might gain by formally participating.[39]

On balance, U.S. attempts to forge a political consensus on SDI research within the Alliance have met with mixed success. On the one hand, the White House has kept SDI from becoming a divisive issue that may play into the hands of Moscow's propagandists. This is a formidable accomplishment, considering the resentment and utter confusion its proclamation engendered in transatlantic relations. But none of the allies has yet embraced SDI on the basis of its strategic merits and their tenuous support may derive from these tactical considerations:

- They are not interested for domestic political reasons in raising the visibility of SDI by opposing the program and starting a major U.S.-European controversy;
- They do not want to antagonize the U.S. president for fear of causing a political backlash in the United States. As long as the program remains limited to research, the allies are likely to give it low-key support; and
- They do not want to weaken the U.S. bargaining position at the Geneva arms talks.

Because the allies do not share the strategic rationale of SDI, they view it mainly as a bargaining chip to attain deep cuts in nuclear forces. Therefore, their continued support of SDI depends either on eventual European acceptance of the strategic rationale of SDI or on progress at the arms talks in Geneva.[40]

On the other hand, the United States paid a hefty price for allied unity and conditional support of SDI. The administration accepted allied political conditions of little immediate consequence for SDI during the research phase, but these same conditions may constrain the program in the future, especially as a deployment decision nears. These concessions for the sake of "short-term political unity" may have impressed Europeans as a "veto" over SDI. This perception could cause highly divisive disputes with the allies down the road. Their reactions to U.S. attempts to rein-

[39] The Soviets issued two separate warnings about West German involvement in SDI research. The first came from the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Mr. Vladimir Semenov, at a press conference of the DKP in Bonn, "Soviet Envoy Warns Against Participation in SDI," *ZDF Television Network,* October 30, 1985; *FBIS-Western Europe,* October 31, 1985, J1. The second warning was issued by Mr. Vadim Zagladin, deputy head of the Central Committee's international affairs section and one of Moscow's key spokesmen on East-West issues.

[40] For a full discussion of issues related to SDI and NATO, see Manfred Hamm and W. Bruce Weinrod, "SDI and America's Allies," *Backgrounder* No. 425, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

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terpret the meaning of the ABM Treaty provide a glimpse of the conflicts that may lie ahead.

The European Stake in Strategic Defense

In light of European anxieties over strategic defense, it has been deemed almost axiomatic that SDI jeopardizes European security and, ultimately, may effect the collapse of NATO. Proponents of this view adduce strategic and political reasons to support their gloomy assessment of the impact of SDI on the Alliance. But they rarely question what will happen to NATO and European security if current military trends at the strategic and theater levels go unchecked. They not only consider the present security situation of NATO satisfactory, that is, stable, they also assert that it will not materially change in the future provided strategic defenses are not introduced.[41]

Both assumptions are unsupported by empirical evidence. First, changes in the strategic environment have raised serious questions about the continued relevance of the doctrine of "flexible response," which provides the military and political foundation of NATO's security policy. Indeed, the controversy surrounding the INF deployment in Europe demonstrated vividly the extent to which "flexible response" and its corollary, "extended deterrence," have been called into question by the loss of U.S. strategic superiority and the deterioration of the theater nuclear balance in Europe.[42]

Second, NATO's military situation in Europe continues to worsen as a result of the massive Soviet military buildup of both nuclear and conventional weapons in the theater. The debate in NATO on raising the nuclear threshold should be welcomed, but it may be largely academic, given the apparent lack of political will to marshal the resources necessary to support a viable conventional defense of Europe. And unless NATO takes dramatic measures to improve conventional capabilities, it may even be unable to exercise its theoretical nuclear option — according to a recent study by NATO's highest military council.[43]

[41] This judgment is contradicted by official NATO and Warsaw Pact force comparisons, the last published by NATO Information Service, (Brussels, December 1984); see also Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Soviet Technological Parity in Europe Undermines NATO's Flexible Response Strategy," *Armed Forces Journal International,* May 1984, pp. 80-95.

[42] Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," in Kenneth A. Myers, ed., *NATO: The Next Thirty Years,* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 3-20.

[43] Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense and Stability," ORBIS, Summer 1984, pp. 215-26; Manfred R. Hamm, "Strategic Defense: Implications for the Western Alliance," in W. Bruce Weinrod, ed., *Assessing Strategic Defense-Six Roundtable Discussions,* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985), pp. 153-58; W. Bruce Weinrod and Manfred R. Hamm, "Strategic Defense and America's Allies," (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, *Backgrounder No. 425,* April 16, 1985).

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Strategic defenses can assist NATO in meeting these challenges to its ability to deter Soviet aggression: first, even limited defenses of U.S. landbased missiles will bolster deterrence by reducing Soviet confidence in its ability to achieve its attack objectives. The growing Soviet first-strike potential against U.S. landbased assets is progressively eroding the physical ability of the United States to implement its nuclear pledge to Europe.

Second, U.S. vulnerability to retaliation also stretches the political credibility of the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe. If SDI can reduce the vulnerability of the United States, this will enhance perceived U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons under NATO doctrine in response to a Soviet attack. This will bolster allied political solidarity and heightens the risk of nuclear escalation for Soviet planners in any attack scenario involving Europe.

Third, "flexible response" depends critically on timely and sufficient reinforcements of people and materiel from the United States. Given the total vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attacks, even surgical strikes against selected targets in the United States would create havoc, rendering organization of a massive logistical reinforcement effort impossible. Even limited defenses of key installations in the United States will boost NATO's conventional staying power.

Fourth, Soviet leaders are acutely aware that the Soviet Union cannot win a prolonged war against the West because of the inferior Soviet industrial base. Large-scale defense of U.S. industrial assets will thus deny Moscow any reasonable prospect of winning a quick victory or defeating the United States and enhance deterrence.

Fifth, a relatively undamaged U.S. industrial base will also be able to resupply NATO after limited weapons stockpiles have been exhausted. Currently, NATO defenses could well falter for lack of supplies, thus calling into question the wisdom of resisting Soviet attack in the first place.

For these reasons, even the defense of the United States alone will have a positive effect on NATO security. It would enhance deterrence and bolster NATO's ability to resist aggression in the event of its failure. Even if the Soviet Union acquired strategic defenses, the benefits accruing to NATO from a strategic defense of the U.S. would not diminish significantly.

Europeans are obviously worried that strategic defenses shielding both superpowers against nuclear attack will undermine deterrence and raise the risk of conflicts below the strategic nuclear level. Admittedly, the United States would not be able to threaten the Soviet Union to the present extent, but this must be balanced by three other considerations:

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First, it is highly speculative whether Washington will, under present circumstances, stand by its nuclear commitment to Europe when put to a test. Reducing the vulnerability of the United States to Soviet retaliation should be in the European interest. While Washington might not be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, increasing the probability of a U.S. response might well offset this decline in U.S. strategic capability.

Second, a more robust conventional posture will raise the nuclear threshold and thwart Soviet planning for blitzkrieg-type offensive operations calculated to effect the rapid collapse of NATO defenses and to sustain the use of tactical nuclear weapons. If confronted with a hopeless military situation, the European governments would probably oppose the use of nuclear weapons. Even if they were willing to authorize nuclear use, the United States might refrain from escalating the conflict to the strategic nuclear level and could desist from using nuclear weapons on the battlefield.

Third, while the benefits and drawbacks of an introduction of strategic defenses are commonly discussed in terms of U.S. first-use, Moscow may force the issue. The Soviet program is sufficiently advanced to enable Moscow to field a limited BMD system with short warning. Lack of U.S. readiness to match Soviet BMD deployment may actually encourage the Soviets to capitalize on their lead in traditional BMD technology. Even a primitive Soviet BMD system to protect military assets could deny NATO limited nuclear options and diminish the viability of "flexible response" that INF deployment was meant to preserve.

But strategic defenses need not be limited to the territory of both superpowers. Indeed, technologies exist or are being developed that could provide a considerable degree of protection against non-ballistic nuclear threats to Europe. Some experts even suggest that development of anti-tactical missile (ATM) defenses to destroy short- and medium-range missiles may in fact be easier and become available sooner than effective space-based defenses.[44]

Once deployed, space-based boost-phase and mid-course intercept mechanisms can ease the strain on groundbased defenses, providing coverage against ballistic missiles, like the SS-11 or modern SS-20s.[45] The latter dispenses its RVs on a lofted trajectory, carrying them high up into space where they are very vulnerable to intercept. But even

[44] David S. Sorenson, "Ballistic Missile Defense for Europe," *Comparative Strategy,* Summer 1985, pp. 159-78; David S. Yost, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance"; Strategic Defense Organization, *SDI Progress Report,* Submitted to the Secretary of Defense, June 1985, discusses the Homing Overlay Experiment and the Airborne Optical Adjunct.

[45] Gregory H. Conavan, *Theater Applications of Strategic Defense Concepts,* (Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-85-2117, June 4, 1985.

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without a space overlay, deployment of ATM defenses in Europe offers a number of advantages:

First, such defenses deny Moscow the ability to achieve a decisive military advantage through pre-emptive attacks against key NATO installations. The Soviets have a dazzling array of nuclear missiles trained on Europe.[46] During the INF deployment debate, opponents often invoked the vulnerability of these systems to pre-emptive Soviet attacks to evoke fears of inviting nuclear attacks and precipitating nuclear war. ATM defenses would lessen the danger of Soviet pre-emption and increase public acceptance of INF deployment.

Second, reducing Soviet confidence in successful pre-emption of NATO's nuclear capabilities will enhance deterrence even if Moscow deployed comparable ATM systems. Pre-emptive attacks play a critical role in any Soviet attack on NATO, and denying Moscow that ability will greatly constrain her military options against the Alliance.

Third, ATM defenses may also deter limited Soviet attacks on NATO. Any such attacks require the neutralization of NATO's nuclear arsenal in the theater. ATM defenses will reduce Soviet assurance of being able to destroy alliance nuclear assets. In the absence of such assurance, the risks associated with attack will outweigh possible benefits. ATM defenses can thus deny Moscow confidence in political war termination. It is hard to imagine that Moscow would launch a premeditated attack under such conditions.

Fourth, NATO airfields, munitions depots, C^3I installations, and port facilities, as well as other fixed and mobile assets, are also vulnerable to a broad array of Soviet nuclear and non-nuclear attack options. Defending these critical assets in the theater will improve NATO's ability to organize and sustain a viable conventional defense. ATM defenses will thus strengthen NATO's ability to deter attack and mount a conventional defense.

Uwe Nerlich described the trends NATO confronts in Europe as follows:

> NATO faces an enduring challenge that is driven by a sustained effort to deny progressively the goals of its strategy . . . In current circumstances, the Soviet Union seems to be increasing her leverage in all areas:
> - the disruption of forward defense;
> - the interdiction of reinforcements;
> - the exploitation of critical vulnerabilities;

[46] Department of Defense, *Soviet Strategic Defense Programs* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1985); for an evaluation of the implications of Soviet strategic defense programs for NATO, see David S. Yost, "Sowjetische Bemühungen um Rakettenabwehr und ihre möglichen Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheit der NATO-Länder, *Europa Archiv*, September 25, 1985, pp. 541-50.

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- the availability of coercive escalatory nuclear options.[47]

With the exception of the last, ATM defenses can reduce the impact of Soviet offensive force acquisitions even if Moscow decides to deploy its own ATM systems. Because current trends are already beginning to deprive NATO of coercive escalatory nuclear options, insofar as NATO has lost "escalation dominance" in the theater, introducing ATM defenses may not alter the overall range of escalatory options available to NATO. Theoretically, ATM defenses, even if they were matched by Soviet ATM systems, would still have a positive impact on NATO's posture: they would constrain Soviet nuclear options against NATO and thereby partially negate the military and political advantages that have accrued to Moscow as a consequence of its nuclear and conventional buildup in Europe.

But ATM defenses could not only raise the nuclear threshold in Europe and enhance deterrence, they might also limit damage to civilian populations should war erupt. Western Europe is densely populated, especially on NATO's central front. Most military installations can be found close to civilian population centers. The range of modern ATM systems would enable ATM batteries deployed primarily for defense of military assets to protect people and limit damage to urban areas. Given the overlapping coverage of civilian and military targets, the costs of expanding ATM defenses into area defenses could well be minimal.

At a more general level, SDI research and deployment also fosters arms control by progressively reducing the political and military significance of nuclear weapons. Once Moscow realizes that it cannot stop SDI by manipulating the arms control process and/or by taking offensive countermeasures to overwhelm U.S. defenses with sufficient confidence, denial of viable warfighting options will likely convince Moscow that its security interests can well be served by joining the U.S. in establishing a framework governing the transition to a defense-dominant strategic relationship. Under such conditions, arms reductions would be a real possibility.[48] This should appeal to European interests.

Opponents of nuclear weapons instinctively tend to reject most of these apparent benefits of strategic and tactical defenses, for they presuppose a willingness to actually engage in warfighting on the European continent. Europeans have traditionally stressed nuclear deterrence and only reluctantly acceded to U.S. demands in the 1960s to field minimal conventional forces in order to at least avoid immediate recourse to nuclear weapons. Therefore, the debate on the merits and drawbacks of

[47] Uwe Nerlich, "Missile Defences: Strategic and Tactical," *Survival,* May/June 1985, pp. 119-127.

[48] For further discussion of these issues, see W. Bruce Weinrod, "Strategic Defense: Implications for Arms Negotiations," *Backgrounder* No. 463, The Heritage Foundation, October 16, 1985.

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strategic defense touches on the very heart of the nuclear dilemma which NATO has been able to manage in the past but will never be able to resolve. Whether NATO is able to cope with the strategic challenges of the future by simply trying to muddle through is highly uncertain. Perhaps the limited range of unpalatable choices available to the European allies will lead them to the realization that strategic defense offers the prospect of a reasonable and politically defensible alternative to seeing their security erode by virtue of strategic developments over which they can exercise little, if any control.

Conclusion

With few notable exceptions,[49] European attitudes toward SDI range from ambivalence and skepticism to outright hostility. It is perfectly legitimate for the allies to question the technological feasibility of SDI and its ramifications for their security. It is equally legitimate for them to challenge Washington's answers. Indeed, most questions and concerns about SDI cannot be answered confidently at this stage of the research program.

But European ambivalence toward SDI reaches far beyond questions of its technical feasibility and strategic impact on their security. It reflects an unflinching commitment to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as a desirable foundation of security, though the assumptions supporting MAD have been eroded by technological developments or disproved by Soviet strategic force programs and doctrinal pronouncements.

While the United States has won highly conditional allied endorsement of SDI research, the allies do not share the strategic philosophy upon which SDI rests. They prefer the certainty of a concept of security that has served them well, although they realize that cannot be maintained into the indefinite future. Allied commitment to the ABM Treaty is as much an expression of their preference for political solutions and distrust of technological fixes to security questions as it is a manifestation of their growing despair about their inability to uphold the existing security framework in the face of mounting evidence of its fragile foundations.

[49] Concern over the increasing accuracy of Soviet short-range missiles armed with conventional and nuclear warheads has fostered interest in a European-based missile defense system. While private groups began in early 1985 to build support for a "European Defense Initiative," the concept has recently been endorsed publicly by West German Defense Minister Dr. Manfred Wörner in "A Missile Defense for NATO Europe," *Strategic Review,* Winter 1986, pp. 13-19; see also Dennis M. Gormley, "A New Dimension to Soviet Theater Strategy," ORBIS, Fall 1985; and John J. Fialka, "NATO Planners See Menace in Accuracy of Soviet Short-Range Ballistic Missiles," *Wall Street Journal,* February 26, 1986.

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The price of European acquiescence to SDI has been high and may have mortgaged the future of the SDI program. For the time being, a divisive row over SDI has been avoided because both the United States and the allies recognized that this would only play into Moscow's hands. But a consensus founded on expediency may well unravel as Europeans become exasperated with the slow progress of the arms talks, and as SDI research approaches deployment decisions.

The Alliance now faces a prolonged period of uncertainty whose outcome will be determined largely by the skills of its political leaders. This crisis resembles the protracted conflict in the 1960s that preceded the alliance's adoption of the doctrine of "flexible response." But the Alliance now has to grope for answers to its security dilemma in a vastly different political and strategic environment that makes it more vulnerable to Soviet pressures. SDI can offer significant benefits to NATO, provided the European allies can muster the political courage to divorce themselves from a strategic concept that cannot guarantee their security indefinitely. The United States must lead the Alliance toward a new consensus on military strategy. The path to consensus lies first through close consultation and not through unilateral imposition that could have disastrous political consequences.

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SUPERPOWER PROBLEMS IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT*

by William E. Griffith

Public discourse about Soviet alliance problems remains deliberately veiled and esoteric. It is increasingly important, however, that recent Soviet problems with East Germany and Hungary be deciphered and analyzed for their causes and implications. By contrast, analyzing Western alliance problems is complicated by a surfeit of information. This article concentrates on Soviet problems in Eastern Europe and treats Western alliance problems more briefly, and primarily for comparative purposes. The involvement of the German question in both alliances highlights this interrelated treatment. The problems of both sides will be assessed for their effects on the Soviet-American correlation of forces.

Over the last five years, Moscow's problems with Eastern Europe have centered first on Poland and later on East Germany and Hungary. In both instances until recently, the old, divided, and hesitant Soviet leadership allowed its problems to drift uncontained longer than in the past, but it eventually limited, albeit not erased, the damage to its interests. Although how Gorbachev will handle these problems was still unclear at the end of 1985, there were some indications that he would try to follow a middle course between crackdown and major relaxation of Soviet control.

The 1981 declaration of martial law in Poland restored overall control by Moscow's ally General Jaruzelski. Solidarity's influence has declined. But Polish civil society, including not only its historic leading element the intelligentsia but also the workers and peasants, has emancipated itself from total Communist control — a unique development in post-1945 Eastern Europe. Poland is still ruled by a Bonapartist military junta, to the chagrin of the remaining Communist party. Moscow accepts

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this state of affairs, *faute de mieux,* but no more than that. The Catholic Church is more powerful than ever. The economic situation, although a little better, is bleak and will likely remain so over the next decade. Worst of all from the Soviet viewpoint, Poland has become an unreliable zone of communications to Soviet forces in East Germany, and the Polish military is less reliable in case of war. Therefore, Moscow cannot and does not any longer consider Poland its most important East European ally.[1]

What Happened In East Germany and Hungary

By the early 1980s Moscow considered East Germany its most important ally in Eastern Europe. But in 1984, Moscow decided that East Germany, as well as Hungary, was unacceptably opposing Soviet foreign policy toward the West, especially toward Washington and Bonn.[2] The East German and Hungarian ruling elites thought that the intensification of Soviet-American tension in general, and over INF deployment in particular, was contrary to their interests, because it threatened to limit their trade and technological ties with West Germany. Such a limitation threatened the consumerism and nationalist symbolism with which they had stabilized their rule. A minority of the Soviet elite also opposed extreme Soviet anti-West German polities, because they favored détente, technological modernization, and importation of Western technology. Prior to the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), Moscow had tolerated these differences because it also needed trade with and technology from the West and because it hoped to use East Germany to influence West Germany against the deployment.[3]

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[1] Timothy Garton Ash, "Poland: the Uses of Adversity," *New York Review of Books,* June 27, 1985, pp. 5-10; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Poland: Reflections on Solidarity," *Yale Review,* Spring 1985, pp. 346-52; Richard Spielman, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of General Wojtiech Jaruzelski," *World Politics,* July 1985, pp. 562-85; ok. [Bogdan Osadczuk], "Polen fünf Jahre nach der Revolte von Danzig," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* August 17, 1985; Jörg Bremer from Warsaw, "'Konspira'—aus dem Untergrund," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* August 7, 1985. Ash, Brzezinski, and Osadczuk are more optimistic concerning resistance to Jaruzelski; Speilman and Bremer more pessimistic.

[2] Ronald D. Asmus, "The Dialectics of Détente and Discord: The Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn Triangle," ORBIS, Winter 1985. See also Wolfgang Seiffert, "Die Natur des Konflikts zwischen der SED-Führung und Moskau," *Deutschland Archiv,* 10/1984 and "Noch einmal, Die Natur des Konflikts. . . ," ibid., 2/1985; Bernard von Plate, "Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen und Ost-West Konflikt," Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 1984; Fred Oldenburg, "Werden Moskaus Schatten länger?", *Deutschland Archiv,* 8/1984; Rudolf Tökés, "Hungarian Reform Imperatives," *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1984; pp. 1-23; translated excerpts of documents in Ronald D. Asmus, ed., "East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of a Dispute," Radio Free Europe Research, August 25, 1984, reprinted, with introduction, as *RFE Occasional Paper* no. 1 (Munich: RFE, 1985.) For general background, see Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, ed., *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale, 1984) and Vojtech Mastny, ed., *Soviet/East European Survey, 1983-1984* (Durham, N.C.: Duke, 1985), a compilation of RFE and RL analyses.

[3] Michael J. Sodaro, "In the Shadow of the Missiles: East German and Soviet Perceptions of West German Foreign Policy" (George Washington University, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, unpublished manuscript.); Wolfgang Seiffert in *Deutschland Archiv,* 10/1984, p. 1051.

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But when INF deployment began in December 1983, Moscow decided to force East Germany, Hungary, and the other East European states to evidence greater hostility to Bonn as well as to Washington. However, East German General Secretary Erich Honecker declared that his country did not "enjoy" Soviet counter-INF deployment and proclaimed a "community of responsibility" between East and West Germany that war should never again begin on German soil — clear indications of his opposition to the hardening of Soviet policy toward Bonn.[4] Authoritative Hungarian articles clearly stated the whole range of differences with Moscow. That some were reprinted in East Germany signalled, not for the first time in modern history, that a German-Hungarian axis had formed.

These heterodox Hungarian views, authoritatively enunciated by Máytás Szürös, international secretary of the Hungarian central committee included: as much concern for national as for international (i.e., pro-Soviet) priorities and, therefore, compromises on this among Socialist states (i.e., no Soviet leading role); a greater role for small countries in both parts of Europe in preserving détente, despite Reagan's policy of differentiation in Eastern Europe; and "creative" reinterpretation of the "general laws of socialism" (i.e., not rigidly following the Soviet model).[5]

An important pseudonymous, but (in retrospect) not entirely authoritative, Soviet article, presumably by O.B. Rakhmanin, first deputy chief of the Soviet central committee department dealing with ruling Communist parties, soon denounced Szürös's views, further revealing the seriousness of the differences. He declared that not détente but imperialist export of counterrevolution and intervention in the socialist states was the present main trend, and that criticism of the general laws of socialism, defining the role of small states outside the class struggle and a larger role for private enterprise (i.e., as in Hungary), was the work of nationalists and rightist opportunists. The article also denounced the Chinese and the Eurocommunists. However, there were a few signs then, and more later, that this hard-line attitude was not shared by all or even by the majority of the Soviet leadership.[6]

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[4] Honecker to the 7th SED CC Plenum, *Neues Deutschland,* November 26, 27, 1983.

[5] Mátyás Szürös, "The Reciprocal Effect of National and International Interest in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," *Társadalmi Szemle,* January 1984, pp. 13-21 ("based on a lecture delivered at the Political College of the HSWP, Oct. 20-21, 1983"). Partial translations: *The New Hungarian Quarterly,* Spring 1984 ("went to press on 22nd November 1983. Final proofs read on Feb. 13th 1984") and FBIS / EEU / Jan. 30, 1984. The most detailed analysis of these Hungarian-Soviet differences is provided in Gyula Jözsa, "Ungarn im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik aus Prag und Moskau," Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, nos. 5 and 6, January 1985.

[6] O. V. Borisov (pseud. for O. B. Rakhmanin, first deputy chief, CPSU CC Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers Parties), "Soyuz novogo typa," *Voprosy istorii KPSS,* no. 4, April 1984 (passed for the press, March 5, 1984). The article would have been even more authoritative if it had appeared under Rakhmanin's name in *Pravda* or *Kommunist.* Rakhmanin has long polemicized against the Chinese under this pseudonym in *Problemy dalnego vostoka.*

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During 1984, the West German government arranged about 1.5 billion Deutsche marks in loans to East Germany, in return for which East Germany somewhat eased its restrictions on travel to West Germany. The majority of the top Soviet ruling elite increasingly thought that West German influence in Eastern Europe was dangerously growing. The Soviet propaganda campaign against West Germany, and implicitly against East Germany's ties with it, was intensified.[7] In early September 1984, remarkably late in the game,[8] Honecker finally felt compelled to "postpone" his scheduled visit to the Federal Republic.

Thereafter East Berlin at first attacked Bonn's policies and demanded that Bonn give it de jure, not only de facto, diplomatic recognition, but Moscow was not satisfied.[9] Soon after Gorbachev assumed power, a June 1985 article, which at first seemed the more authoritative because it was published in *Pravda* and was pseudonymous, repeated and intensified the April 1984 Soviet attacks against Hungary, with respect to the "general laws of socialism" and the incorrect claim of Eastern and Western small countries to play a special role in furthering détente. The article called for "stricter criteria of allied solidarity and coordination" vis-à-vis the West instead of "nationalism," and denounced as "revisionist" the weakening of centralized planning, propagating market competition, and increasing the size of the private sector (i.e., any extension of Hungarian economic reforms).[10] The article did not denounce the Chinese, with whom Gorbachev was trying to improve relations, thereby demonstrating more clearly that it was directed against Eastern Europe.

However, two articles published shortly thereafter in the equally authoritative *Kommunist* took the opposite position. Moreover, their authors, Kádár's deputy Nemeth and Professor Bogomolov, the relatively reformist director of the Soviet institute concerned with the East European economies, gave their articles at least as much authority as the

[7] Notably by L. Bezymensky in *Pravda,* July 27, 1984.

[8] See the symposium in *IPW Berichte* (East Berlin), June 1984.

[9] *Neues Deutschland,* September 25, 1984, p. 1; Mátyás Szűrös, "Active Foreign Policy in the Service of Peace," *New Hungarian Quarterly,* Winter 1984 ("went to press on August 3rd 1984. Last proofs read on 29 October 1984," i.e., it was sent to press before Honecker's "postponement" of his visit to West Germany but the proofs were read and returned after that occurred, thus demonstrating that Budapest's public views were not wholly silenced thereafter); Szűrös, Radio Budapest, February 11, 1985 (FBIS/EEU/February 13, 1984/p. F 1-22); and *Rudé právo,* April 4, 1985 (FBIS/EEU/April 10, 1985/pp. F 3-9); Romanov and Kádár, *Pravda,* March 27, 1985 (FBIS/SOV/March 28, 1985/pp. F 11-18); Kuznetsov and Losonczi in Radio Budapest, April 3, 1985 (FBIS/EEU/April 5, 1985/pp. F 2-11.)

[10] O. Vladimirov (pseud., probably for O. B. Rakhmanin), "Voprosy teorii. Vedushchiy faktor mirovogo revolutsionnogo protsessa," *Pravda,* June 21, 1985, pp. 3-4 (FBIS/SOV/June 24, 1984/pp. BB 2-7.) For excellent analyses, see Elizabeth Teague in Radio Liberty Research, June 24, 1985; A. O. [Andreas Oplatka] from Moscow in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* July 6, 1985; and Christian Meier, "Zum Kurs der sowjetischen Osteuropa-Politik: Ein Grundsatzartikel von 'O. Wladimirow' in der *Prawda* vom 21. Juni 1985," Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, September 5, 1985. Rakhmanin has used several pseudonyms; see Gilbert Rozman, "Moscow's China-watchers in the post-Mao Era," *China Quarterly,* June 1983, pp. 215-41, at p. 223.

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one in *Pravda*. (Indeed, since all three appeared almost simultaneously, the publication of their sharply differing views was presumably approved by Gorbachev.)

Nemeth wrote frankly about Hungary's economic problems, caused by "international tension" (i.e., the collapse of superpower détente). He stressed that Hungary will intensify democratization and trade with the capitalist countries and will concentrate on high technology. Bogomolov supported economic decentralization and, while declaring that the "national and state interests of all socialist countries coincide in the main," added that neither "supranational organs," including the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), nor "administrative constraints" but only "voluntary cooperation based on equality" among socialist states can make this true. Then in late August 1985, Nikolai Shishlin, a senior consultant to the party secretariat, set forth a somewhat middle position between *Pravda* and *Kommunist*. That long excerpts of his article were immediately reprinted in the Hungarian party daily showed Budapest's pleasure.[11] Differing views on other subjects also appeared in the Soviet press.[12]

Before the November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit, signs indicated continuing debate on this range of issues, and a possible move by Gorbachev away from the hard-line position expressed by Rakhmanin. The most important of these, another article by Szürös, broke new ground with respect to West European and Third World Communist parties and repeated, albeit more moderately, his earlier theses on Soviet-East European relations.

Szürös produced the most striking analysis of Eurocommunism that has appeared in any pro-Soviet country. He pointed out that the "technical-scientific revolution" was producing a new social stratum of more technologically skilled persons and therefore "the conventional base of the communist movement" was decreasing. This development, he went on, had made "some of the most influential" West European Communist parties (i.e., the PCI) proclaim "a program of socialism which varies very much from real existing socialism" (i.e., the Soviet model), and which "considers a socialist society an ultimate aim to be reached at the end of a long, gradual historical development," while their "direct aim" is to

[11] Karoly Nemeth, "In the Interests of Building Developed Socialist Society," *Kommunist*, no. 10, July 1985 (signed to press, July 3, 1985); Acad. O. Bogomolov, "Coordination of Economic Interests and Policy under Socialism," ibid., pp. 82-93; N. Shishlin, "Pervaya Zapoved'," *Novoe Vremya*, August 23, 1985. For analysis, see Elizabeth Teague, "Kommunist Speaks Out In Defense of East Europe's National Interests," Radio Liberty Research, August 12, 1985 and "Debate over East Europe's National Interests Continues," ibid., August 29, 1985.

[12] See Aleksander Bovin, Radio Budapest, August 31, 1985 and a round-table discussion among Zagladin, Yakovlev and Burlatskiy in *Literurnaya Gazeta*, June 26, 1985 (FBIS/SOV/July 1, 1985/pp. CC 13-21).

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"restrict the power of monopolies." In the Third World, he continued, Communist parties have given priority to a popular front policy (i.e., to a policy not recently favored by Moscow, which has placed more emphasis on Communist party control).[13]

Szűrös's article appeared shortly after a Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, after Honecker visited Budapest, and after Kádár visited London. Kádár and Mrs. Thatcher had stressed the role of "small and medium-sized nations," a theme Kádár again emphasized in an article shortly thereafter. Honecker reaffirmed the need for dialogue between the two German states,[14] and excerpts from the Szűrös article on relations among socialist states were rapidly reprinted in *Neues Deutschland,* just as his articles had been in 1984.[15] And while Prague, as before, stressed Communist unity and even criticized Egon Bahr's "equidistance" views (i.e., Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union), an influential colleague of Rakhmanin, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, took a line close to Shishlin's. By the end of 1985, the debate in Moscow was clearly continuing, with uncertain result; Budapest and East Berlin, encouraged by the Geneva summit, resumed their former ideological positions and cultivated their relations with Bonn.[16]

Why It Happened

Germans and Hungarians, both former imperial peoples, have historically been anti-Russian and more recently anti-Soviet, as their 1953 and 1956 risings demonstrated. The Soviet crushing of these insurrections made both Germans and Hungarians unlikely to rise again within the same generation; but their historic contempt for Slavs, intensified by the characteristic contempt of developed peoples for the semi-developed imperial states that rule them, made them susceptible to their leaders' appeals, however veiled, to their nationalisms. Moreover, unlike Czechoslovakia, neither East Germany nor Hungary has long or firm democratic traditions: Hungary compromised in 1867 with its Austrian occupiers,

[13] Mátyás Szűrös, "Some Topical Questions of the International Communist Movement," *Népszabadság,* November 2, 1985. Translation: MTI Weekly Bulletin, November 20, 1985; large excerpts in *Budapester Rundschau,* November 18, 1985; excerpts re Soviet-East European Affairs only in *Neues Deutschland,* November 6, 1985. Szűrös also published a book of his articles and radio speeches in 1985. Analysis: Koppany in Radio Free Europe Research, November 12, 1985 (only covers the part on Eastern Europe.)

[14] János Kádár, "Hungary and Peace in Europe," *New Hungarian Quarterly,* Winter 1985; Honecker in *Neues Deutschland,* November 2-3, 1985.

[15] Cf. Koppany in RFE Research, November 12, 1985.

[16] Moscow Television, November 26, 1985; Jaroslav Čmejrek, "Pozice socialistické internacionály a sociálně demokratických stran v otázkách míru, mezinárodní bezpečnosti a odzbrojení," *Mezinárodni vztahy,* 1985-6, pp. 64-68, at p. 67; and for continuing debate between *Pravda and Rabochy klass i sovremennyi mir,* see W. A. [Werner Adam] from Moscow in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* December 17, 1985.

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and the Prussian tradition of subordination to authoritarian state power is still alive in East Germany.

Hungarian and East German ruling elites have recently featured their historic heritages in order to help stabilize their power. They profited from the bloodletting and flight abroad which the risings of 1953 and 1956 brought. Only after they repressed dissent and cut off contacts with the West did they begin to make carefully limited and controlled concessions to consumerism and nationalism and to resume economic and political relations with the West. For consumerism, they needed hard currency earnings to import Western consumer goods and Western technology so they could export to Western as well as to Eastern markets. They feared that they would destabilize their power by withdrawing their concessions, as Ulbricht did in 1953 and Gerö in 1956, and they were increasingly confident that they could use their concessions to strengthen, not weaken, their power. They gradually so extended these concessions that when the Soviets attempted to limit their ties with West Germany, they felt their own stability jeopardized and, therefore, opposed Moscow's attempt. Because Moscow compromised on the issue, Honecker and Kádár could feel that they had so far successfully managed to avoid the danger forecast in Alexis de Tocqueville's law of revolution: "Only consummate statecraft can enable a king to save his throne when after a long spell of oppressive rule he sets to improving the lot of his subjects."[17]

Moreover, there has been a gradual growth in Eastern (and Western) Europe of a desire for "Europeanization": to resume the common European heritage. This is particularly strong in Central Europe, of which East Germany and Hungary as well as West Germany are historic parts. In Western Europe, especially in West Germany and earlier in Gaullist France, this is often coupled with an aversion to both superpowers, a kind of "Euro-Gaullism," or at least, as in the Social Democratic party (SPD), the desire for more West European autonomy from the United States within the NATO framework, plus closer ties with Eastern Europe. (The Christian Democratic Union [CDU] and the Free Democratic party [FDP] favor the former but give less priority to the latter.) In Eastern Europe, though primarily directed against Soviet control, "Europeanization" spawns hopes that all of Europe can reassert itself.[18]

[17] From his classic *The Old Regime and the Revolution.*

[18] Peter Bender, *Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters* (Berlin: Severin & Siedler, 1981); Peter Glotz, *Manifest für eine neue Europäische Linke* (Berlin: Siedler, 1985); Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, "Prozess der Integration nur in Reformschritten," *Vorwärts,* July 20, 1985; Horst Ehmke, "Uberlegungen zur Selbstbehauptung Europas. Eine Diskussionspapier," *Politik Aktuelle Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands,* no. 1, January 1984, modified and adopted by the SPD as "Konzept für die Selbstbehauptung Europas," April 11, 1985. For analysis, see Erich Hauser, "Die Entdeckung Europas durch die SPD," *Frankfurter Rundschau,* October 1, 1985. I have profited greatly from an important unpublished paper by Professor Lily Gardner Feldman of Tufts University.

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Economics

Western and especially West German trade with Eastern Europe has recently flourished, particularly with those states which are developed, have instituted economic reforms, or have traditional ties with the West, above all with West Germany. Hungary qualifies on all three counts, and East Germany on the first and last and partially on the second. Because only West Germany has political as well as economic reasons to increase its trade with Eastern Europe, especially with East Germany and to a lesser extent with Hungary, its trade with both is far greater than that of other West European states.[19]

East Germany profits greatly from its unique ties with West Germany and through it with the European Community, whose founding treaty made East Germany its silent member by giving it freedom from tariffs for its exports to West Germany and, therefore, throughout the Community. East Berlin probably receives about $2 billion annually from Bonn in various forms: West German interest-free credit, the "swing," which amounts to a hard currency reserve; annual payments for traffic transit to and from West Berlin; compulsory, profitable West German travellers' currency exchanges; remittances to East Germans from West German friends and relatives; and the large sums paid by Bonn for improved travel and for release of political prisoners.

East German and Hungarian trade with West Germany have risen rapidly. West Germany is the single source of modern technology for both, including non-embargoed high technology such as microelectronics. Because the Soviet Union profits from this as well, USSR economic officials tend to oppose its limitation. Moreover, neither East Germany nor Hungary wants to withdraw from CMEA or decisively to shift its trade away from the Soviet Union, for each needs Soviet energy supplies, raw materials, and markets.

Like other East European countries, East Germany and Hungary borrowed heavily in the West to overcome declining economic growth, higher petroleum prices, and increasing technological backwardness. But by the late 1970s, the global recession and the lessening sales of their low-quality goods in hard-currency markets produced an overall, synchronized East European economic crisis. However, East Germany and Hungary managed to overcome it better and faster than the other East

[19] Office of Technology Assessment, *Technology and East-West Trade* (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1980), p. 175; Angela E. Stent, *Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union. A Challenge for the Cohesiveness of the Western Alliance* (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 1983), p. 46; Testimony of Robert D. Hormats before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, November 12, 1980; "Presse Information: Neues Erdgasprojekt aus der Sowjetunion unter Dach und Fach" (Essen: Ruhrgas AG, November 20, 1981); Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, *Der Deutsche Osthandel* (Bonn, December 1982), pp. 16, 26.

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European countries, not the least because of their trade ties with the Federal Republic.[20]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, whose subsidies to Eastern Europe had risen greatly, decided to cut them back in view of its own growing economic problems.[21] It also reduced its energy sales to Eastern Europe and raised energy prices, in part to sell more energy for hard currency.[22] Moscow also used CMEA to try to reduce fuel consumption, increase product quality, emphasize high technology, integrate the East European economies more closely with that of the Soviet Union, and have them export more of their better quality goods to the USSR rather than to the West. Hungary and East Germany opposed any such move, for it would lower their exports to the West (and their hard currency earnings), and increase their technological gap with the West, thus condemning them to technological backwardness and to reduced consumerism at home in order to satisfy Soviet economic desires.

Soviet Policy

These 1984 events occurred when the Soviet leadership was old, weak, divided, and indecisive. The USSR also lagged in high technology compared to the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, and it therefore needed East (and West) German technology all the more. The Soviet attitude toward East German and Hungarian economic relations with West Germany is structurally paradoxical. On the one hand, Moscow needs the technology that East Germany and Hungary get from West Germany, and it wants to use East Germany to influence West German politics. On the other hand, it exaggeratedly fears the revival of German power and the increased political influence of West Germany on East Germany growing from East German economic dependence on West Germany. Moscow's fears are understandable: one of the principal Soviet gains from World War II and principal preconditions for its superpower status is the continuing division of Germany, Soviet hegemony over its

[20] Deborah Duff Milenkovitch, "Political Economy of Socialism in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1985, pp. 79-84, at p. 79; Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "Economic Adjustment in Eastern Europe," RAND R-3146-AF, September 1984; Charles Gati, "The Soviet Empire: Alive but Not Well," *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1985, pp. 73-86; J. F. Brown and A. Ross Johnson, "Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe," RAND R-3189-AF, December 1984; A. Ross Johnson, "Eastern Europe's Time of Troubles," RAND P-7072, February 1985.

[21] David E. Albright, "On Eastern Europe: Security Implications for the USSR," *Parameters,* Summer 1984, p. 24.

[22] John M. Kramer, "Soviet-CMEA Energy Ties," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1985, pp. 32-47; Vladimir Sobell, *The Red Market. Industrial Cooperation and Specialization in COMECON* (Aldershot, England: Gower House, 1984); *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* June 12, 1984; *New York Times,* June 11, 1984; *Washington Post,* June 16, 1984; B. V. Flow, "German Democratic Republic," RFE Research, October 19, 1984; "Indebtedness to West Seen Benefitting Inter-German Trade," DIW Wochenbericht, March 10, 1983, pp. 132-39.

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eastern part, and, therefore, the decisive lowering, to Soviet advantage, of German power in Europe and the world. Moscow therefore wants to contain the rise of German power as a part of its maximum aim to effect in Europe: a group of "fragmented, submissive states."[23]

Immediately after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, experts and propagandists in Moscow and in East Berlin differed on policy toward West Germany. Some experts in both capitals maintained that West Germany remained loyal to the United States and that Moscow and East Berlin should oppose détente and rearm further. Others in both capitals maintained that Bonn differed seriously with Washington about the Soviet Union, East Germany, and INF deployment, and that therefore East-West, East Berlin-Bonn, and Moscow-Bonn détente should be maintained. A second difference concerned foreign economic relations. Should the Soviet Union, East Germany, and CMEA practice autarky or should they encourage trade and economic cooperation with the West, i.e., mostly with West Germany? Third, differences were hinted at concerning security policy, including SS-20 and INF deployment. Should the Soviet Union and East Germany arm more or should they turn toward arms control? These differences also intermeshed with differences about the Federal Republic. At first the Soviet experts were less strongly opposed to West Germany than were the East Germans, but by 1984 the contrary was the case, for Soviet policy toward the Germanies had changed.

Once INF deployment began, Chernenko unsuccessfully tried to punish West Germany for allowing it. By late 1985, however, Gorbachev seemed to be cultivating Western Europe (including West Germany) while simultaneously, though unsuccessfully as the Geneva summit showed, trying to block or limit U.S. SDI deployment and to revive at least some degree of détente with Washington. It is important to remember that recent Soviet differences with East Germany and Hungary were the result of a post-INF-deployment change in Soviet policy toward West Germany and, therefore, toward East Germany and Hungary as well. Even so, it would probably be incorrect to think of the "postponement" of Honecker's visit to West Germany only as a Soviet-compelled reversal of East German policy toward West Germany. Rather, it probably marked a compromise between Moscow and East Berlin, for thereafter Honecker (as well as Kádár) continued his basic policies toward Bonn.

Soviet policy may revert again, after the 1985 Geneva summit, to cultivation of, rather than hostility toward, West Germany. At the end of 1985, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe still seemed to be a subject

[23] John Van Oudenaren, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," RAND R-3136-AF, March 1984, p. 16; and "Die sowjetische Politik gegenüber Westeuropa," *Europa Archiv*, February 25, 1985; Harry Gelman, ed., *The Future of Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe*, RAND R-3254-FF / NATO, September 1985.

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of debate in Moscow, publicly among experts and probably within the leadership as well. Conversely, Honecker's policies toward Moscow and Bonn did not cause any major disunity in the East German Communist party (SED) leadership, and his late 1985 purge of perhaps his only opponent, Konrad Naumann, underlined Honecker's firm control. Gorbachev himself, it seemed by the end of 1985, was still either unwilling, because he wanted more debate and had other important priorities or, less likely, unable, because he was not in full control, to impose one firm line on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.[24]

West German Policy

Bonn's engagement with the East remains subordinate to its membership in the West.[25] But it has raised incorrect Western fears that this marks a return to the traditional German position of *das Land der Mitte,* trying to balance (through *Schaukelpolitik*) between East and West. Official Bonn policy has been, and remains, to strengthen European unity and thereby to have Europe become a more equal ally of the United States—quite a different objective from neutralism and one which official U.S. policy has always supported. Bonn's aims in the East have never been as great or as dangerous to the West or the Soviet Union as Western critics and Soviet leaders have declared. But West Germany does have a special interest in extending its influence in that direction. This is not only economic in origin, although that is important. West Germany is going neither nationalist nor neutralist. Contrary to fears in East and West, the Federal Republic remains a stable, democratic, Western state. Bonn's present CDU / CSU-FDP government gives greater priority to European unity and to close relations with the United States than have any of its predecessors since Adenauer. Bonn has had considerable success in both respects, in part because France has been exaggeratedly fearful of the rise of nationalism and neutralism in the SPD and the Greens, and because Reagan and Kohl are personally and ideologically congenial.

Chancellor Kohl has not only continued, but has intensified, West German *Ostpolitik,* despite the prolonged CDU opposition in the 1970s.[26] The CSU leader Franz-Josef Strauss was instrumental in a 1984 one billion Deutsche mark credit to East Germany. Moreover, Bonn as much as the other West European states successfully resisted the U.S.

[24] See n. 3 above, and the revealing article about Gorbachev's German policy by a CPSU CC staff German expert, Nikolai Portugalov, "Bonn zehrt nur von der Substanz," *Die Zeit* (N. Am. ed.), August 16, 1985.

[25] Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1985 / 85; Timothy Garton Ash, "Which Way Will Germany Go?" *New York Review of Books,* January 31, 1985; Reinhard Meier, "Die allmähliche Auflösung der deutschen Frage," *Europa Archiv,* November 10, 1984.

[26] See my *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1978.)

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attempt to block the major West European natural gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. Kohl intensified *Ostpolitik* primarily because increased West German travel to East Germany gave *Ostpolitik* the popularity that no mass party like the CDU could afford to disregard. Second, his FDP coalition partner, whose then chairman Foreign Minister Genscher had also been foreign minister in the SPD Schmidt government, remained firmly committed to *Ostpolitik,* in part because its business supporters favored it. Thus, Kohl could hardly have formed a coalition with the FDP had he not committed himself to continue the policy. Third, the change in East Berlin's policy away from *Abgrenzung* ("delimitation") to a German "community of responsibility" made clear that while Brandt's *Wandel durch Annäherung* ("change through rapprochement") had not liberalized East Germany domestically, it had helped to improve its relations with West Germany. By 1984, therefore, most West Germans realized that East German foreign policy was no longer totally pro-Soviet and that Bonn had influenced it toward normalizing relations with West Germany.

A rising German national consciousness is developing in both states, but it reflects adherence to the same *Kulturnation* rather than an active reunification policy, if only because East and West Germans alike realize that reunification is not in the cards. Thus West and East Germany, in different ways, to different extents, and with different degrees of tolerance by the superpowers, are reasserting their historic roles in Europe and in Central Europe in particular. They remain within their alliances *inter alia* because they see no realistic alternative. Bonn and the great majority of West Germans do so primarily out of fear of the Soviet Union. East Berlin, unlike the great majority of East Germans, does so because the SED leadership needs Soviet support to remain in power. Both well know that only by remaining firmly within their alliances can they gain more autonomy and influence within them.

The United States and Western Europe

West Germany is the most atypical West European state: a part of a nation divided by Soviet power and will. Politically, economically, and ideologically a part of the Western democratic community, it is committed to keeping West Berlin free of Soviet domination but it cannot do so alone. On the frontier of Soviet power, if only because it is non-nuclear, it is vastly inferior to it. For all these reasons, it is the West European state that is the most firmly committed to alliance with the United States. Finally, the great majority of West Germans and of Frenchmen as well rightly think that Franco-German reconciliation is one of the

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greatest achievements of post-1945 Western Europe and the core of its increasing unity.

However, West Germany increasingly shares with most other West European states (Great Britain is the main exception) a sense of Europeanness and, therefore, a rising concern about its dependent position vis-à-vis the United States. Because this Europeanness is still largely inchoate and confined to the intelligentsia, mostly to its leftist segment, it is as difficult as it is important to analyze. Its principal source is the frustration of former imperial powers in the former center of world power: conscious of their own recovery from their 1945 prostration; convinced of their historic and cultural superiority to what they see as Europe's two giant, naive children, America and Russia; and increasingly frustrated by the recent rush forward in high technology by the United States and Japan and by the rising military superiority of the United States. Western Europe sees itself as overly dependent upon U.S. economic policies — high interest rates, budget deficits, and protectionism directed against the Community's subsidized exports. Many West Europeans also feel menaced by the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe and by the shift in U.S. interest toward the Far East.

The considerable opposition to SDI in Western Europe has several causes: the anti-nuclear and ecological movements; British and French fears that SDI will degrade their nuclear deterrents; fear that it will further increase the U.S. technological lead; fears that SDI, plus any Soviet response, will further cement West European inferiority; and fear that superpower arms control agreements on SDI will recreate General de Gaulle's old nightmare, the superpower *double hégémonie*. Yet, only the French government has rejected SDI (although French firms are bidding for SDI contracts), while Great Britian, Italy, and the Federal Republic have signed on.

West European leftist alienation from the United States is underpinned by growing European fear of nuclear war and resulting anti-nuclear sentiment; it was intensified by the initial confrontational posture of the early Reagan administration. The alienated are repelled by what they regard as American reaction; religious fundamentalism; anti-Soviet, cold war chauvinism; consumerism; and militarism. The conservative major West European governments pushed through INF deployment in late 1983, but in the process the British Labour party and the West German Social Democratic party abandoned the NATO nuclear consensus, although both remained committed to membership in NATO itself. The Labour party committed itself to unilateral British nuclear disarmament. The SPD not only remained opposed to INF (and to SDI) but set up a joint working group with the East German SED on chemical warfare

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weapons, which agreed on a draft treaty banning them from Central Europe, and working groups with the Soviet and other East European Communist parties as well.[27] Nevertheless, electoral success for either party would probably only be possible if it modified these policies. Moreover, INF deployment delivered a major blow to the West European peace movements and by late 1985, the West German Greens were declining and nearly split.[28]

Despite growing involvement in the Far East, resentment of West European "softness" toward the Soviet Union, and pressure for partial U.S. troop withdrawal from Western Europe, the Reagan administration remained firmly engaged with Western Europe. Moreover, the replacement of Haig by Shultz and Reagan's shift toward greater priority for arms control and other negotiations with the Soviet Union, culminating in the 1985 Geneva summit, eased U.S. tensions with Western Europe.[26] On balance, U.S.-West European relations are better than they were five years ago.

The Superpower Correlation of Forces

During the last five years the Soviet-American global correlation of forces has been changing in Washington's favor. The U.S. defense buildup, Reagan's projection of his will to use power, the wave of patriotism, and the rush forward in high technology (including SDI) were the main causes of this change. Whether SDI will work remains disputed, but in any case the Soviet Union will not sit by and accept a perception that it is inferior in this respect if it can possibly avoid it. (The new, serious Soviet problem is that perhaps it cannot.) The recent emphasis in Soviet military literature on the acquisition and establishment of military doctrine for military high technology makes clear that the new Soviet leadership is aware of a major new challenge. But it cannot soon, if ever, hope to meet it effectively without access to Western technology. Obtaining such technology will enable the USSR to maintain strategic parity, without making too many concessions to its opponents.

Moscow has another military problem which has also changed the military correlation of forces to its disadvantage: the question of the reliability of the armed forces of East Germany, Poland, and Hungary in

[27] B. V. Flow, "Shifting Attitudes between the SPD and SED," RFE Research, December 10, 1984; Ronald D. Asmus, "Chemical-Free Weapons Zone in Central Europe?" ibid., August 1, 1985.

[28] For a less optimistic view of West Germany, see Ronald D. Asmus, "West Germany: Old Questions Posed Anew?" *SAIS Review*, Winter-Spring 1985, pp. 211-25.

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war, prewar, and crisis situations. The Soviet General Staff has probably revised downward its estimate on this issue.[29]

Thus, although it could change again in favor of the Soviet Union, especially if Gorbachev were to exploit successfully some Third World opportunity, the correlation of forces seems more likely to continue to move in favor of the United States. Events in Europe — notably in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, West Germany, and France — have played a major part in this development, for the Soviet Union has recently been having more problems with its East European allies than the United States has had with its West European ones.

Conclusions

From the viewpoint of global politics, the most important recent development is the Soviet Union's difficult relationship with its East European allies. Recent East European developments indicate that East European deviations from Soviet foreign policy occur because of the leaderships' motives, encouraged by mass pressure in favor of nationalism, autonomy, and consumerism. The leaders and the masses, albeit from different motives, desire greater ties with the West, contrary to Soviet wishes. The leaders do not want to break with Moscow, for they fear the loss of power, and the masses do not dare, for they fear Soviet invasion. Thus, both leaders and masses have built-in reasons for compromise with Moscow; however, the leaders must satisfy demands somewhat and thereby restrain the masses. The latter, in turn, must be predisposed to restraint themselves by traditions of discipline, as in East Germany, and by memories of a recent crushed rebellion, as in East Germany and Hungary.

Developed countries such as East Germany and Hungary fear being cut off from the West by the Soviet Union and, thus, dragged down into backwardness in high technology, therefore in hard-currency exports, and thereby in consumerism. The common feelings of Europeanness and of superiority to the "backward Slavs" also play a role. So do historic ties to the West, especially to West Germany.

Historical ironies are legion. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was eventually partially successful. So was the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. János Kádár is today's Ferenc Deák; both achieved an *Ausgleich.* Honecker and Kádár have taken advantage of Soviet difficulties, as Deák did of the 1866 defeat of Austria by Prussia. But both, like Deák, do not

[29] William E. Odom, "Soviet Force Posture: Dilemmas and Directions," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1985, pp. 1-14; A. Ross Jonson and Barbara Kliszewski, "The Polish Military After Martial Law," RAND N-2001-AF, June 1983.

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intend, because they neither want nor can afford, to break with those with whom they negotiated their *Ausgleich*.

Western statesmen and scholars must now add one more deviation from Soviet policy, this recent one by East Germany and Hungary: not a break like Yugoslavia, Albania, or China; not as far-reaching as Romania; but still a deviation of some significance.

Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe is not soon likely to become decisively more liberal. Gorbachev shows no signs of this and he can easily interpret Russian history to warn him against such a move. Still, the East German and Hungarian leaderships are unlikely soon to forget their recent maximum foreign policy aim, more autonomous but still firm relations with the Soviet Union. Their best hope for this was in face of an old, weak, divided, and indecisive Soviet leadership. It is not yet clear how much they can hope for with Gorbachev in power. In the meantime, if only because Gorbachev needs Western technology and because he is cultivating both the United States and Western Europe, East European trade and technological relations with the West seem likely to continue.[30]

United States Policy Toward Eastern Europe

The United States and West Germany want Soviet influence in Eastern Europe to diminish gradually, Soviet influence in Western Europe to remain low, and the latter to unite and remain in close alliance with the United States. Bonn's *Ostpolitik* gives higher priority to gradual change in Eastern Europe and to détente than does Washington's policy because Bonn is a regional, German power while Washington is a global power; their priorities and their publics' priorities differ. Bonn prefers incentives in dealing with Moscow while Washington has sometimes preferred confrontation. Bonn's incentives toward East Germany and Hungary have been more productive than has U.S. confrontation — a policy Washington is changing.

Bonn commits more resources and gives higher priority to East Germany (and to Hungary) than Washington does, but it is even more committed to NATO, to the European Community, and to reconciliation with France. The most important lesson of these developments for U.S. foreign policy, therefore, is to continue American engagement in Western Europe and especially in West Germany. Washington should continue to support five main policy objectives in Western Europe: maintain U.S.

[30] I have profited greatly from A. James McAdams, "Conceptualizing Change in Soviet-East European Relations," a paper presented to the American Political Science Association annual meeting, New Orleans, La., August 29-September 1, 1985, which seems to me the most stimulating work on this subject to date.

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military engagement in Europe: support Franco-German reconciliation and, therefore, not force Bonn to choose decisively between Washington and Paris; encourage West European political, economic, and military unity; endorse Bonn's policies on German reunification and intra-German détente; and work toward a U.S.-West European agreement on policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These policies are also the best suited to deal with Moscow in Europe, just as Soviet-American bilateralism about West European interests, against West European insistance to the contrary, is contrary to U.S. interests as well.[31]

With respect to Eastern Europe itself, and especially East Germany and Hungary, the U.S. policy of differentiation in treatment of East European states, set forth by Vice President Bush in his 1984 Vienna speech, is the more valid in view of these recent developments. Washington has improved its relations with East Berlin and Budapest. American national interests and democratic traditions require that U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe combine *Realpolitik* with support for democracy and the rule of law. Not easy, even contradictory, and unlikely to be supported by Western Europe, Bismarckians will say. But no other policy can win and keep American public support. Moscow combines *Realpolitik* and ideology; why should the United States not? What Zbigniew Brzezinski and I proposed more than two decades ago as such a policy seems to me still valid today:

> . . . the United States should adopt a policy of what might be called peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe. This policy should: (1) aim at stimulating further diversity in the Communist bloc; (2) thus increasing the likelihood that the East European states can achieve a greater measure of political independence from Soviet domination; (3) thereby ultimately leading to the creation of a neutral belt of states which, like the Finns, would enjoy genuine popular freedom of choice in internal policy while not being hostile to the Soviet Union and not belonging to Western military alliances.[32]

The United States should privately reciprocate East European initiatives toward differentiation, but rarely publicly applaud them. Nevertheless, Washington should occasionally set forth this policy publicly in order to ensure American public support. The United States should understand and accept that the Federal Republic has a special interest in East Germany and in détente in Europe. On the other hand, Washington rightly expects Bonn to maintain its West European and Atlantic orientation and to consult fully with it on policy toward East Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. Not only are Bonn's policies likely to be unsuccessful

[31] This view is developed in my *The Superpowers and Regional Tensions* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 103-10.

[32] Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1961, pp. 642-54, at p. 644.

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without American support, but American interests in West Berlin and in the Federal Republic would be unfavorably affected by lack of consultation.

The United States should be sure that it understands these developments. It should aid them, discreetly, when it can, always in consultation with its NATO allies, especially the Federal Republic. The future of these developments will be neither short, continuous, dramatic, nor necessarily decisive for change in Europe. But insofar as they continue, they will be to the advantage of the United States and the West.

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THE QUESTION OF NO-FIRST-USE

by Marc Trachtenberg

The idea that the United States should promise not to use nuclear weapons unless an adversary used them first is by no means new. Proposals of this sort have been aired periodically for the past thirty-five years.[1] But it was only in 1982, with the appearance of an important article by McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith, that no-first-use became a live political issue.[2] By now, the debate has come and gone; the issue, like so many others, simply faded away. But because what was at stake was not just some minor change in declaratory policy — because what was really being raised was the basic question of just how dependent we should be on nuclear weapons — the issue is still worth examining: an analysis of the argument for no-first-use might shed some light on the larger problem of the role that nuclear weapons should play in our military policy.

Traditionally, the argument for no-first-use, like the argument for decreasing our reliance on nuclear weapons more generally, has rested on the assumption that a reduced risk that the West would initiate a nuclear exchange would more or less automatically reduce the risk of nuclear war. But in the current discussion, the argument for such a general reorientation of defense policy is rooted in more fundamental claims about the "non-utility" of nuclear weapons. Thus, Kennan characterized the "nuclear bomb" as "the most useless weapon ever invented," and former Secretary of Defense McNamara stressed the point that "nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless — except only to deter one's opponent from using them." [3]

[1] N. F. Mott, "Can Atomic Weapons Keep the Peace?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* January 1949, p. 11; S. K. Allison et al, "Let Us Pledge Not to Use H-Bomb First," ibid., March 1950, p. 75. See also Lawrence Weiler, "No First Use: A History," ibid., February 1983, pp. 28-34, essentially a survey of American and foreign government activity in this area since 1945; Robert Tucker, Klaus Knorr et al, "Proposal for No First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Pros and Cons," Princeton Center of International Affairs, Policy Memorandum No. 28 (September 1963); and especially Richard Ullman, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1972. Congressional hearings on the subject were conducted in 1976: "First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsible Control," Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1976).

[2] McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs,* Spring 1982.

[3] George Kennan, "A Modest Proposal," *New York Review of Books,* July 16, 1981, p. 14; Robert McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs,* Fall 1983, p. 79.

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What does it mean to say that nuclear weapons are "useless"? Is this contention tantamount to a claim that nuclear weapons simply cancel each other out and have no other political effect — i.e., that world politics proceeds as though they did not exist? The assumption clearly is not that nuclear arsenals simply neutralize each other, that they could never actually be used, and that they are therefore politically irrelevant. For if there were no possibility of nuclear war, it would make little sense for people to concern themselves with issues of nuclear weapons policy. The problem is that there is a certain chance that these "unusable weapons" might some day *be* used, and, consequently, the risk that a conflict might escalate beyond the nuclear threshold endows these forces with political meaning. A nuclear world will be different — radically different, I think — from a nonnuclear world. In other words, a nuclear strategy — not just the weapons, but also the way we think about them and the way we deploy them — will certainly have effects which go beyond the mutual deterrence of nuclear attack. Whether these effects are to be judged useful or pernicious is a matter for analysis. What is wrong is to blandly assume that positive effects just cannot exist.

When we talk about reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, we have to consider systematically the effects of such a shift. A nuclear orientation may have some unsuspected advantages, and a move away from it might therefore have some unpleasant consequences. Before making a judgment, it is important to know what these effects are. We may be willing to pay a price for moving away from nuclear weapons, but we should first try to get a clear sense of what it is.

In this context, historical work can be particularly valuable; not only the history of international politics in the nuclear age, but the history of military policy and the history of strategic thought as well.

Some Lessons From History

Are nuclear weapons good for anything other than the deterrence of their use by others? Does the physical placement of such weapons, for example, have a distinct political effect? Does the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in West Germany, to take a case in point, tend to deter a Soviet conventional invasion of the Federal Republic? It is frequently claimed that it would not: why should the Soviets care if the American missiles that strike them are launched from bases in West Germany or from submarines off the coast of Holland? [4]

[4] See for example Lord Zuckerman, "Nuclear Fantasies," *New York Review of Books*, June 14, 1984, which approvingly invokes McNamara's making of this argument; note also G. Treverton, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'Grey Area,'" *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, p. 1079.

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However, the evidence of the Cuban Missile Crisis makes it clear that it does matter to the invader whether nuclear-tipped missiles are located in territory about to be attacked. In 1962 it was taken for granted that the effective deployment of such missiles in Cuba would make an invasion of the island a very risky business. It was for this reason that the resolution of the affair became a matter of such great urgency for the Kennedy administration: the assumption was that if the United States had to attack, it was much safer to do so before work on the sites had been completed and the missiles on the island had been armed with their nuclear warheads.[5] For whatever reason, the administration thought it more likely, in the event of an attack, that the Soviets would fire their missiles in Cuba rather than launch their ICBMs — i.e., that the Russians might think that triggering the Cuban missiles might not be tantamount to plunging into all-out war. Hence the famous warning in President Kennedy's October 22 speech which was clearly designed to disabuse them of any such notion: the launch of any of the nuclear missiles from Cuba, he said, would be regarded "as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union."

The fact that such anxieties existed and had to be dealt with in these ways shows that a successful Soviet deployment in Cuba would have tended to deter an American invasion. By the same token, however, the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe can be presumed to have a certain deterrent effect. Whether this consideration provides a sufficient justification for such deployment is another matter. The example is only meant to show, first, how nuclear weapons can have positive effects beyond the deterrence of their use by others, and, second, how we can learn about the likely effects of our actions by studying how we have in fact reacted to analogous behavior on the part of others in the past.

A second example, this time from the history of defense policy, relates more directly to the no-first-use proposal. No-first-use, like the general idea of a shift away from a predominantly nuclear orientation, is commonly predicated on the assumption that a nonnuclear defense of Western Europe is possible — that is, that conventional parity can be achieved through unilateral action. But what brought conventional parity in Europe within reach by the early 1960s? To the extent that military manpower can be taken as a rough indicator of conventional military power, it was Soviet policy that played the key role. There were massive

[5] See the analysis in Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security*, Summer 1985, 153-55; and in id., Introduction to Documents, in "White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis," ibid., pp. 168-69.

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cutbacks in Soviet military manpower during the late 1950s; and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, in January 1960, announced plans for a further sharp reduction to only 2,423,000 men, which was approximately the American level at the time.[6] It seems clear enough that Soviet policy was deeply influenced by prevailing American ideas: if the Eisenhower New Look doctrine and the postures it rationalized effectively ruled out a massive conventional war, what was the point of preparing for one? The Americans would escalate in any event; as a result of American policy, a major U.S.-Soviet limited war was virtually impossible. Certainly there are many indications that Soviet leaders took the American doctrines of the 1950s seriously, and it seems reasonable to assume that American policy was one of the most basic forces shaping Soviet strategic thinking in this period.[7]

Indeed it is amazing how close Khrushchev's views were to Eisenhower's by early 1960. Just a few days after the Soviet chairman announced in his famous January 1960 speech that his regular air force was being phased out, that bombers were obsolete, and that they would be entirely replaced by rockets, Eisenhower was telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed B-70 bomber (the forerunner of the current B-1) "left him cold in terms of making military sense." The Air Force Chief of Staff's arguments about bomber recallability, "the psychological effect of manning static weapons" and so on, had no effect on him. Eisenhower was convinced that "the age of aircraft for actual use over enemy territory [was] fast coming to a close." Missiles were "cheaper" and "more effective." Given "the kind of destructive power we had," he doubted whether there was still a place for the bomber: "he saw no need for it."[8] Both the Khrushchev and Eisenhower positions were far too extreme to be explained simply as products of the technological environment, and it is obvious that they were closely linked.

What all this suggests is that the Eisenhower New Look, with its heavy nuclear orientation, may have actually improved the balance of conventional forces. Indeed, by the end of the Eisenhower period, when members of the incoming Kennedy administration were briefed by

[6] For the figures, see Jeffrey Record, *Sizing Up the Soviet Army* (Washington: Brookings, 1975), Table 2-1, p. 5. For the text of the speech, see *New York Times,* January 15, 1960. The American level was given in another article the *Times* published that day as approximately 2,500,000 ("Capital Thinks Russians Seek to Apply Pressure.")

[7] See David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 35-36, 41; Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 30; and the (then secret) Suslov speech of October 8, 1960, quoted in "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and its Significance," a CIA memorandum of April 1, 1961, p. 27, in National Security Files, Box 21, JFK Library, Boston.

[8] Memorandum of Conference, January 20, 1960, by General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight David Eisenhower Diaries, Box 29: Staff Notes, November 1959; also in Declassified Documents Collections, 1978:119E.

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their predecessors about military and foreign policy matters, they were especially surprised by Secretary of Defense Gates's confidence about America's ability to fight a limited war. As Clark Clifford wrote in one of the memoranda recording these briefings, "Secretary Gates was exceedingly sanguine about the state of our forces insofar as limited war capabilities were concerned. He said that the United States forces are in excellent shape and fully adequate to any foreseeable test." This referred specifically to conflicts that might arise over Korea, Formosa, Iran, Berlin, and Laos.[9] And although the documents are not explicit on this point, it seems that by this time the term "limited war" had come to have a distinct nonnuclear connotation.

Few would have predicted in 1953 that the New Look, with its strong distaste for a massive limited-war-fighting capability, would actually lead to the situation Secretary Gates described. But in retrospect the logic of the process seems clear enough: a nuclear orientation, through its effect on an adversary's policy, can actually improve the conventional balance. What this implies for us today is that any attempt to dilute the nuclear orientation of American policy might by the same logic weaken the rationale for limited Soviet conventional forces; placing greater emphasis on conventional forces could thus lead to a worsening of the conventional balance from the West's point of view — at least if one accepts the usual assumptions about the structure of comparative advantage in the area of conventional force-raising potential.[10] In other words, the indirect effects might well overwhelm the direct ones, and an attempt to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons might ultimately have the effect of increasing it.

In the 1950s, when the issues of limited war and tactical nuclear weapons were first seriously discussed, one of the more impressive insights was that nuclear weapons could have a profound effect on a military conflict even if they were not actually used. What would be the nature of a conventional war in Europe (in James King's phrase) "fought in the shadow of nuclear power"?[11] Political ambitions would have to be limited, and there were important military effects as well. A commanding general would be reluctant to concentrate his forces if he were afraid that this would tip the scales and lead to nuclear strikes against his armies; thus, to the extent that some massing of forces was necessary for

[9] Clifford to JFK, January 24, 1961, President's Office Files, Box 29a, folder "Eisenhower, D. D. 1/17/61-10/9/61," JFK Library, and the McNamara (January 24, 1961) and JFK (January 19, 1961) memos of the same meeting in the same file.

[10] See John Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security*, Winter 1984-85.

[11] James E. King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1957, p. 244. Actually Bernard Brodie had used the term in this context even earlier: see Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Arno, 1946), p. 83.

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offensive action, a risk of nuclear war tended to load the dice in favor of defense.

What this implies, first of all, is that nuclear weapons can have important effects — military effects — beyond deterring their use by others. Those effects may be positive, and they may be sacrificed by a policy which seeks to rule out any prospect, under any circumstances, of the West initiating a nuclear exchange.

But is it possible that the effect could be negative? In an extraordinary passage, former Secretary of Defense McNamara accepted the point about the "nuclear shadow" effect, but argued that since this makes it more probable that a nonnuclear attack would fail, it must therefore increase the risk of a Soviet nuclear strike. From the Soviet point of view, he wrote, "preparing themselves for the possibility of NATO nuclear attacks means that they must avoid massing their offensive units. This would make it more difficult to mount a successful conventional attack, raising the incentives to initiate the war with a nuclear offensive.[12]

This passage is of interest for two reasons. First, it is an implicit admission that nuclear weapons might be militarily "usable" — for the Soviets at least — and if use can be militarily rational for them, why is it out of the question that use in some circumstances might make sense for us as well? But the more important point is that, at its core, this is an argument against any strong conventional defense. In fact, this line of reasoning implies that we should make conventional offensive action easier for our adversaries, lest they in their frustration opt for a nuclear attack.

It is important to be sensitive to the effect our views might have on other countries. We seem to assume that our adversaries pay no attention to our internal discussion of these issues. And yet, Soviet officials have long been aware of the possibility of exploiting bourgeois pacifism for their own political ends. As Lenin wrote Chicherin, the foreign affairs commissar, in February 1922: "You and I have both fought against pacifism as a programme for the revolutionary proletarian party. That much is clear. But who has ever denied the use of pacifists by that party to soften up the enemy, the bourgeoisie?" [13] Such attitudes are by no means dead. It is therefore important to be concerned with the effect our writings have on Soviet perceptions.

Lest this point be misunderstood, it is important to stress that Soviet sensitivity to our attitudes is in itself very desirable. It is a touchstone of stability that rivals be able to assess each other and orient their policies

[12] McNamara, "Military Role," p. 75.

[13] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works,* vol. 45 (Moscow, 1970), pp. 474-75. There are many other documents from this period which reflect a similar point of view.

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accordingly — that they press ahead only when this assessment indicates that the risks are minimal, and that they are cautious when the risks are great. Indeed, an ability to attune one's policy to the logic of power — or to the correlation of forces, as the Soviets say — is a chief characteristic of a competent and effective foreign policy. Policies oblivious to the structure of power, which plunge ahead without regard to any calculus of risk, driven primarily by some moral principle or some strong emotion, simply do not promote a stable international system. Moreover, our adversaries' sensitivity to our attitudes need not have purely negative effects. Indeed, their sensitivity provides us with important leverage: by framing our attitudes with an eye to their likely response, we can exert some control over their policies.

It follows, therefore, that we should pay particular attention to what might be inferred about our basic attitudes from what we say. Take for example the argument that first use of nuclear weapons would be "militarily irrational." But if it is irrational (because of the great risk of escalation) to use nuclear weapons first in the case of a major conventional war, why would it be any less irrational to use them in the event an enemy is the first to breach the nuclear barrier by, say, setting off a few low-yield weapons "as a demonstration of resolve"? Certainly the threat of escalation would not be any less great at that point. Why would it make sense to run the terrible risks of escalation with a nuclear response no matter what the provocation — massive tactical nuclear attacks, large-scale city-avoiding counterforce strikes, or whatever? Or, to take the argument to its logical conclusion, how could it be "militarily rational" to respond in kind even if we were the victims of an all-out Soviet nuclear attack?

If one believes that one should never use nuclear weapons first, but that it is permissible to consider their use if an enemy introduces them, then one must rely on some criterion other than "military rationality." But unless one makes it clear what that additional criterion is, the impression might remain that "military rationality" must be our overriding concern; that is, we would appear to be relying on a test that in the final analysis would rule out not just *first* use but *any* use of nuclear weapons. Given that accepting a policy also implies an acceptance, to some degree, of the logic on which it was based, we need to be concerned with what arguments of this sort might suggest to an adversary.

This is not to argue that the use of nuclear weapons in warfare is necessarily "rational." It is not even clear what "rationality" means in this context. The real problem concerns the effect of adopting this anti-nuclear attitude. It is not at all obvious that it would reduce the risk of nuclear war. For the acceptance of this point of view might well have

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the effect of making not just a Soviet conventional attack, but even a Soviet nuclear attack, more likely: we might end up giving the impression that our fear of escalation is so deep that we would not respond with nuclear weapons no matter what the Soviets did.

Thus, proponents of no-first-use assume that adoption of this policy would lead, in Kennan's words, to a "far-reaching restructuring of our armed forces." [14] The central question here is whether the goal is to rule out *any* use of nuclear weapons or simply to rule out *initial* use. Thus Kennan writes that "the training and equipment," "the strategy and the tactics" of America's forces currently "have been affected by the assumption that we might have to fight — indeed, might wish to fight — with nuclear weapons, and that we might well be the ones to inaugurate their use." [15] This is the situation that Kennan would like by and large to reverse. But if the assumption to be abandoned is that we *might* have to fight with nuclear weapons, this can only mean that we should not seriously prepare ourselves to fight with them. We would then be unprepared to respond even if an adversary used them first. A policy of maintaining an option to use nuclear weapons first without committing ourselves to their automatic use might produce a military establishment very much like one prepared to use nuclear weapons only after an enemy had done so first — that is, armed forces with a true dual capability. But Kennan, for example, implies that we need more far-reaching changes, and that we should only prepare seriously to fight conventional war.

McNamara argues along similar lines that "NATO's threat of 'first use' " has its costs:

> Preparing for tactical nuclear war limits NATO's ability to defend itself conventionally in several ways. Nuclear weapons are indeed "special" munitions. They require special command, control and communications arrangements. They require special security precautions. They limit the flexibility with which units can be deployed and military plans altered. Operations on a nuclear battlefield would be very different from those in a conventional conflict; NATO planning must take these differences into account.
>
> Moreover, since most of the systems that would deliver NATO's nuclear munitions are dual-purpose, some number of aircraft and artillery must be reserved to be available for nuclear attacks early in a battle, if that became necessary, and are thus not available for delivering conventional munitions.[16]

But again, these are arguments against having a tactical nuclear capability in the first place. If no-first-use is to be kept distinct analytically from a policy of ruling out any use no matter what an enemy does, then it should be taken as implying that an efficient "second use capability" should be

[14] Kennan, "On Nuclear War," *New York Review of Books*, January 21, 1982, p. 10.
[15] Ibid.
[16] McNamara, "Military Role," pp. 74-75.

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maintained. This may indeed require more elaborate "command, control and communications arrangements" than would be necessary under a 1950s-style first-use policy. Similarly, it is difficult to see why it is less important to maintain reserves of nuclear-capable aircraft and artillery under no-first-use than under the present system, unless one really wants to deprive one's own side of the ability to retaliate effectively in the event an enemy is the first to breach the nuclear threshold.

Suppose, however, that policy was in fact built on the assumption that nuclear weapon use is never rational. There would be little point then to preparing ourselves seriously to fight a nuclear war, even one begun by the other side. We would, therefore, be reducing an enemy's risk should he decide to use nuclear weapons against us. And if our nuclear capabilities were allowed to deteriorate — for example, by becoming increasingly vulnerable to the improved weapons of the other side — this might in itself (in the way commonly argued for strategic weapons) be a "destabilizing" influence.

The Balance of Anxiety

But the political effects would probably outweigh the military ones. When we talk about these issues, we are among other things signaling our adversaries about how we would behave if certain extreme contingencies arose. If we give the impression that a large and growing segment of American opinion views nuclear deterrence as a gigantic bluff — that we have no real intention of ever using nuclear weapons no matter what happens — this is sure to have an effect. The danger again is that in allowing our attitudes to shift in this direction, we increase the risk that an adversary would actually launch a nuclear attack.

The argument about the irrationality of nuclear options is commonly based on a belief in the uncontrollability of nuclear war, and in the virtual inevitability of escalation. And yet, the more firmly we hold these notions, the less likely it is that we would in fact retaliate with nuclear weapons even if an enemy were to use them first: there is a good chance that we could be terrorized by our fear of escalation into not responding in kind. Paradoxically, a powerful belief on our part in the inevitability of escalation would reduce an enemy's assessment of the actual risk of launching a nuclear attack: we might even convince an opponent that, after absorbing a limited nuclear attack, we would capitulate rather than risk thermonuclear holocaust. Thus, the more convinced either side is of the inevitability of escalation, the less likely it is that a limited nuclear attack would actually escalate. The stronger either side's belief in the uncontrollability of nuclear war, the more likely it is that a

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nuclear war would be brought to a swift end — that is, that it would actually be controlled. A nuclear strike might then become rational simply as a consequence of one's adversary viewing it as irrational.

The point is that the fear of escalation can be exploited. The prospect of nuclear war scares us as well as them and may make us more cautious in a dispute than we might otherwise be. Realizing this, they might decide to play on our fears and take a more aggressive position as a direct result of the increased level of risk. The threat of uncontrollable devastation, therefore, does not necessarily lead to caution. One's fears can be balanced by the knowledge that a rival is also afraid — indeed, they may be more than balanced by the perceived advantages of playing on an adversary's anxieties.

When people first began to think seriously about the political consequences of the atomic bomb, one of the most controversial issues was whether it was a "weapon of aggression." Those who denied this assumed that the means for retaliation in kind could be made secure, and that something we would now call "mutual deterrence" would be the likely consequence. But a condition of this sort would not necessarily lead to prudent behavior on the part of great powers. "Hitler made a good many bloodless gains by mere blackmail, in which he relied heavily on the too obvious horror of modern war among the great nations which might have opposed him earlier," Bernard Brodie wrote in 1946. As historical interpretation, this clearly left much to be desired: the fear of war was not the only basis for the German triumphs of the 1930s. But the point Brodie drew from his comment about Hitler is nevertheless worth pondering: "A comparable kind of blackmail in the future may actually find its encouragement in the existence of the atomic bomb." [17]

So far, things have not quite worked out that way. Attempts to secure unilateral advantages by playing on a nuclear-armed adversary's fear of a holocaust have on the whole been unsuccessful. The fear of nuclear war has weighed more heavily as a restraint than as something to be exploited. Why this has been the case is not clear: Is it the basic satisfaction of both America and Russia with the status quo? Is it the risk-averse character of large bureaucratic states? Or is it the relatively even distribution of fear? Whatever its causes, the situation has had certain advantages. It is therefore important, as we consider how to restructure the system, to be aware of what those advantage are — to be sensitive, that is, to what we might risk losing.

There is first of all what might be called the defensive bias of nuclear weapons. Back in the 1950s, many of the people who wrote on strategic issues were concerned with creating "usable" power. The prob-

[17] In Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon*, p. 85.

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lem with too great a reliance on thermonuclear weapons was that this prevented the United States from using its power for political ends; the strategy of massive retaliation had, except for the most blatant and extreme cases of aggression, effectively disarmed the country. The problem, these theorists argued, was that under Eisenhower, American policy was too exclusively defensive in orientation. A limited-war capability was therefore necessary — this was Henry Kissinger's line at the time — if the country were to pursue such "positive goals" as the reunification of Germany or the easing of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.[18] By the beginning of the 1960s, "limited war" had increasingly come to mean "conventional war"; conventional power was "usable" in a way that nuclear power simply was not. Thus, a conventional buildup was linked to goals that went beyond mere maintenance of the status quo. This assumption was evident in Dean Acheson's writings and utterances at the time.[19] Even Thomas Schelling argued for nonnuclear forces as the only way of supporting an interventionist policy in Eastern Europe.[20]

These particular policies might have been dangerous, but the theoretical insight they rested on was sound: it is hard to use nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes — and, hard as it was then, it is certainly harder now. But was the nuclear straitjacketing of American foreign policy to be regretted? Carl Kaysen almost grudgingly pointed out (while working in the Kennedy White House in 1961) that this might have been a fortunate thing: the weakness of Eisenhower's military policy effectively neutralized what Kaysen viewed as Eisenhower's over-militarized foreign policy.[21]

What then does this argument about the conservative bias — i.e., the primarily defensive character — of nuclear weapons imply? A certain reliance on nuclear weapons on our part may also lead our adversaries to stress a nuclear strategy; but if dependence on nuclear forces constrains us, it should constrain them as well. Both sides will be more cautious, and the risk of war will be reduced.

This argument about the defensive, and therefore stabilizing, implications of nuclear-based strategy depends, however, on the persistence of the situation that has prevailed so far: where the fears of each side have outweighed the possible attraction of exploiting the corresponding fears of a rival. The rise of "nuclear pacifism" in the West is the one

[18] Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Norton, 1957), esp. pp. 13, 37, 39, 42.

[19] See his article "The Practice of Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1963, esp. pp. 254-55, and his speech to the Institute for Strategic Studies of September 1963 published in Adelphi Paper No. 5. Note also Brodie's comments on this in *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 402.

[20] In David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen, eds., *National Security: Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead* (New York: Hoover, 1963), pp. 626-27; see also p. 735.

[21] Carl Kaysen, "Thoughts on Berlin," August 22, 1961, p. 8, in National Security Files, Box 82, JFK Library.

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thing that might disrupt this situation. If the Soviet leadership, for example, were to become convinced that we would never use nuclear weapons, this balance might be shifted: the chance to exploit our fears would then outweigh their own sense of risk.

Given the limits on our ability to predict our own behavior, an asymmetry of this sort could be profoundly destabilizing. Our nuclear pacifism, and the military posture it may have engendered, might draw our adversaries into a more aggressive policy than they would otherwise pursue. We might then become so upset that, in desperation, we would resort to apocalyptic threats to get them to withdraw. Having gotten in so deep, however, they might find it difficult to pull back; and this, combined with the inferences they drew from our prior policy, might lead them to discount our threats and risk a real test of will. This, the best historians argue, was the way war came to Europe in 1939 — a war, it must be remembered, that neither Hitler nor the British wanted at the time.[22] For many years after World War II, we were perhaps too obsessed with certain crudely drawn lessons of the Munich period. The risk now, after Vietnam, is that in ignoring the lessons that should be drawn from a study of the 1930s, we might again end up making the same sort of mistakes that were made then.

This issue can also be viewed from the perspective of the history of American strategic thought. One of the nicer points made in the strategic literature in the 1950s was that policy pronouncements — like no-first-use, for example — were, among other things, attempts to predict our future behavior. But are we quite sure that, when the chips are down, regardless of what we might say now, we would prefer a conventional defeat to any kind of nuclear option, no matter how massive that defeat, no matter how great its political consequences? Calling for a conventional buildup is no way of getting around this question, since, even if conventional parity were achieved in principle, no one could predict the outcome of a nonnuclear conflict with any certainty.

If we are not sure that we would be prepared to accept a total defeat — over Berlin, for example, or even over Western Europe as a whole — then we run the risk of unintentionally misleading an adversary into thinking we would not be tempted to resort to nuclear threats, when in fact we might. In the past, we in the West have certainly misled our adversaries about our ultimate willingness to use military force. This was most obvious in the case of the Korean War when the whole thrust of American policy prior to the North Korean invasion of the south had

[22] The best discussion to my mind remains Raymond Sontag's classic article, "The Last Months of Peace, 1939," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1957, 507-24. This was the basis for his treatment of the subject in Chapter Thirteen of his book *A Broken World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

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been to signal our intention to disengage from Korea and to place it outside our "defense perimeter." But perhaps the pacifism of the 1930s provides a more relevant example. To many in Britain at the time, the horrors of war were detested and feared in the abstract. Nothing could justify a new war with Germany, and the weapons to fight it with could therefore not be justified either. An image was projected which led Hitler to feel that Britain would not resist German expansion in the east; but the events of 1939 were to show that the British had not had a clear sense for what their feelings would be when not war itself, but the threat of a Nazi-dominated Europe, emerged as the most pressing problem.

The point of all this is not that we should be ready to use nuclear weapons in defense of any particular political goal, but only that we need to think through how we might react in certain extreme and apparently remote contingencies. This, after all, is what strategy is ultimately about; the central problems of strategy relate to the most painful decisions, not to the ones most likely to arise.

If we adopt no-first-use, then, would we be prepared to write off West Berlin if its status were again challenged? Would we be prepared to accept a conventional defeat, no matter how massive, no matter what the political consequences — in Central Europe, in the Middle East, or indeed in any place in the world? If we simply swept aside questions like these, we would be asking for trouble if such awesome decisions ever presented themselves — and issues like no-first-use are of interest only to the extent that such problems are indeed real.

The Terms of the Trade-off

There is an argument that a shift to no-first-use and related policies would not increase the risk that we might some day be forced to face such decisions. The claim is that whatever we say or do, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a finite chance that they might be used in certain contingencies, this in itself assuring an adequate level of deterrence. The concept of "existential deterrence," as McGeorge Bundy calls it, thus serves as a kind of deus ex machina allowing us to have our cake and eat it too: we get the benefits of a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons without any real sacrifice of deterrent effect.

This thesis turns on the assumption that a major conventional conflict inescapably entails a great risk of escalation past the nuclear threshold. In 1969, Bundy was explicit about these matters. The American nuclear commitment, he argued, was basic to the defense of Europe, but nuclear "superiority" was never necessary for the American guarantee to work. It depended instead — and this is a point that recurs even in his

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recent writings — on the presence of an American army in Europe, and on "the very evident risk that any large-scale engagement between Soviet and American forces would rapidly and uncontrollably become general, nuclear and disastrous." [23] It was for this reason, in fact, that he used to argue that "the deterrent does work, even at a distance, as in Berlin. *Maybe* the American nuclear commitment is not as firm as it seems," he continued, "but what sane Soviet leader wants to put Soviet society in the scales to find out?" [24] If no-first-use ever is accepted as policy, one could still write that deterrence could work because no rational Soviet leader would want to take the chance that the American nuclear commitment is as *weak* as it seems. But do we really want our security to depend on calculations of this sort?

In any case, most important about this line of reasoning is its inconsistency with the arguments about the "unusability" of nuclear weapons, the military irrationality of first use, and the virtual impossibility that any government with a modicum of sanity would actually decide to employ them. Bundy in 1969 had argued that because of the danger of retaliation, there was "literally no chance at all that any sane political authority, in either the United States or the Soviet Union, would consciously choose to start a nuclear war." [25] But he was then thinking mainly of central war: a massive strike with strategic weapons, rather than tactical "first use" on a much smaller scale. Assumptions about the virtual inevitability of escalation, however, or even its high probability once the nuclear "firebreak" is crossed, tend to erase the distinction.

If nuclear war, then, even in the most extreme circumstances, cannot possibly come about through sane, conscious decision, how then *can* it come? One thinks of such things as unauthorized launches, but are we quite sure that it is technically possible for nuclear weapon use to be initiated without such a conscious decision by the political authorities in either country? In this context, it is interesting to note the testimony of Admiral Gerald E. Miller, the former deputy director of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, and thus someone who was in a position to know:

> I think we would have considerable difficulty getting any nuclear weapons launched, getting authority down through the system, to the point where the

[23] The quotation is from his speech to the Annual Conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 1979, "Strategic Deterrence After Thirty Years: What Has Changed?" published in the *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, 1980, no. 4, p. 486, and also in Adelphi Paper No. 160, but he had been making this point in other writings for many years: see his "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1969, esp. pp. 17-18, and his Ditchley Foundation lecture, "The Americans and Europe: Rhetoric and Reality" (Ditchley Park, 1969), p. 16, where he also made the argument about the American nuclear commitment being essential to the freedom of Europe (pp. 5-6).

[24] Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," p. 12.

[25] Ibid., p. 9.

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weapon would actually be triggered and exploded. There is a fantastic amount of concern about the civil authority over these weapons. I have watched it grow in the past 20 years to the point where I think we would have a lot of difficulty getting one off if the entire civilian hierarchy was well, surviving, and in close communication within the whole system. There is considerable constraint on release.[26]

It is hard for an outsider to know how accurate this picture is. But one thing that is clear is that the no-first-use movement is not interested in making escalation more automatic: the kind of measures it seems to want — e.g., the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from forward areas — would tend to make "unintentional" nuclear weapon use even less likely than it is now. Thus, it hardly makes sense for proponents of no-first-use to count on the risk of unintended escalation as the only real guarantee of the freedom of Europe, for, in that case, they would be relying on a phenomenon that they were doing their best to undermine.

One cannot have it both ways. Whichever way policy shifts, there is a price to be paid. It is therefore crucial to approach these problems in such a way that the trade-offs are evident and intellectually manageable. And this involves thinking through the problem of how benefits are related to risks — of whether, to use the language of the economists, "deterrence" is a scarce good or a plentiful one.

The argument about "existential deterrence" is tantamount to an assumption that deterrence is plentiful, in the sense of being easy and cheap to achieve. It is thus strange to see it linked to the opposite argument that deterrence is scarce — i.e., that because the risks are so great, the threat of going nuclear no longer has much credibility. Similarly, claims about a great and irreducible risk of escalation from the conventional to the nuclear level (linked to the "existential deterrence" thesis) are not completely consistent with the view that the real risk of escalation emerges only once the nuclear "firebreak" is crossed. When Bundy and his associates argued in their *Foreign Affairs* article that "no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, can reliably be expected to remain limited,"[27] they were emphasizing the importance of the "firebreak." If they had chosen to make the equally plausible argument that *no* U.S.-Soviet war could "reliably be expected to remain limited," the effect would have been to play down its significance.

If the existential deterrence thesis has its problems, so does the opposite argument, which bases its case for no-first-use on the assumption of military irrationality and on the related claim that the threat of possible first use is simply not credible. Since the assumption is not

[26] "First Use of Nuclear Weapons," p. 71.
[27] Bundy et al, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," p. 757.

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that use is impossible (if it were, no one would have to worry about nuclear weapons), what this argument assumes is that the risk of use is finite but small. Assume, for example, that under certain extreme conditions, given present policy, there is a mere 5 percent chance that a war would go nuclear. There would, therefore, be an overwhelming probability — a 95 percent chance — that no nuclear weapons would be used; hence, the argument would be that the threat of first use is not credible and that policy instead should be built on the principle of no-first-use. Note the logic here: from the point that credibility is weak is drawn the conclusion that it should be weakened still further — a fallacious approach because it does not take into account the price tag that would be attached to such a shift in policy.

We are talking here about a trade-off: we can drive down the probability that we might escalate from the conventional to the nuclear level, but in so doing we lose a bit of the deterrent effect. Is there anything that can be said about the terms of this trade-off? The general principle of diminishing marginal utility would imply that this end of the spectrum is perhaps the worst place to try to drive down the risk of escalation. In the present context, this principle would mean that a shift from a zero percent to, say, a 10 percent probability of escalation would have a greater marginal deterrent effect than a shift from 10 percent to 20 percent, while an increase from 20 percent to 30 percent would have a still smaller effect. If the principle applies, then at the low end of the scale, where the risk of the West's initiating a nuclear action is slight, small increases in the probability of escalation would have a big deterrent effect. Gradually, as the level of risk increases, the curve flattens out and the marginal increase in deterrence diminishes. Therefore, it is precisely at this end of the scale — the area where "credibility is weak" — that we are likely to get the biggest return for marginal increases in the level of risk, and where we pay proportionately the biggest price for small cuts in the level of risk.

All these issues involve trade-offs of one sort or another. Since there is no way of disinventing nuclear weapons — no way, that is, of turning back the clock to a period of nuclear innocence — there is also no way, no matter what we do, of completely eliminating all risk. The problem must therefore be one of balancing risks, of weighing the anxieties associated with one line of policy against those linked with another. In this context, probably the most we could honestly say is that we would not want even to consider nuclear weapon use except in the most extreme and dire contingencies. Even then we are not sure what we would do,

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but we would like at least to keep our options open. To try to do more than that would almost certainly create more problems, and more serious problems, than it would solve.

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CHINA'S CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT*

by Jonathan D. Pollack

China is in the midst of a profound political and economic transition that has begun to alter the East Asian strategic, economic, and political landscape. After two decades of intermittent political and economic turmoil, the Chinese leadership has undertaken a searching reappraisal of its past development policies and a major effort to recast its approach to modernization. The political, institutional, and economic reforms initiated since the late 1970s are unprecedented in the history of large, centrally planned political and economic systems. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping, China's preeminent leader and the principal architect of these changes, has described them as a "second revolution." Although the leadership is at pains to defend these steps as congruent with the precepts of Chinese socialism, long-standing ideological imperatives have been cast aside, in tacit recognition of their irrelevance to the requirements of sustained economic growth and technological innovation. At the same time, economics has assumed primacy over politics in China's relations with the outside world. The present implications of these changes appear to be largely political and economic, but their potential strategic consequences — in relation to both the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as East Asia — cannot be disregarded.

Put simply, the Chinese leadership has determined that China's emergence as an independent major power represents the dominant policy consideration for the remainder of the twentieth century. Although significant impediments and uncertainties will affect the directions and results of this effort, there seems little doubt that China has undertaken a fundamental break with its political and ideological past. China's preoccupation with its long-term development goals has already substantially affected the country's internal and external policy directions.

How are these changes influencing the East Asian security environment? What factors limit the scope of political and economic

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reform within China, and how might these constraints influence Beijing's external policy choices? What do these developments portend for China's evolving strategic role, both globally and regionally? How likely is the possibility of China again undergoing internal political changes that would reverse or substantially alter Beijing's present policies in East Asia?

To assess these questions, this essay will explore four interrelated issues: (1) China's evolving security strategy in its global and regional context; (2) China's internal economic and political reforms and their external implications; (3) recent trends in Chinese policy toward the Korean peninsula that shed light on China's economic, political, and security goals; and (4) the principal uncertainties and constraints that could affect these policy directions in the near to mid-term future.

China's Security Strategy: Toward Partial Strategic Disengagement?

China's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States have constituted the central issues in Chinese security strategy since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.[1] The Chinese have long sought a strategic position independent of both superpowers, but not in fundamental conflict with either. This position has been far easier to conceptualize than to achieve. In the 1950s and 1960s, Washington counted Beijing among its principal political and military adversaries; in the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow has viewed Beijing in a comparable light. Moreover, both the United States and the Soviet Union regard East Asia as an area of substantial and increasing strategic importance, as evidenced by the military deployments of both superpowers in the region. The continued military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, virtually on China's doorstep and directly affecting the security calculations of China and Japan as well as the two global powers, further complicates the PRC's effort to stand apart from Washington and Moscow.

Prevailing sentiment within the Chinese leadership and among Chinese strategic observers nevertheless holds that opportunities for achieving such independence are far more promising now than in the past. These expectations are based not upon an assumption of a defiant, isolated China, but upon a country that is more internationally engaged today than at any time in the last thirty-five years.[2] In particular, the

[1] For a more extended discussion of the historical evolution of these relations, see Jonathan D. Pollack, "China and the Global Strategic Balance," in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 146-76.

[2] See Li Dai, "Our Country Has Opened a New Situation in Foreign Affairs," *Shijie Zhishi*, No. 1, January 1, 1985, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report — China [FBIS-China]*, February 5, 1985, pp. A1-4.

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Chinese seem persuaded that the Soviet-American competition (both globally and regionally) will continue to be very active, will perhaps intensify, but will remain essentially stalemated.[3] Chinese observers have concluded that under such circumstances both superpowers — but especially the Soviet Union — have substantial incentives to seek relief or respite from their wide-ranging international obligations, with improved relations with China ranking among the principal possibilities.

Calculations about the possible constraints on Soviet power seem critical to the PRC. The Chinese see the Soviet Union confronted by a mounting technological and military challenge from a resurgent United States at a time when the new leadership in Moscow is still very much in the process of consolidating its power. Although conceding that the Soviets remain unwilling to abandon long-held foreign policy goals or to relinquish their major geopolitical gains of the past decade or more, some Chinese analysts believe that resource limitations may ultimately compel at least a partial policy reassessment in Moscow. Thus, trends in Soviet internal development are followed closely by Beijing to ascertain their possible implications for the exercise of Soviet power.[4] Most believe that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev will renew the political and economic reforms espoused by Andropov but stalled under Chernenko. But Chinese analysts are much less in agreement that efforts to reverse the USSR's faltering economic performance will soon compel the Soviet leadership to accept a major retrenchment in its foreign policy. This does not mean that the Chinese rule out any adjustment in Soviet policy toward China. But even the more hopeful Chinese analysts forecast a protracted adjustment process.

Regardless of the stasis in Soviet behavior toward the PRC, senior officials in Beijing believe that Moscow will remain largely preoccupied with other issues — in particular, the long-term military competition with the United States and a pressing internal political and economic agenda. To the extent that Soviet attention is focused elsewhere, Chinese leaders believe that Moscow will be inclined to reduce its pressure on Beijing. Such "breathing space" comports with the PRC's depiction of the present strategic environment as less tense, but not benign. As stated by Deng Xiaoping, "The danger of world war still exists. Because of the two superpowers' ongoing arms race, the factors of war will continue to grow. However . . . the growth of the forces for peace in the world will

[3] This section draws upon discussions with Chinese strategic specialists during visits to the PRC in November 1984 and June-July 1985.

[4] For examples of such assessments, see Tang Xiushan, "Three Months Since Gorbachev Took Office," *Liaowang*, No. 24, June 24, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, July 18, 1985, pp. C1-4; and Li Chiufa, "Gorbachev Systematically Expounds on His Reform Ideas," *Shijie Jingji Daobao*, July 22, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, July 31, 1985, pp. C1-2.

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outpace the growth of the forces for war . . . It is possible that large-scale world war will not break out for a relatively long time . . . There are hopes for safeguarding world peace."[5] Deng offers this optimistic projection to justify his decision to turn China's attention to the long-deferred tasks of restructuring the economic system, raising the living standards of the population, upgrading the technological level of Chinese industry, and reducing the size of the Chinese military establishment.[6]

Deng's assurance that the risks to Chinese security are more manageable has also justified his efforts to increase China's latitude in defining its foreign policy directions. Repeated declarations since 1982 that China "will never attach itself to any other state or bloc of states" underscore China's long-term goal of strategic independence. The PRC's renewed criticisms of the "hegemonism of the two superpowers" are also intended to demonstrate China's claim to such an independent role, since the United States as well as the Soviet Union is again subject to such condemnation. As for all states, however, it is a constrained independence. Even as the Chinese have dissociated themselves from an intimate security relationship with the United States, they recognize the need for much closer Sino-American economic and technological ties and press the United States to permit China far greater access to sensitive technologies with defense applications. The more candid Chinese observers also concede that the U.S. response to the Soviet military buildup of the 1970s was the principal factor explaining China's shift in the early 1980s to what they describe as an overall strategic balance between the superpowers. Perhaps most important, the Chinese understand that any major changes in the regional security environment — especially a serious deterioration in U.S.-China relations or developments that complicate the ability of the United States to deploy military power in the West Pacific — could confound the optimistic projections of senior Chinese officials.

Thus, even as the Chinese strive for improved relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States, they confront a pronounced asymmetry in their relations with the two superpowers. The Soviet Union remains a direct security threat to China even if the PRC asserts that the immediacy of this threat has somewhat diminished in recent years; the United States no longer poses such a threat. Sino-Soviet economic ties have grown appreciably (from $330 million in 1982 to $1.2 billion in

[5] Deng made these remarks in a speech on June 4, 1985, to an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party. Although he has made comparable remarks repeatedly in recent years, their presentation at one of the very infrequent enlarged meetings of the Military Commission gives them added weight. Xinhua Domestic Service, June 11, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, June 12, 1985, pp. K1-2.

[6] See in particular Deng's speech to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission, October 22, 1984, Xinhua, December 31, 1984, in *FBIS-China*, January 2, 1985, pp. K1-6.

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1984, with a target figure of $3.5 billion for the end of the decade.[7] By contrast, Sino-American trade in 1984 totalled $6.1 billion, making the United States China's third largest trading partner. Direct U.S. investment in China has surpassed $1 billion, well in excess of that of any other state. Furthermore, 15,000 Chinese students are also in the United States for advanced training, more than have been sent to all other countries combined.[8] Although a Sino-Soviet agreement of late 1984 establishes a joint commission to monitor economic ties and scientific and technological exchanges, these ties have only begun to develop, in contrast to the twenty-four Sino-American protocols signed since 1979 in areas such as energy, electronics, and high energy physics. Similarly, the long-term Sino-American trade agreement of July 1985 provides for the first direct Soviet role in the Chinese development effort in twenty-five years — including the upgrading of seventeen plants constructed by the USSR in the 1950s and the building of seven new ones. But the agreement remains to be implemented. Thus, the potential for significantly enhanced Sino-Soviet technical and economic cooperation, although real, has yet to be realized. Even if the expectations of such cooperation prove realistic, the Soviet role in China will remain far more modest and limited than the relations that China has already undertaken with the United States and Japan.

Nevertheless, there has been demonstrable forward movement in Sino-Soviet relations since the early 1980s. Despite China's repeated insistence that no "fundamental improvement" in relations will be possible in the absence of a reduction in the Soviet military threat to China (i.e., the "three obstacles" of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the USSR's conventional and nuclear buildup near the Sino-Soviet border, and Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia), leaders in Beijing — including Deng Xiaoping — have concluded that measured, incremental improvements are possible. However, a lively debate seems under way within China about what further steps (if any) China should undertake without serious, substantive concessions from the Soviet Union. The repeated assurances of spokesmen in Beijing that economic, cultural, and personnel exchanges do not imply "normal political relations" appear less persuasive than in the past.[9] As one Chinese account has observed,

[7] Dusko Doder, "Moscow, Peking Sign Pact," *Washington Post*, July 11, 1985.

[8] The data on trade and investment are cited by PRC Ambassador to the United States Han Xu in *Shijie Zhishi*, No. 8, April 15, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, April 23, 1985, p. B1. The data on students were cited by Ambassador Han in Xinhua, December 25, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, December 26, 1985, p. B1. According to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, two-way trade in the first eleven months of 1985 totalled $7.28 billion, an increase of 26 percent over the same period for 1984. (*Los Angeles Times*, January 26, 1986.)

[9] As stated by a Foreign Ministry spokesman: "China [has] always stood for normal political relations with the Soviet Union. We think that the removal of the three major obstacles is essential and necessary to the establishment of such political relations." (Xinhua, May 8, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, May 9, 1985, p. A1.)

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"the years of estrangement in Sino-Soviet relations are now over."[10] The more important issue remains whether these "nonpolitical" steps to diminish tensions and enhance cooperative ties will assume a larger meaning, or whether the Sino-Soviet political relationship will remain essentially unchanged.

The possible renewal of party-to-party ties offers an instructive case in point. In January 1985, a spokesman for the CCP International Liaison Department insisted that "the question of the relations between our two parties is not under consideration now."[11] However, during his visit to the Soviet Union for the Chernenko funeral, Vice Premier Li Peng offered "hearty congratulations and good wishes" from CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang on the occasion of Gorbachev's election as CPSU General Secretary.[12] Subsequently, a Foreign Ministry spokesman described this gesture as "very natural."[13] In an April 1985 meeting with visiting East German officials, Premier Zhao Ziyang stated that "the Chinese Communist Party and Government . . . attached great importance to economic and technological cooperation with the GDR."[14] In May 1985 Hu Yaobang enunciated four principles for relations between parties (independence, complete equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in internal affairs) that appear sufficiently general to allow further movement toward the resumption of party-to-party ties.[15] The restoration of Sino-Soviet trade union relations in August 1985 (when a Soviet labor delegation visited China) represents another such indication,[16] as does the exchange of visits of delegations from the National People's Congress and the Supreme Soviet.[17] Thus, despite repeated Chinese denials that a resumption of high-level political relations is not in the offing, the Chinese may believe that such measured steps and dangled hints of the possibility of resumed party ties will convince the Soviet Union to undertake conciliatory actions of their own, thereby facilitating further steps by the Chinese.

Given the rapidity with which Gorbachev has consolidated his internal political position and the expectation of a long tenure, the Chinese have substantial incentives to demonstrate reasonableness toward the new Soviet leadership. China's readiness to continue improved relations with Moscow in the absence of the Soviets' making even token

[10] Shen Yiming, "Vice Premier Yao Yilin Visits the Soviet Union," *Liaowang,* No. 30, July 29, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* August 12, 1985, p. C2.
[11] Mark Baker, "China Rules Out End to Soviet Rift," *Financial Times,* January 30, 1985, p. 3.
[12] Xinhua, March 14, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* March 15, 1985, p. C1.
[13] Hong Kong *Dagong Bao,* March 16, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* March 18, 1985, p. W1.
[14] Xinhua, April 27, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* April 29, 1985, p. H1.
[15] *Beijing Review,* June 3, 1985, p. 6.
[16] *Trud,* August 21, 1985, in *FBIS-Soviet Union,* August 22, 1985, p. B1.
[17] *Izvestiya,* October 19, 1985, in *FBIS-Soviet Union,* October 22, 1985, p. B1.

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gestures of accommodation regarding the "three obstacles" constitutes an important concession in this regard. Brezhnev had long sought such a decoupling of state-to-state relations from the larger political and security differences between the two sides, but Beijing previously refused to consider this possibility.[18] To this extent, leaders in Moscow believe that they have made a significant breakthrough with Beijing, and at little or no political cost. Chinese actions also confirm the belief of Soviet analysts that important voices within the leadership in Beijing desire an improvement in relations with Moscow, and can be expected to advocate further steps in this regard.

The changes in Sino-Soviet relations evident since 1982 also demonstrate China's movement away from the siege mentality that long predominated in Chinese security strategy. China's departures from the united front strategy of the late 1970s reflect not only a more relaxed view of the threat posed by Moscow, but increased Chinese confidence in the stability of the PRC's relations with the industrialized world. These include the continued improvement of Sino-U.S. relations despite Chinese objections to U.S. support for Taiwan; the further development of Sino-Japanese relations (which senior Chinese officials describe as "the best in history"), including 1984 two-way trade of $13 billion; and the ratification of the Sino-British agreement on the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Under such circumstances, the Chinese believe they can pursue initiatives toward the Soviet Union unthinkable only a few years ago. Nor do Chinese officials see such improvements coming at the expense of China's relations with the West and with Japan. It remains to be seen, however, whether China will be able to sustain this forward movement over the long run in the absence of some perceptible shifts in the continued Soviet effort to pressure and encircle China from north, east, south, and west.

The Cambodian conflict and Beijing's wholly unsuccessful effort to compel a Vietnamese military withdrawal are among the most serious obstacles to China's attempt to reduce Sino-Soviet tensions. In late 1984, Hanoi's army routed anti-Vietnamese resistance elements in western Cambodia, in particular demonstrating the military weakness of the non-Communist military forces. Despite previous assurances from Deng Xiaoping and other senior PRC leaders that a major Vietnamese offensive would elicit a Chinese counterattack, the Chinese refrained from a major military response.[19] The impending arrival of Soviet Vice Premier

[18] See Jonathan D. Pollack, *The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Chinese Security Debate,* The Rand Corporation, R-2907-AF, October 1982, especially pp. 73-80.

[19] For example, Deng Xiaoping allegedly informed West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in October 1984 that "we launched a little operation [against Vietnam in 1979] and taught the Vietnamese a lesson. And we will do so again, if they do not soon withdraw from Cambodia." (See Theo Summer's

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Arkhipov — the highest level Soviet visitor to China in over fifteen years — encouraged the Chinese to be cautious, since the flare-up of Sino-Vietnamese border hostilities the previous April had led Moscow abruptly to postpone Arkhipov's visit originally scheduled for that time. Rather than again risk this possibility — thereby undermining the credibility of Beijing's effort to improve relations with both Moscow and Washington — Vietnam's dry season offensive went largely unanswered by the Chinese.

But Chinese restraint at that time had no effect at a diplomatic level; Moscow was not prepared to urge (let alone compel) Hanoi to move toward a political solution of the Cambodian problem. Indeed, there has been a continued buildup of Soviet forces in Vietnam, including detachments of Tu-16 bombers and MiG-23 fighters. In June 1985, a Chinese foreign ministry official stated that "no sign whatsoever has indicated that the Vietnamese authorities have any sincerity in improving Sino-Vietnamese relations."[20] Perhaps somewhat coyly, Deng in April 1985 proposed that among the "three obstacles," it would be "easiest" for Moscow to urge a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, since "this will not do any harm to the Soviet Union. It can still maintain its relations with Vietnam and can still obtain bases provided by Vietnam."[21] If the Chinese anticipated a serious Soviet response to these overtures, then the results of the first meeting between Gorbachev and Vietnamese leader Le Duan in late June were not particularly encouraging. Although the Vietnamese provided their strongest statement of approval to date for the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow reaffirmed its full support for Hanoi's effort to subjugate Cambodia.[22]

Under these circumstances, Beijing had no incentives to hint at any flexibility toward Hanoi. In September 1985, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman emphatically denied press reports that China was engaged in secret talks with Vietnam over normalization. Although acknowledging that Hanoi had proposed such contacts "through diplomatic channels on several occasions," the spokesman asserted that "as Vietnam is continuing its aggression against and occupation of Kampuchea, there is no point of talking with it."[23] A subsequent Chinese commentary discredited Vietnam's pledge to withdraw all its troops by 1990, and accused Hanoi of serving as "the spearhead of Soviet expansion in Southeast

article in *Die Zeit,* October 12, 1984.) Similarly, Prince Sihanouk claims that on October 1 Deng and Hu Yaobang both promised Sihanouk that China would punish Vietnam in the event of major setbacks for the resistance forces. (William Branigin, "Sihanouk Urges Chinese to Move Against Vietnam," *Washington Post,* February 17, 1985.)

[20] Xinhua, June 26, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* June 26, 1985, p. A1.

[21] Beijing Domestic Television Service, April 17, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* April 18, 1985, p. G1. In the Xinhua version of Deng's television remarks, no mention was made of Soviet bases in Vietnam.

[22] Richard Nations, "A Mild Chill in Moscow," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* July 11, 1985, pp. 10-11.

[23] Xinhua, September 11, 1985, in *FBIS- China,* September 11, 1985, p. A1.

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Asia." The report also claimed that Vietnam was planning a major new offensive "as huge amounts of Soviet-made arms and supplies are being moved to Kampuchea. Also, new reinforcement troops have arrived, Hanoi has received a Soviet promise of doubled aid and Vietnam's Defense Minister Van Tien Dung has explored the possibility of 'cooperation' between Soviet and Vietnamese troops."[24] Such commentaries reflect extreme Chinese pessimism that the Soviets will forego their valuable strategic gains in Southeast Asia and risk their ties with Vietnam for the uncertain dividends that might derive from a political breakthrough with Beijing. The unresolved question for China will be whether and how to respond militarily to any renewed offensive by Vietnam.

Despite Moscow's unresponsiveness to Chinese overtures, Deng believes that China should leave the door ajar to gradual forward movement with the Soviet Union. By abstaining from actions that Moscow is likely to regard as gratuitously provocative, and by avoiding highly visible steps that imply a higher level of security collaboration with the United States, the Chinese hope, in time, to elicit a more positive response from Moscow to their calls for improved political relations. In an interview with a visiting Japanese political delegation in late March 1985, Deng asserted that it would take two to three years for Gorbachev's political priorities to emerge fully and clearly.[25] By implication, Deng believes that China should retain flexibility in its policies toward the USSR on the possibility that the new Soviet leadership might ultimately be prepared to do more than improve the general atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations.

Deng's hopeful reasoning reflects his preoccupation with China's orderly domestic development, rather than optimism that Moscow is likely to undertake a major reappraisal of its policies toward China. A China distracted by regional tensions or engaged in direct military conflict (as in 1979) would be less able to address the domestic tasks that Deng feels must take precedence. At the same time, the lack of an explicit anti-Soviet rationale in China's defense ties with the United States — ties that can be expected to develop further, if slowly — reduces the chance that such relations will provoke a strong reaction from Moscow. But the PRC's posture of limited strategic disengagement could pose serious risks to China's longer-term security interests, especially if Soviet leaders were to conclude that China had become reconciled to the irreversibility of Soviet military deployments directed against the PRC. This judgment is further underscored by the Soviet Union's renewed activism with North Korea, to be discussed below. The balance between the requirements of China's

[24] Lan Tian, "What Lies Behind Vietnam's Proposal of a 'Political Settlement' of Kampuchea Issue," Xinhua Commentary, September 13, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, September 13, 1985, p. E1.
[25] Kyodo, March 28, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, March 29, 1985, p. D1.

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momentous internal transformation and the continuing challenges to PRC security posed by the USSR seem certain to remain matters of utmost importance and continuing debate among leaders in Beijing.

China's Shifting Internal Agenda

Since his return to political power in the summer of 1977, Deng Xiaoping's principal energies have been devoted to moving China away from the trauma of twenty years of intense internal political conflict and toward a far more eclectic, less ideologically constrained set of development policies. At a political level, Deng has sought to displace large numbers of aged or incompetent officials, to promote those with at least a modicum of technical training, to avoid the excessive concentration of political power in any one institution, and to implement measures that supplant lifelong tenure in leadership positions through fixed terms of office. At an economic level, Deng has introduced reforms that reduce the power of central planners and permit far greater latitude for individual enterprises. On the assumption that China's security environment will remain reasonably stable, Deng hopes that China will be able to join the ranks of the rapidly industrializing states of East Asia. His statements and actions concede the failures of China's prior approach to socialist development that stifled initiative, generally excluded the outside world, and provided few incentives for peasants, workers, or scientists to produce or achieve more.

In important respects, the political changes have taken longer and have been more difficult to effect than many of the economic reforms, since they have entailed the removal of numerous officials long entrenched in senior leadership positions and clearly accustomed to the perquisites enjoyed at high levels. Over time, however, Deng has won an increasing number of these battles. In a series of party meetings held in September 1985, Deng secured the resignations of ten out of twenty-four members of the Political Bureau, including numerous aged officials (especially from the armed forces), as well as sixty-four out of 346 full or alternate members of the party Central Committee. These resignations enabled the promotion to these high-level vacancies of younger figures who are overseeing the modernization effort.[26] In a politically shrewd step to minimize any potential discontent among displaced officials, all those resigning are to retain their salaries, housing, and related amenities.[27] By these steps, Deng has

[26] Six of the ten vacancies in the Political Bureau were filled during the plenary session of the CCP Central Committee in September 1985. The Political Bureau presently consists of twenty full members and two alternates. See *Beijing Review,* September 30, 1985, pp. 6-7.

[27] Jim Mann, "China to Let Retiring Officials Keep Perquisites," *Los Angeles Times,* September 19, 1985.

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reduced the political constraints on further change and secured high-level positions for leaders in "the second and third echelons" (i.e., in their sixties and fifties), thereby attempting to ensure policy continuity following his own departure from the political scene.

In the context of these political constraints, China's economic accomplishments of the last half decade have been impressive. The introduction of the agricultural responsibility system in the late 1970s — whereby peasants retain earnings from crop production once state quotas have been fulfilled — has led to major breakthroughs in agricultural output, stimulating the larger process of economic growth. Although longer-term improvements in agricultural performance are likely to require major new capital and technical inputs to the rural sector,[28] few dispute the reforms' demonstrable accomplishments. The Chinese have also shifted investment away from heavy industry and fostered growth of real income, thereby permitting higher levels of consumption and improved living standards.[29]

However, extremely complicated and contentious issues confront the Chinese in soliciting an increased role for foreign capital and technology and in implementing reforms in the urban industrial sector. To upgrade industries burdened with dated technology and to gain access to new production processes in industries undergoing rapid technological change, the Chinese have expanded their export capabilities (in energy, textiles, and foodstuffs), thereby hoping to accumulate the necessary funds to purchase advanced technology and equipment from abroad. The encouragement of increased foreign investment, through joint ventures, compensation trade, and other measures, is also deemed integral to the modernization of China. To date, the results are uneven but encouraging, as Chinese enterprises and trade organizations gradually devise more workable long-term arrangements for collaborating with foreign companies.[30] To judge from the comments of most senior Chinese officials, the encouragement of such an "open door" policy is essential to the nation's long-term development prospects. As stated by Deng Xiaoping, "it is impossible for China to carry out its modernization program without pursuing the open policy."[31]

Given the historical sensitivities regarding a foreign capitalist presence on Chinese soil, the ideological repercussions of these practices remain very delicate political issues. The foreign economic role in China

[28] Nicholas R. Lardy, *Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

[29] Nicholas R. Lardy, "Consumption and Living Standards in China, 1978-1983," *The China Quarterly*, December 1984, pp. 849-65.

[30] Samuel P.S. Ho and Ralph W. Huenemann, *China's Open Door Policy* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984).

[31] Xinhua July 21, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, July 22, 1985, p. D1.

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is concentrated in China's coastal and offshore areas (the latter for energy exploration), in order to limit the potential spillover effects that might result from the introduction of capitalist commercial practices. These include China's special economic zones, first introduced in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces in 1979 but extended in 1984 to an additional fourteen cities, which are intended to provide preferential tax treatment and a variety of other incentives to encourage foreign investment. However, in July 1985 Chinese officials announced a "slowdown" in this activity, with the expansion of the special economic zones to be limited to four cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian, and Guangzhou) "where fairly good conditions for foreign investment exist."[32]

Although some observers interpreted these developments as portending a major reversal in China's recent economic directions,[33] the slowdown seems more a reflection of China's reach exceeding its grasp. In this context, it was increasingly apparent that the additional ten cities lacked the requisite industrial and managerial infrastructures to attract foreign investment or to absorb advanced technology effectively. In Deng's apt description, the special economic zones (as well as the economic reforms as a whole) represent a "bold experiment" that will encounter "certain twists and turns and even mistakes of various degrees." Yet, Deng and other exponents of these policies have also reiterated the clear accomplishments evident in the special economic zones, which have been deemed a "correct" policy.[34]

In addition to the development of the economic zones, an even larger effort has been launched to reinvigorate China's existing industrial enterprises. These changes entail major departures from the research and development system introduced by the Soviet Union in the 1950s but still largely intact within Chinese industry.[35] The reforms are intended to greatly improve industrial efficiency and productivity by stimulating internal demand for more technologically advanced producer and consumer goods; reducing barriers to the dissemination of research results across R&D systems; shifting scientific manpower from basic to applied and developmental research; significantly reducing the role of party personnel in day-to-day economic management; enhancing the authority of skilled technical personnel in business decision making; establishing new

[32] Xinhua July 15, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, July 16, 1985, p. D1.

[33] For one especially pessimistic account, see John F. Burns, "China's 'Open Door' to West Begins to Close," *New York Times*, August 4, 1985.

[34] See Deng Xiaoping's remarks in Xinhua, July 2, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, July 2, 1985, p. G1; and Xinhua, July 15, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, July 15, 1985, p. J1. See also "An Interview with Deng Xiaoping," *Time*, November 4, 1985, pp. 39-40.

[35] For further discussion, see Jonathan D. Pollack, *The R&D Process and Technological Innovation in the Chinese Industrial System*, The Rand Corporation, R-3284, May 1985; id., *The Chinese Electronics Industry in Transition*, The Rand Corporation, N-2306, May 1985; and K.C. Yeh, *Industrial Innovation in China with Special Reference to the Metallurgical Industry*, The Rand Corporation, N-2307, May 1985.

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material incentives for workers and technical personnel to increase the quantity and quality of factory output; and reducing the proportion of factory profits returned to the state, to permit industrial enterprises greater latitude in the allocation of surplus funds. These changes are embodied in party documents on reform of the economic structure and reform of science and technology management, issued in October 1984 and March 1985, respectively.[36] The larger objectives of the reforms are to strengthen greatly the role of market forces in industrial development, reduce the role of central planning in directing the activities of the industrial system, introduce unparalleled levels of competition within the urban economic structure, and encourage far more rapid innovation on the part of the R&D system.

Thus, not only are China's leaders seeking to restructure long-existing approaches to R&D; they are also redirecting financial and organizational resources away from the central planning apparatus and toward individual enterprises — seemingly heretical steps for those accustomed to the tenets of a Soviet-style planning process. In the estimation of Deng and other reformers, however, China has few alternatives if it is to make up lost economic ground, especially in relation to the dynamic economies along the Pacific rim. The Chinese also view such reforms as essential if China is to participate in what is described as "the new technological revolution" in fields such as electronics and telecommunications. In effect, the Chinese are seeking to define a hybrid model of Socialist industrial development involving aspects of both market and plan, for which few if any precedents exist. Indeed, some Chinese argue that the true long-term threat posed by China to the Soviet Union is the possibility that the continued success of the economic reforms will enable China increasingly to outpace Soviet economic performance.[37] It is no surprise then that the Chinese solicit a larger Western role in their development program and look to the experiences of the dynamic industrializing economies of the Pacific in assessing their development options.

However, even optimistic Chinese planners concede that the implementation of such reforms is likely to prove far more difficult and contentious than the introduction of the agricultural responsibility system. Deng, for example, has referred to a period of three to five years within which he hopes the urban economic reforms will take root. By that time he believes "China would have laid the foundation for a sustained and stable economic growth in the following 50 to 70 years."[38]

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[36] For texts of the two documents, see *Hongqi,* No. 20, October 21, 1984, in *China Report — Red Flag,* JPRS-CRF-84-023, pp. 1-20; and *FBIS-China,* March 21, 1985, pp. K1-9.

[37] In an interview with a senior Chinese economic planner, I was told that the Soviet Union "lacked the guts" to undertake reforms comparable to those initiated by China.

[38] Xinhua, July 15, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* July 15, 1985, p. J1.

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The effects to date of the urban reforms remain highly uneven, reflecting the wide differences evident in the technical skills of the Chinese labor force; the varied responses of enterprises to their opportunities for innovation; the differing rates of technological change in various industries; and the infrastructural and managerial conditions prevailing in various sectors. Moreover, introduction of the reforms has led to side effects — not fully anticipated — that demonstrate the complexities inherent in the shift away from central planning. Foremost among these problems is the need for a more rational pricing system, more closely reflecting relative scarcity and demand for various products and services. An additional problem concerns the ability of the planning system to retain macroeconomic control under increased enterprise autonomy. For example, in the fall of 1984 Chinese banks were granted greatly increased latitude in their lending decisions, leading to excessive expansion of the monetary supply. Similar problems were created by the partial devolution of authority to the provinces and to individual enterprises on decisions relating to the expenditure of foreign exchange for acquiring products and industrial processes from abroad. This policy led to major drawdowns in foreign exchange reserves and a ballooning trade deficit (most notably with Japan), as enterprises rushed to acquire goods from abroad.[39] Corruption and black marketeering have also emerged as troublesome problems, fueling criticisms of the open door policy as critics try to slow the pace of policy change. The upsurge of such complications illustrates that the implementation of industrial reforms and the introduction of foreign technology and products is likely to prove highly uneven. It has also led to steps to reassert some central controls over the economy, including severe cuts in imports in the latter half of 1985 and efforts to impose a freeze on foreign exchange expenditures.

In addition to the efforts to acquire advanced technology from the West, some Chinese planners also see relevance in enhanced economic and technological ties with the Soviet Union. Projected increases in Sino-Soviet trade in the latter half of the 1980s reflect a policy initiated in 1982, when trade relations first experienced modest growth. The trade composition will take advantage of complementaries between the two economic systems: Chinese foodstuffs and light industrial products will be exchanged for Soviet trucks, heavy machinery, chemicals, and other industrial products.[40] However, it remains to be seen whether the two sides will be able to match the targeted increases in trade. Even the expansion of the early 1980s fell short of the proposed figures established

[39] See Louise do Rosano, "Overheating the Engine," *China Trade Report,* September 1985, pp. 1,4.

[40] Serge Schmemann, "Soviet-China Trade to Double Under a New Five-Year Pact," *New York Times,* July 11, 1985.

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in the annual trade protocols.[41] Nevertheless, by signing a long-term agreement for the entire period of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) — a step that Beijing resisted even during the 1950s — future Sino-Soviet trade ties will be placed within the long-term planning cycles of both economic systems. In addition, given that China and the Soviet Union will continue to deal through barter arrangements, this trade will not entail any outlays of hard currency reserves. Moreover, the agreement to refurbish a limited number of industrial plants and to construct a small number of new ones suggests that some Chinese planners see the relevance of selected Soviet industrial technologies for some of China's development needs.

Notwithstanding efforts to devise a coherent economic strategy, the Chinese development program could well prove extremely eclectic and (at least in some respects) highly experimental. Furthermore, political logic and the history of past shifts in the Chinese political pendulum caution against viewing the reforms as irreversible. Yet, critics of Deng's policies confront an inescapable reality: support for the reforms is rooted in the demonstrable failures of the past R&D system, the lack of a discernible alternative approach to economic development, and the clear successes that the new policies have already achieved.[42] Thus, regardless of any ideological or political objections to its content, the reform program is likely to remain the central item on the Chinese policy agenda. Moreover, Chinese economic planners recognize that a major effort to reassert central control over industries that have enjoyed substantial decision-making authority for the first time could prove extremely disruptive and very difficult to implement. It is therefore increasingly difficult to imagine the reconstitution of the Chinese central planning system that operated prior to the introduction of the reforms.

China and Korea: Beijing's New Course

China's shifting stance toward the two Koreas offers some of the most telling indications of Beijing's new internal and external policies.[43] Although the Chinese remain constrained by the extraordinary sensitivities of leaders in Pyongyang, leaders in Beijing have assumed a more active role in relation to the peninsula. Especially since the hijacking of a Chinese aircraft to South Korea in May 1983 and the Rangoon bombing in October,

[41] For a pessimistic appraisal by one Chinese planner, see Mary Lee, "Thanks, But No Thanks," *China Trade Report,* September 1985, pp. 10-11.

[42] See in particular "An Interview with Deng Xiaoping," *Time,* November 4, 1985, pp. 39-40.

[43] This section draws upon Jonathan D. Pollack, "U.S.-Korean Relations: The China Factor," to be published in a monograph on U.S.-Korean relations edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Han Sung-Joo.

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China has been testing the possibilities of a more differentiated approach toward both Koreas, despite the uncertainty and strain that this policy has created for Beijing in its relations with the North. For the first time in more than three decades, China is not willing to grant North Korea blanket veto power over PRC policy toward the peninsula.

Chinese actions have included a number of dramatic departures from past policy: (1) China's willingness to engage in contacts with officials and citizens from the Republic of Korea (ROK) in various athletic, scientific, and economic contexts; (2) a burgeoning indirect trade relationship between China and the ROK that, according to most estimates, already exceeds China's trade with the North; (3) related improvements in Chinese-South Korean relations without any discernible breakthroughs in North Korea's efforts to achieve closer ties with the United States at the expense of Washington's relations with South Korea; (4) China's explicit dissociation from North Korean terrorist acts against South Korea; (5) China's continuing pressure on North Korea to pursue a less rigid and more incremental approach to the reunification issue; and (6) China's willingness to cooperate with the United States and Japan in exploring steps that might reduce tensions on the peninsula.

These changes reflect the confluence of four developments: (1) South Korea's steadily widening advantage over North Korea in the long-term economic competition; (2) the ROK's increasing international visibility that North Korea has been unable to stymie or reverse; (3) China's pronounced shift away from rigid central control of the economy and the increased encouragement of a mixed approach to industrial and technological development; and (4) the PRC's effort to separate politics and economics in its foreign policy, leading to increased links with the capitalist states along the Pacific rim and a parallel commitment to regional stability. Although none of these developments made the changes in Chinese policies inevitable, they have contributed to a significant change in the political and economic environment that China's leaders confront in Northeast Asia, providing Beijing with new incentives and opportunities for a more differentiated policy toward the peninsula.

Equally significant, these changes have intersected with three critically important items on the Chinese and North Korean political agendas: (1) the continued salience of the reunification issue to both leaderships, but with sharply asymmetrical circumstances confronting leaders in the two capitals; (2) the leadership succession process in North Korea; and (3) the differing security perceptions and needs of leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang. The succession process is likely to prove especially crucial. The Chinese appear to believe that timely, measured actions on their part will gradually influence the policy choices of leaders in the North.

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Although Chinese leaders entertain few illusions about controlling (or even fully understanding) decision making in Pyongyang, they are persuaded that long-term trends on the peninsula are moving in directions congenial to Chinese interests. In particular, the Chinese seem persuaded that North Korea will ultimately undertake a policy reappraisal analogous to the changes pursued by China since Mao's death. The PRC leadership recognizes that this process will require extremely deft handling lest the Chinese offend the political sensibilities of leaders in Pyongyang. But Beijing has not shown much concern that its actions might precipitate a marked improvement in Soviet-North Korean relations, nor has it let this possibility deter changes in Chinese policy that entail risks for China's ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The opening of multifaceted talks between Seoul and Pyongyang during late 1984 and the spring of 1985 — the first such direct negotiations between the two sides since the abortive North-South talks of the early 1970s — is viewed by Beijing as a major breakthrough. First, it has enabled the Chinese to explore more openly their unofficial relations with the ROK. In a November 1984 interview with visiting Japanese correspondents, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang asserted that the further development of PRC-ROK ties (in particular direct economic ties) "[would] depend on how things develop between North Korea and South Korea."[44] Second, the Chinese have been able to use North Korea's express commitment to a confederal arrangement with South Korea to link their own calls for a "one country, two systems" approach to the unification of Korea. Chinese officials have repeatedly claimed that Beijing and Pyongyang share the same approach to reunification; in February 1985, Deng Xiaoping was quoted publicly for the first time as stating that the "one country, two systems" concept was "the way to solve" both the Chinese and Korean questions.[45]

The North Koreans have not voiced comparable enthusiasm about the relevance of this formula to both situations. Unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been generally able to deny Taiwan the conventional attributes of statehood (i.e., widespread diplomatic recognition, membership in international organizations, etc.). Moreover, the Chinese differentiate between the China-Taiwan question, which in Beijing's view involves the issue of national sovereignty, and the North Korea-South Korea relationship, which they say does not. The ROK *does* enjoy widespread international recognition, including the fact that more than sixty states recognize both North and South. Thus, when the Chinese depict the

[44] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun,* November 26, 1984, p. 7.

[45] Deng initially made this remark to British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe in April 1984. The comment was published by Xinhua, February 3, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* February 4, 1985, p. A1.

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unification of Korea, they assert that neither North nor South will control one another. Although Pyongyang's unification proposals nominally voice a comparable commitment, there is very little in the record of the North Korean behavior of the past thirty-five years — including the proposals of 1984-85 — that lends credence to Pyongyang's commitment to treat the ROK and its leadership as an equal and autonomous political actor. The ultimate implication of China's statements must be particularly unsettling to the North. Although the PRC does not maintain a government-to-government relationship with the ROK, it regards South Korea's existence as an established international fact that it no longer actively contests.

Third, the onset of negotiations on the peninsula has facilitated China's pursuit of regional stability — one of the most important items on the Chinese political agenda. Since North Korea's January 1984 call for tripartite negotiations involving Pyongyang, Washington, and Seoul, the Chinese have generally asserted that the situation on the peninsula has become less tense.[46] Given that political trends among China, the United States, and Japan during 1984 and 1985 generally entailed stability and forward movement, the Chinese have been able to enjoy the political and economic dividends of closer Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. However, with the exception of a modest trade relationship with Japan, North Korea remains entirely excluded from this process. The gap between Chinese and North Korean depictions of the regional political and security environment remains glaring. North Korea continues to offer a steady stream of ominous warnings about the imminence of war, the U.S. nuclear threat to the DPRK, and an emergent "U.S.-Japanese-South Korean triangular military alliance" — claims that are almost totally ignored by the Chinese. Thus, North Korea remains deeply troubled by China's readiness to live with existing political and security arrangements on the peninsula. Although the Chinese voice occasional criticisms of certain aspects of U.S. military policy (for example, the annual Team Spirit exercises between U.S. and South Korean forces), these criticisms are generally low-key, and are no longer accompanied by biting attacks on the legitimacy of the presence of U.S. forces. By implication, the Chinese recognize that U.S. forces remain a stabilizing element on the peninsula, to which the PRC (much to North Korea's dismay) no longer takes strenuous exception.[47]

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[46] See, for example, Zheng Baoqin, "New Developments in North-South Korean Dialogue," *Ban Yue Tan,* No. 14, July 25, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* August 28, 1985, pp. D3-5.

[47] While visiting Japan in March 1984, Vice Premier Wan Li stated that "we hope that South Korean and American troops stationed there will not launch military actions" — a tacit acknowledgement that China was not calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces on the peninsula. (*Beijing Review,* March 12, 1984, p. 3.)

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China's adjustment to regional political and economic realities — and Beijing's continuing effort to depict trends on the peninsula in an optimistic light — stands in stark contrast to the strident, alarmist quality of North Korean statements. The glaring discontinuities in Chinese and North Korean commentaries on developments such as the DMZ shooting incident of late 1984 — in particular, China's factual accounts of these events and its remarkably evenhanded depiction of North-South relations — suggest the degree to which Beijing and Pyongyang appear headed in conflicting directions, even if these differences have not yet produced a serious rupture.[48]

Thus, the Chinese have adopted a "walking on two legs" strategy. In terms of government-to-government ties, China still deals exclusively with the DPRK in Pyongyang, enabling senior Chinese officials to maintain the public fiction that "there is no change whatsoever in our policy toward South Korea . . . [and] there will be no change in the future."[49] The Chinese also continue to voice full support for North Korean overtures to the South — a necessary but essentially cost-free means of maintaining a credible political relationship with the North. In terms of actual practice, however, there is an increasing if tacit Chinese acceptance of the reality of South Korea — a divergence in actions and policies between China and North Korea that China cultivates and North Korea has been unable to prevent.

Indeed, not only have the Chinese diverged from their long fealty to the North Korean policy line, Deng himself has quietly acknowledged differences with Pyongyang.[50] But these differences reflect contradictions rather than a crisis in relations. Even as North Korea in 1984 and 1985 resurrected its long-strained relations with the Soviets — an effort that appears to be bearing substantial fruit, including the first major Soviet military deliveries to the DPRK in fifteen years — Kim Il Sung did not wish to see a precipitous deterioration in relations with the PRC. By depicting Northeast Asian security at odds with Chinese views and closely identified with those of Moscow, Kim hopes to achieve three goals: to caution the Chinese against moving too far with South Korea or assenting more fully to the U.S. regional security role; to elicit increased economic

[48] Compare, for example, Tao Bingwei, "New Development of Relations Between North Korea and South Korea," *Shijie Zhishi,* No. 24, December 16, 1984, in *FBIS-China,* January 31, 1985, especially p. D1; Zheng Baoqin, "The Situation on the Korean Peninsula Tends Toward Relaxation," *Ban Yue Tan,* No. 2, January 25, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* February 28, 1985, pp. D1-2; and Kim Tae Hwa, "The U.S. Must Respond Quickly to Our Proposal for Tripartite Talks," *Kulloja,* No. 1, January 1985, in *FBIS-Asia and Pacific,* March 4, 1985, pp. D1-5.

[49] This opinion was expressed by Vice Premier Li Peng during a 1984 visit to Japan. *Mainichi Shimbun,* September 8, 1984, p. 3.

[50] In an October 1984 conversation with a visiting Japanese delegation, Deng observed that "we do not necessarily agree with some policies made by North Korea." ("Deng Warns of Eruption in U.S.-China Ties Over Taiwan," *New York Times,* October 12, 1984.)

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and political support that he has not received from Beijing; and to secure more advanced weapon systems (including MiG-23 fighter aircraft) that the PRC cannot make available to the North. The Chinese repeatedly express the view that Kim Il Sung will not mortgage his hard-won independence by offering major concessions to the Soviets as the price of securing increased aid. At the same time, the Chinese have publicly endorsed the improvements in Soviet-North Korean relations, which they describe as part of Pyongyang's effort (like that of China) to develop an independent foreign policy and broaden contacts with the outside world.[51] It remains to be seen whether China's optimism will be borne out. Indeed, should Moscow be able to upgrade significantly its military relations with North Korea, it would constitute a major challenge to China's oft-repeated view that the Soviet Union's political and military pressure against the PRC has eased and is likely to ease even further, thereby undermining China's continued efforts to reduce Sino-Soviet tensions.

But the Chinese believe that gradual policy engagement with the DPRK will ultimately lead to important policy changes in the North. Senior North Korean officials visited Shanghai and Shenzhen during 1984 to inspect the results of China's economic reforms and its open door policy, leading Hu Yaobang to inform visitors that North Korea now approved of these steps.[52] The promulgation of a North Korean joint venture law paralleling that adopted by China is taken by some observers as an indication that the DPRK is moving in these directions. Indeed, in October 1984 Deng Xiaoping encouraged Japanese investors to become involved in such arrangements with Pyongyang, "however small the profits there are."[53] Through such encouragement and the example of China's own economic progress, China hopes that it can nudge North Korea to undertake a more ambitious program of economic reform. Deng may also indicate to North Korea that pragmatic economic steps could represent a political foot in the door with the outside world.

Regardless of the uncertainties, China no longer assumes a reactive posture toward the peninsula. At present, China enjoys a unique position among the major powers involved on the Korean peninsula: It alone has the capability to deal credibly with both North and South, at the same time that it enjoys close economic and political links to the United States and Japan. Although China will continue faithfully to present the North Korean case to the United States and Japan, Beijing no longer feels constrained in pursuing its own long-term policy goals, including implied limits to the nature of its defense obligations to the DPRK. The

[51] See the remarks of the spokesman of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xinhua, September 11, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* September 11, 1985, p. A1.

[52] Jiji Press, July 5, 1984.

[53] Kyodo, October 23, 1984, in *FBIS-China,* October 23, 1984, p. D1.

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Chinese see the dangers of inaction outweighing any possible risks, thus leading Beijing to become more actively and visibly engaged in developments on the peninsula than at any previous point in the past three decades. In Chinese-Korean relations and at other levels, however, a key question remains: What are the potential policy developments that could undermine China's optimistic calculations about its present political and economic opportunities?

Trends and Implications

The dramatic economic and political changes in China since the late 1970s — many of them launched by an eighty-one-year-old leader of singular authority and extraordinary resilience — raise the inevitable issue of the long-term prospects for policy stability and continuity in the PRC. To what extent are such policies institutionalized? How lasting are the decisions that China has made under Deng's leadership? What developments might undermine the course Deng has initiated? Or, has Deng so transformed the Chinese policy agenda that no leader or group of leaders will be able to reverse the PRC's present political and economic directions?

Deng has repeatedly voiced optimism about the prospects for continuity of his policies, a point underscored by the results of the September 1985 party meetings, where numerous younger members of his reformist coalition were promoted to ranking positions in the leadership. Deng has initiated a long-term process of political change, but the long-term stability and success of the reforms will depend on factors beyond his control. Indeed, Deng has argued that political continuity must be based on successful policies, rather than dependent on a single individual. On balance, having made a cathartic break with the tumultuous political past, it is very difficult to conceive of China yet again undergoing a period of isolation akin to the Cultural Revolution. The xenophobic policies of that era have been thoroughly discredited. Even among those who express doubts about the ideological, political and cultural consequences of the reforms (most notably, senior economic planner Chen Yun and party ideologist Hu Qiaomu), it is inconceivable that any leader would wish to see China again plagued by weakness, vulnerability, and extreme divisiveness. To this extent, it appears that Deng has achieved a conclusive alteration in the terms and boundaries of Chinese political debate. Judgments about China's future political orientation may ultimately become matters of gradation rather than stark ideological choice.

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However, to judge from his decision to remain politically active,[54] Deng believes that his continued involvement will further entrench reformist policies. His decision may also reflect continued difficulties in implementing reforms in some areas, most notably in the armed forces. The process of reform in the military — and in particular Deng's campaign to convince aged generals to relinquish their authority and position —has developed slowly. It is revealing that Deng continues to retain his chairmanship of the Central Military Commissions of both the party and state — quite possibly indicating where his leadership is most needed. Thus, Deng has gradually sought to build an organizational constituency within the officer corps to supplant those who view the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a bastion of cultural and political tradition.[55]

Developments during 1985 indicate major breakthroughs in Deng's long-term strategy for military reform. The decisions announced at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in June, the transfer or replacement of most regional military commanders (most notably Li Desheng, long-time commander of the Shenyang Military Region), and the retirement of numerous superannuated military leaders from their party posts in September suggest that Deng has finally eroded the power of those within the armed forces blocking implementation of his policies.[56] Although the decision to reduce the armed forces by one million men between 1985 and 1987 was justified as a unilateral initiative by the PRC to contribute to world peace, it seems extremely unlikely that these reductions will be drawn from any of Beijing's frontline combat units. Rather, the decision will permit a streamlining and rationalization of an extremely bloated military establishment, allowing substantial reductions in leadership organs as well as the elimination of redundant military units.[57]

Even as oblique hints of debate surfaced over the decision on troop reduction,[58] senior military officials stated that the manpower reduction would enable the armed forces "to transfer more funds for the research and development of modern weapons and technical equip-

[54] For example, Deng indicated to a Japanese political delegation in March 1985 that he intended to remain active during the period of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). This decision altered Deng's stated intention expressed in the early 1980s to retire by 1985. Kyodo, March 28, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* March 29, 1985, p. D1.

[55] For a thoughtful review of recent Party-army dynamics, see Alastair I. Johnston, "Changing Party-Army Relations in China, 1979-1984," *Asian Survey,* October 1984, pp. 1012-1039.

[56] See the account by Lo Ping in *Zheng Ming,* No. 93, July 1, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* July 8, 1985, pp. W4-8.

[57] For detailed discussions, see the interview with Military Commission Permanent Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun in *Liaowang,* No. 27, July 8, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* July 17, 1985, pp. K2-6; and Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi, "A Strategic Decision on Strengthening the Building of Our Army in the New Period," *Hongqi,* No. 15, August 1, 1985, in *FBIS-China,* August 8, 1985, pp. K1-7.

[58] According to Hu Yaobang, "the decision was made after two years of repeated deliberation and a cool and objective analysis of the international situation and China's own defense capabilities." (Xinhua, June 11, 1985, in *FBIS-China,*, June 11, 1985, p. H1.)

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ment."[59] Through such arrangements, Deng and his allies hope to enhance the power of reform-minded officers within the armed forces, thereby facilitating an incremental modernization strategy within the defense establishment.

Deng's strategy for defense modernization remains based on deferring near-term military acquisitions while addressing the broader needs of industrial growth and technological innovation. The virtues of development-first orientation were outlined by Deng in a major speech delivered in October 1984:

> Quadrupling China's gross annual value of industrial and agricultural production [between 1980 and 2000] is of great significance. It means that by the end of this century, China's GNP will reach $1 trillion . . . If reflected in our national power, we will become a relatively strong country. This is because by that time, if we use 1 percent of our GNP for national defense, it will amount to $10 billion and if we use 5 percent, it will amount to $50 billion, provided that our GNP reaches $1 trillion. We can do a lot with $10 billion, and improving some of our equipment will be an easy job.[60]

Such a program for military modernization would permit selective acquisition of more advanced military systems (including some purchases of foreign military technology), but only when China's defense industrial infrastructure and military establishment are able to absorb such an infusion.

There appear to be three possible security developments that could alter Deng's optimistic calculations: (1) stepped-up Soviet military actions or additional Soviet deployments in Asia that heighten pressure on the PRC; (2) renewed military tensions or serious hostilities within the region (e.g., with Vietnam); and (3) unexpectedly rapid technological breakthroughs in the Soviet-American strategic defense competition that degrade the credibility of China's nuclear deterrent. Any of these developments could compel Beijing to reconsider its assumption of diminished threats to PRC security and necessitate near-term defense acquisitions that China would like to avoid or defer to a later date. Viewed in the context of the development program as a whole, Beijing's efforts to diminish regional tensions and avoid embroilment in the Soviet-American competition become much more understandable. At the same time, renewed difficulties in U.S.-China relations — especially those that question Beijing's access to sophisticated "dual use" technologies — would undermine the PRC's long-term goal of strategic independence.

In an internal context, sustaining the momentum of the reform will depend on the continued success of China's economic policies,

[59] Yang Shangkun in *Liaowang*, July 8, 1985, p. K6.

[60] Deng, Speech to Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission, October 22, 1984, Xinhua, December 31, 1984, in *FBIS-China*, January 2, 1985, P. K3.

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Deng's ability to institutionalize his policies, and an orderly transfer of political power to his successors. But Deng must also continue to deflect the criticisms of those who see the reforms threatening the fundamental tenets of Chinese socialism. Deng's public comments on the reforms — in particular, his commitment to "the predominant position of public ownership in the economy and prevention of the polarization of wealth in the drive for prosperity for all" — reflect his sensitivity to the political consequences of a modernization strategy totally unconstrained by ideological criteria.[61] Thus, Deng and those who succeed him must hope that the economic reforms work well, but not so well that they pose a larger risk to the prevailing character of the political system.

By virtue of the policies introduced in the past half decade, Deng Xiaoping has recast the agenda of Chinese internal and external politics. He does not believe that the Chinese Communist Party has any alternative: "China's history over the past few centuries has showed that a closed-door policy leads only to backwardness . . . China has started its new march . . . to improve productivity and raise the people's living standards while adhering to the principles of socialism. The only way to improve productivity is to restructure China's economy."[62] Thus, Deng perceives an interconnected quality between his internal and external goals. By virtue of the requirements of the modernization strategy, an internationally engaged China has a very large and continuing stake in amicable relations with its neighbors in Northeast Asia and substantial incentives for a more predictable relationship with both superpowers. It is precisely these considerations that augur well for a constructive Chinese role within East Asia and a continued effort by the leadership in Beijing to sustain the extraordinary political and economic transformation underway within China.

[61] Xinhua, August 29, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, August 29, 1985, p. D1.
[62] Xinhua, August 28, 1985, in *FBIS-China*, August 28, 1985, p. D1.

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JORDAN AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: THE HASHEMITE PREDICAMENT

by Aaron D. Miller

The story is told of the young King Hussein who asked one of his grandfather's aged Bedouin troopers about the key to a long life. "The answer is simple, your Majesty," the old man replied. "Never begin any journey into the desert until you are certain your camels can carry the load." There is little doubt that the king took the old man's lesson to heart. For more than three decades, Hussein ibn Talal has preserved his throne by maneuvering cautiously between the domestic and external challenges threatening the Hashemite kingdom. Hussein's record, to be sure, has not been unblemished. Given the limited resources at his disposal and the magnitude of the threats Jordan has faced, the king's staying power has been impressive. Even his critics concede that Hussein's longevity — he is one of the longest governing monarchs in the world today — is itself a remarkable testament to his success.

Hussein's staying power — variously attributed to the force of his personality, his popularity, and to his control over the army and security service — flows primarily from the king's recognition of Jordan's limitations and from a keen understanding of the domestic and external constraints on Jordan's options. This caution and reserve is frequently buried beneath a torrent of high-sounding rhetoric about defending Arab and Palestinian rights — rhetoric that consistently suggests a greater role for Jordan than it seems capable of playing. But these rhetorical excesses are tempered by Hussein's acute appreciation of what is possible. What is striking about Hussein's world view is his recognition of one elemental fact: any strategy that exceeds the resources on hand to achieve it is a prescription for disaster. The king's decision to enter the 1967 war against Israel is a case in point. Yet even this move, Hussein's costliest mistake, was doubtless weighed against the risks to his prestige of staying neutral and exposing the Hashemites once again to charges of profiting at the expense of the Arab and Palestinian cause.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or of any other U.S. government agency.

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Hussein's recognition of Jordan's limitations, however, competes with the motive that has driven Hashemite policies for nearly sixty years — a strong desire to play a major role in the Arab world and in the Arab-Israeli arena. This ambition, which can be traced to Hussein's great-grandfather, Sharif Hussein of Mecca, was linked to the Hashemites' own sense of their historical importance as direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammed, rulers of Mecca and the Hijaz districts since the tenth century, and later, standard bearers of the Arab nationalist uprising against the Ottoman Turks. This sense of mission and destiny was most evident in the policies of Hussein's grandfather Abdullah, founder of the modern Kingdom of Jordan. It is also clear in Hussein's own self-image and aspirations. The legacy of the past, particularly Hussein's tie to Abdullah and his loss of Jerusalem and the West Bank in the 1967 war, weighs heavily on him, coloring much of his perspective on Arab-Israeli issues. This sense of loss and shame, in contrast to the role the Hashemites believe they should play, is often overlooked in assessing Hussein's policies. Few seem to recall that with Jordan's loss of Jerusalem in the 1967 war, the Hashemite family is now burdened with the responsibility for losing Islam's three holiest cities.

This sensitivity to limits, combined with Jordan's traditional desire to play a larger role in the region, has presented Hussein with what we might call the "Hashemite predicament": Jordan has interests and ambitions in the region which exceed the resources at its disposal to protect its interests or to effect its ambitions. These ambitions and interests flow not only from the Hashemite family's prestige and idealized self-image but from clear political and strategic imperatives, as in the case of the Palestinian issue. Nonetheless, Jordan's location and demographic make-up limit Hussein's options and highlight the Hashemites' vulnerability. Sandwiched between a militarily superior Israel, Syria, and Iraq and a traditionally patronizing Saudi Arabia, Jordan has often been forced to subordinate its interests to the Arab consensus and to pursue its objectives cautiously and tentatively. Hussein has frequently acted boldly in an Arab and Palestinian context — witness his move to crush the fedayeen in Jordan in 1970 or his quick and steady support for Iraq in its war against Iran. He has been reluctant, however, to act unilaterally in an Arab-Israeli arena.

Nowhere is this dilemma more clearly illustrated than in Jordan's involvement in the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli peace process. And nowhere is Hussein's caution, his need to weigh risks against opportunities, better reflected than in his personal relationship with these concerns. For thirty years, the problem of Palestine and Palestinians has been a core issue in Jordanian domestic and foreign policy. It has been

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a source of prestige and vulnerability for both Hashemite kings. Moreover, the Palestine issue is a problem from which Jordan cannot escape because it involves both banks of the Jordan River. The presence of more than a million Palestinians on the East Bank cuts to the core of Jordan's identity and future stability. The issue of the West Bank, although inextricably linked to these problems, encompasses the separate issue of working out a modus vivendi with Israel and the Palestinian national movement.

These two components of the Palestinian issue pose three challenges that highlight the key issues confronting Jordan for the foreseeable future: the problem of *demography,* the search for *national identity,* and the problem of *competitive and cooperative relations* with *Israel and the PLO.* In managing each, Hussein must search for solutions compatible with Jordan's domestic and external pressures — a fact that leads not to bold and decisive action but to a more ambiguous and tentative decision-making style. This hesitancy promotes speculation that Hussein is neither serious about nor committed to negotiations with Israel but is more concerned with motion without movement in an effort to secure advanced weapons from the United States and carry on a never-ending minuet with Arafat.

Because these three challenges pose consequences for Jordan that cut to the core of its future stability, they force Hussein to consider a negotiated solution of the Palestinian problem and peace with Israel. For the short term, the risks posed by these challenges are probably manageable. The East Bank Palestinian population is relatively well-integrated and quiescent, and the PLO has been greatly weakened in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion. In fact, there are those who wonder why Jordan needs to expose itself to Syria, cooperate with its traditional enemy, the PLO, and set the stage for a new relationship with the West Bank that could become more of a liability than an asset. In short, why not let the West Bank go and concentrate on the security, economic development, and political problems of the East Bank?

Assessing Hussein's innermost thoughts and motives on the Palestinian issue is problematic. It is likely that the king's perception of the Palestinian issue is shaped as much by the past and future as by the current situation. In addition to Hussein's desire to restore Hashemite prestige for the loss of the West Bank and Jerusalem, he calculates that an unresolved Palestinian issue will ultimately undermine Hashemite control of the East Bank. It is not only the unfocused fear of another Arab-Israeli war or the growth of radicalism in the region that shapes Hussein's thinking. Rather, it is his fear that an increasingly alienated East Bank Palestinian majority, under-represented in the Jordanian political system and extremely receptive to a radicalized Palestinian national movement,

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will threaten and ultimately undermine Hashemite control. At a minimum, the PLO will seek to turn Jordan into its next base for continuing the struggle against Israel. This process, in the king's mind, will be accelerated by the outmigration of Palestinians from the West Bank as Israel's de facto annexation becomes formalized. While Hussein doubtless understands that his successors will have to deal with the problems posed by a Palestinian majority within the Hashemite kingdom even if there is no West Bank settlement, he probably calculates that a West Bank compromise would allow the Hashemites to better manage their Palestinian problem and to preserve control.

Hussein is no sentimentalist; neither is he a reckless visionary. The legacy of the past and the long-term risks and payoffs of the future have to be weighed carefully against the short-term consequences of marshaling Arab and Palestinian support and, ultimately, of negotiating with Israel. Paradoxically, the same factors that push Hussein to consider negotiations also constrain him to keep out. Jordan's large Palestinian population, Hussein's dependence on the PLO, and his lack of Arab support limit his maneuverability even before he gets to the negotiating table with Israel — the place where he will need to be the most flexible and pragmatic. Complicating Jordan's decision to enter into direct talks is the conventional and unconventional threat posed by Syria — a problem that Hussein must somehow resolve. He must either find a way to neutralize Syrian opposition or he must try to determine those circumstances that would produce Syrian participation.

Hussein realizes that the unique bond between Israel and the United States and Israel's control over the West Bank will weaken his position going into negotiations — a fact that forces him not only to seek cover to enter the process but also compels him to find ways to strengthen his leverage at the table before negotiations begin. Thus, Hussein needs PLO, Arab, and international backing for any bid to enter negotiations. And it is for this reason that he shys away from direct bilateral talks with the Israelis. Unlike Sadat, Hussein believes he is in no position to make unilateral moves toward Israel which defy the Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue or on the return of all Arab (including Syrian) territory. There is little chance that Hussein will unilaterally cross any Arab-Israeli Rubicon without sufficient protection and guarantee.

In the end, Hussein's calculations on the key question of negotiating with Israel will not be shaped by long-range considerations, although these will provide the background for his actions. Instead, Hussein will decide by weighing the immediate risks and opportunities. In short, is the political balance of power sufficiently tipped his way to offset the risks of moving ahead?

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To some degree Hussein has already concluded that the current environment offers opportunities. Three factors — a popular two-term president who has attached his name to an initiative that accords Hussein a central role, a weakened yet credible Arafat, and a Labor prime minister committed in principle to territorial compromise — have set the stage for a possible peace process. To minimize the risks involved in a Jordanian bid to enter negotiations, Hussein is banking on developing two relationships which he has been cultivating intensely over the past year — first, a link with the PLO to reduce the dangers of moving to the negotiating table and, second, a relationship with the Americans designed to increase his leverage once he arrives. Although Arab support is critical in Hussein's calculations, he knows that Jordan will never get a ringing endorsement of its peace initiatives from its Arab allies. This lack of Arab support explains Hussein's insistence on international cover, most likely an international conference, to temper the impact of direct negotiations with Israel. The support of Arafat and the Americans, however, is vital. Unless Hussein can ensure that Arafat shoulders a large part of the responsibility for Arab concessions and that the United States is prepared to use its leverage on Israel to give up territory, he will not embark on a risky course that could increase Arab pressures on Jordan and accelerate the radicalization of Palestinians on the East Bank and outside.

The paradox in Hussein's approach is clear. In minimizing the risks of negotiating with Israel, he has maximized his reliance on a number of regional and international factors beyond his control. Moreover, the Jordanian strategy requires the PLO and the United States to take controversial steps that could not only overload their respective political circuits but could prejudice the outcome of the negotiations before they ever begin. These include a U.S.-PLO dialogue based on PLO acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, Israel's right to exist, a probable renunciation of terrorism, and an international conference that might invite Soviet and Syrian participation. Even if it were possible to coordinate such a package without a breakdown in the process, such an approach would then have to be sold to the Israelis. And it is extremely unlikely that any Israeli government, let alone one that is balanced between Labor and Likud, could respond positively. In the end, Hussein may discover that his approach, while designed to afford Jordan maximum protection, has so tipped the political balance against his Israeli interlocutors that they have no incentive to participate in the peace process.

The Legacy of the Past

Before turning to Hussein's current tactics and strategy toward the peace process, it is important to consider briefly the historical context

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in which Hashemite policies developed. Jordan's relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue flows from its geography and demography — elemental factors that are impossible for nations to change. Where Jordan is and what it has become shape its approach to the Palestinian problem in a way that is unmatched by any other Arab state. Even Syria, which claims that Palestine was also carved from its own territory, cannot rival the bonds that tie the Hashemites to the area west of the Jordan River. Between 1948 and 1967, Jordan alone controlled a vital part of historic Palestine. Unlike Egypt's control over Gaza, Jordan formally incorporated the West Bank into its own territory. Moreover, these links were not only to the territory but to the tenants. Abdullah and Hussein established unique relationships with Palestinians there and on the East Bank. And of all the Arab states, only Jordan granted citizenship en masse to the Palestinian refugees who resided within its borders. Despite the restrictions on Palestinians, they assimilated and were integrated into the East Bank's economic and political life in a way unparalleled elsewhere. More than a million Palestinians, (a quarter of the world's total) reside in Jordan today — a fact that by itself makes the Palestinian issue more salient for Jordan than for any other Arab state.

How the Hashemite kings dealt with these realities constitutes the history of the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship over the past sixty years. For Abdullah, the problem of Palestine was inextricably bound to the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1922 and emerged as the central issue in his foreign policy after World War II. Despite the formal separation of the area west of the Jordan from the British mandate, a fact Abdullah grudgingly came to accept, he never really relinquished his goal of uniting both banks of the Jordan River — both as an end in itself and as a stepping stone to a Hashemite-dominated Greater Syria.

For Abdullah, who once admitted that he was never content with his "wilderness of Transjordania," Palestine's appeal continued well after his hopes for creating a Greater Syria had been dashed. The area west of the Jordan offered a natural direction for Hashemite expansion and presented a potential source of markets and capital, as well as an outlet to the sea. Moreover, there was Jerusalem — a prize that carried special significance for a family that had been deprived of its traditional control over Islam's two most holy cities. Finally, Abdullah could not ignore the potential challenge from a disorganized, though radicalized, Palestinian national movement under the control of his arch-rival Haj al-Amin al-Husayni, "Mufti of Jerusalem." Abdullah, like his grandson Hussein, came to see that he must play the pre-eminent role in managing the Palestinian issue west of the Jordan in order to preserve his own regime. "The Mufti and Kuwatly [President of Syria] want to set up an

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independent Arab state in Palestine with the Mufti at its head. If that were to happen I would be encircled by enemies on all sides," Abdullah confided to a friend in 1947.[1]

Events in Palestine between 1947 and 1949 presented opportunities and risks that were too important for Abdullah to ignore. The day after the state of Israel was established, Jordanian forces entered the West Bank. By 1949, Abdullah had added 2,200 square miles to the Hashemite kingdom, secured Jerusalem, and, in his view, enhanced his family's prestige. After 1948, Abdullah had himself crowned King of Jerusalem by the Coptic Church, treated the city like a second capital, and held Friday prayers there.[2]

Despite the liabilities of incorporating thousands of better educated and urbanized Palestinians into a traditional rural and nomadic environment, Abdullah believed that his Palestine policy was a natural result of the Hashemites' role and historic responsibility. This involvement in the affairs of Palestine was also an exercise in realpolitik but it gave to Abdullah, as an outsider in an Arab world of leaders seeking to justify their own hold on power, a unique sense of mission and destiny. Pushed out of the Arabian peninsula by the al-Sauds, forced from Damascus by the French, and denied their traditional role as protectors of the Hijaz, the Hashemites needed Palestine to recoup their prestige and regain their rightful influence and status. Whatever his rivalries with his brothers, Abdullah had a strong sense of family loyalty. As T. E. Lawrence recalled, Abdullah's object was, of course, the winning of Arab independence and the building up of Arab nations, "but he meant to keep the direction of the new states in the family."[3] The bitter irony of Abdullah's quest was that it brought him into direct conflict with his Arab neighbors and Palestinian nationalists who accused him of profiting from the 1948 Arab defeat and of cooperating with the British and the Israelis — a charge Arab radicals would later level at his grandson. Abdullah's murder in 1951 with Hussein at his side at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem by a young follower of the Mufti revealed just how dangerous Hashemite involvement in the problem of Palestine had become.

Abdullah bequeathed a complete legacy to his grandson. Accompanying the prestige and authority Abdullah believed the West Bank had given the Hashemites was the increasingly difficult challenge of reconciling Hashemite and Palestinian interests within the context of the

[1] Jon and David Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1960), p. 59.

[2] Naim Sofer, "The Political Status of Jerusalem in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1948-1967," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim, eds., *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel* (London: Frank Cass, 1982), pp. 225-73.

[3] T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1926), p. 41.

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merged banks. For the most part Hussein followed the precedents set by his grandfather for whom he felt a profound affection and respect. Like Abdullah, Hussein envisioned some form of unity of the two banks as a natural and inevitable result of the linkage of destiny between Palestinians and Hashemites. And like Abdullah, Hussein tried through cooptation and control to subordinate a separate Palestinian identity within a larger Jordanian framework. In addition to coercion and material benefits, Hussein's secret weapon was his ability, at least until the 1960s, to manipulate Palestinian political desires and to convince the Palestinians that Arab unity under a Hashemite aegis could most effectively realize their joint goals of liberating Palestine. "Jordanians on both Banks are equal members of one big family," Hussein remarked in April 1964.[4]

Merging the two identities became even more important for Hussein as the Palestinian national movement grew increasingly independent and militant during the 1960s. The creation of the PLO and its emphasis on a separate Palestinian entity not only challenged the Hashemites' credentials and authority as patrons of the Palestinian cause but threatened their security. It was dangerous enough that Fatah and the other independent groups talked about the immediate liberation of their land. But these Palestinian nationalists provided a new focus of identity for Palestinians residing on the East Bank as well. Indeed, Abdullah's worst fears about the Mufti paled in comparison to the potential danger an independent and militant PLO would pose to his grandson.

Hussein's fateful decision to enter the 1967 war against Israel accelerated the competition and rivalry with the Palestinian movement while adding a new dimension to the Hashemite legacy on Palestine. The war had one unforeseen benefit: defeated, the Hashemites were able to do something they were never really able to do in victory — create closer ties with those other Arab regimes, Egypt and Syria, that were also linked to the 1967 debacle through loss of territory. Nonetheless, Israel's crushing defeat of the combined Arab armies created formidable challenges for the Hashemites. First, it strengthened the prestige and power of independent Palestinian organizations and increased their ability to compete for leadership on the Palestinian issue. Moreover, Israel's crackdown on Palestinian terrorist activity in the West Bank led the fedayeen to shift the focus of their activities to the East Bank, setting the stage for the events of September 1970. Second, the consequences of the defeat were a terrible personal blow to Hussein and to Hashemite authority. Hashemites who had taken Jerusalem and the West Bank a decade and a half earlier were now burdened with its loss.

[4] *Middle East Record 1967*, vol. 3, (Jerusalem: Israeli Universities Press, 1971), p. 392.

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Hashemite interest in the West Bank went beyond matters of prestige and focused on the authority and survival of the regime. The Abdullah-Mufti rivalry was replaced by a more bitter struggle between Hussein and the Palestinian resistance movement, culminating in the explosive events of Black September 1970. If the king had any doubts that the Palestinian question could engulf both banks of the Jordan River, they were shattered by the fedayeen challenge to his authority. After 1970, Hussein became even more determined to defuse, coopt, and manage the forces of Palestinian nationalism.

Once again hard political and demographic realities only confirmed the Hashemite view that Jordanian-Palestinian destinies had to be linked within a common, but Hashemite-dominated, framework. It was no coincidence that within a year after the Jordanian army had crushed the Palestinians, Hussein proposed a plan for a Federated Arab Kingdom consisting of two regions, one on each side of the Jordan with one army, a federal judiciary, and an executive controlled by Amman. The West Bank's capital was to be Jerusalem and it was to have its own judiciary, executive, and legislative authority within the federal structure.

While the Rabat decision of November 1974 undercut Hussein's role and elevated the PLO to an unprecedented level of authority, he continued to emphasize the importance of a union between the two banks. In May 1982 he noted: "We and the Palestinians have been a single people in the past and the present . . . this future may be realized in the declaration of a federation (union), between the West Bank and Jordan on the basis of Jordanian and Palestinian choice."[5] The Reagan initiative in September 1982, the ongoing dialogue with Arafat, and the February 11 agreement have kept the issue of a close Jordanian-Palestinian relationship on center-stage.

Although Hussein's approach to the Palestinian issue is clearly similar to his grandfather's, there are important differences. First, Hussein, unlike Abdullah, seemed determined to normalize Jordan's relations with key Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria. Moving Jordan back into the security of the Arab consensus was much easier in the wake of the 1967 war — a conflict which linked Syria, Jordan, and Egypt not only in battle but in defeat. Moreover, Jordan's growing economic dependence on Arab support provided additional incentives for staying within the Arab consensus on key issues — something Abdullah routinely ignored. Hussein's decision, however, was not only imposed on him by circumstance; it was a calculation based on the king's recognition that Hashemite objectives could only be pursued by working within the parameters estab-

[5] Susan Hattis Rolef, *The Political Geography of Palestine: A History and Definition* (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1983), p. 23.

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lished by more powerful and influential states. Hussein has often criticized the wisdom of allowing consensus politics to dictate policies, but he has nonetheless accepted its limits on Jordan's room to maneuver on Arab-Israeli issues.

Second, unlike Abdullah, Hussein has been forced to accept the legitimacy and relative independence of the Palestinian national movement. Arab support for the PLO at Rabat, Arafat's enhanced international status, and Hussein's inability to speak authoritatively for Palestinians on either side of the Jordan River have made it difficult for him to operate as his grandfather had. Hussein still strongly endorses the notion that Jordanians and Palestinians on both banks must be joined under the patronage and authority of the Hashemites and that Palestinian national aspirations can only be fulfilled by close association with Jordan. Nonetheless, Hussein recognizes the need for a separate Palestinian national identity, albeit subordinated to Jordanian interests. This concept is expressed in Hussein's idea of a confederation not between two equal entities but between a senior and junior partner. Jordan would control defense and foreign policy of any Palestinian West Bank entity along the lines of the king's 1972 United Arab Kingdom plan.

Whatever Hussein intends in the way of final arrangements, he has been forced to accord the PLO a key role, thereby opening new opportunities to a potentially deadly adversary. East Bank residents are legitimately concerned that the senior-junior relationship could result in an entrenched PLO in Amman without any negotiated settlement or, worse, a settlement in which the Palestinian component of the "confederation" might undermine Hashemite control of the East Bank. This challenge will present Hussein with a formidable problem in the period preceding negotiation and in any settlement that emerges.

And the Risks of the Future

As Hussein weighs the prospects of negotiating a settlement of the Palestinian issue and peace with Israel, three inextricably linked considerations shape his view of the importance of a settlement. Each consideration — Palestinian demography, Jordan's political identity, and relations with a Palestinian national movement — has caused the Hashemites serious problems in the past. Together these factors pose challenges that could undermine the Hashemite kingdom. Paradoxically, each incentive to negotiate also severely restricts Hussein's room to maneuver both within an Arab and a Palestinian environment, and with Israel. Events since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, particularly the split within the PLO, have given Jordan additional leverage. Whether Hussein actually enters

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negotiations in an effort to cope with these long-term challenges, however, will depend on his management of the immediate risks.

The Demographic Imperative

The presence of more than a million Palestinians on the East Bank (50 to 60 percent of the Jordanian population) and their implicit connection to an additional 850,000 West Bank Palestinians raise fundamental questions about the nature of the Jordanian state. The Palestinian factor is not merely an issue in Jordanian foreign policy; it is at the heart of Jordan's future political and social development. The problem, as some observers suggest, is not simply a matter of a hostile, radicalized Palestinian population eager to overthrow Hussein. East Bank Palestinians today, themselves divided into different groups depending on the time of their arrival, are remarkably well integrated into Jordan. With the exception of Israel, which eventually granted citizenship to Palestinian Arabs within the pre-1967 borders, Jordan is the only state in the region to have conferred citizenship en masse. Palestinians do not need special work or residence permits, control most sectors of the Jordanian economy, and while disproportionately under-represented in high positions in the political system, army, and security services, presently hold half of the ministerial positions in Hussein's cabinet. Over the past three decades, the Palestinian community, particularly the 1948-49 arrivals, has acquired a real stake in the continued stability and security of the regime. Few desire to jeopardize what has become a second home and risk returning to their status as refugees.

This Palestinian stake in the stability of the Hashemite kingdom, however, is not inexhaustible. There are no guarantees that the Palestinian community will remain quiescent and supportive of Hussein's general approach to Arab-Israeli issues. The ability to manage the demographic challenge posed by a Palestinian majority will depend on three factors: continued economic prosperity; drawing East Bank Palestinians into the Jordanian political establishment; and defusing Palestinian nationalist aspirations on the West Bank and in the diaspora. Even if Jordan could be hermetically sealed from outside political forces, given the high Palestinian birth rate, Jordan's economic dependence, and prospects of a shrinking job market, Hussein could face an increasingly restive Palestinian population dissatisfied with their second-class political status and their domination by a Hashemite king and a handful of prominent East Bank families. The approximately 250,000 Palestinians who inhabit the shantytowns and camps of Amman (now almost 85 percent Palestinian), many of whom are already disaffected and influenced by a more militant Palestinian

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nationalism, could provoke serious trouble. Should the estimated 300,000 Palestinians holding Jordanian passports and working in the Persian Gulf be forced to return home, the East Bank would confront an extremely volatile situation.

Jordanians or Palestinians: Whose Acculturation?

The presence of a potentially alienated Palestinian majority on the East Bank creates a second challenge for the Hashemites and generates a second incentive for trying to find a territorial and political solution to the Palestinian problem. Observers and analysts have long argued that the Hashemite kingdom is an artificial creation with little legitimacy beyond Hussein's personal charisma and control. In effect, the argument goes, Jordan is already a Palestinian state in all but name. Such an argument seriously underestimates Hashemite success in creating a legitimate political base and in managing the troublesome nature of the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. Given the odds against creating any kind of national identity, the Jordanians have fared much better than might be expected. Hussein's personal legitimacy and his bonds with the Bedouin and East Bank families have created a remarkably stable environment and a viable political and social contract. This situation is even more impressive given that Jordan has seen little progress in land reform, redistribution of wealth, or broadening of popular participation in the political system — factors that might help to defuse popular frustration and create greater confidence between the rulers and ruled.[6]

Nonetheless, Jordan confronts a legitimacy problem that flows not only from the lack of broad participation in the political system but from ethnic and political divisions. As others have suggested, the divisions between Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians constitute the most serious "nation-threatening" cleavage in Jordanian society.[7] Palestinians compete and in most instances do better than many Jordanians economically. Moreover, Palestinians are under-represented in Jordan's high political life, even though many feel they are more sophisticated and better educated than their Jordanian countrymen. The problem is further complicated by Jordanian domination of the security services and army and a widespread feeling among many Palestinians that they are insecure second-class citizens.

All of these factors contribute to the problem of forging a sense of Jordanian national identity. Were the refugees Palestinians attached to

[6] Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 209-19.

[7] Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 15-16.

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Palestine who simply lived in Jordan, or acculturated Palestinians with a primary loyalty to the Hashemites? They carried Jordanian passports and were able to live and work where they pleased. But did they feel like Jordanians? And what was their role in the political system of a country dominated by a Hashemite king and a handful of prominent Bedouin tribes and Jordanian families?

These questions become even more acute as the nature of Jordanian society begins to change. As one of the pillars of Hashemite authority — the bond between the king and the tribes — begins to weaken with the Bedouin playing a lesser role in Jordan, the need to redefine political community based on a new sense of Jordanian national identity becomes more apparent.[8] In many respects, this task is much more difficult than it was in the period 1922 to 1948 when Abdullah could focus attention almost exclusively on the concept of Transjordan. It became more complicated after 1948 and 1967 with the influx of Palestinian refugees and the rise of the PLO. Jordan then had to contend with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians whose loyalties and identities lay elsewhere. Now more than ever, Jordan must develop that national consciousness which transcends tribal and family affiliation. The key question is clear: What is the role in this process of an insecure and alienated Palestinian majority whose loyalties are also pulled by the Palestinian national movement? Palestinians will want a greater political role in Jordan whether or not the West Bank issue is resolved. The feeling among most of Jordan's million plus Palestinians that they are not full-fledged participants in the political system may well constitute the single greatest challenge to the stability of the Hashemite kingdom.

The need to integrate East Bank Palestinians and Jordanians into the political process might be the crux not only of the development of a national identity, but of the continuing political stability of a Hashemite-dominated Jordan. The recall of parliament in early 1984, while almost uniformly interpreted by Western observers as a foreign policy move to re-establish a formal Jordanian relationship with West Bank representatives, had important domestic implications. Though it must have been clear that reconvening the lower house would only have a symbolic impact, many Jordanians and Palestinians saw Hussein's move as an important beginning.

The relationship between Hussein's Palestinian problem on the West Bank and the problems of national identity and broadening political participation on the East Bank is clear, though often overlooked. Palestinians in the Hashemite kingdom are frustrated both by their inability to

[8] Paul A. Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin, *Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 49-61.

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play a greater role in the East Bank's political process and by failure to fulfill their national aspirations. Clearly, progress toward a West Bank settlement of the Palestinian problem would not resolve either issue. Indeed, most East Bank Palestinians would not be permitted or willing to take up residence in a West Bank entity. Nor would such a solution redress the lack of Palestinian participation in Jordan's political system. Some might argue that Palestinian control of the West Bank might encourage Palestinians on the other side of the river to wrest control of the East Bank.

Many Jordanians see a West Bank Palestinian solution — carefully managed and controlled by Amman — as a way to handle the difficult problem of an East Bank Palestinian majority. First, by defusing the appeal of a credible and unrequited Palestinian national movement, the Jordanians believe they can reduce the external leverage of such a movement on their own East Bank Palestinian population. At the same time, a West Bank settlement might help to defuse East Bank Palestinian frustrations and better manage the inexorable Palestinian desire for a redistribution of political power in Jordan. The benefits of the West Bank safety valve approach for East Bank Palestinians would be primarily non-material. Yet these payoffs, which would include a greater sense of security and belonging, and open bridges, should not be underestimated. By cultivating a greater attachment psychologically and symbolically to the idea of a Palestinian entity among East Bank residents, the Jordanians probably hope to head off or at least to slow the pressure for Palestinian dominance on the East Bank. The king must also calculate that it would be in Israel's interest, despite the Israeli right's views on the subject, to encourage such a scenario rather than a two-state solution at Hashemite expense — Israel and a Palestinian state in what is now Jordan. Still, if Hussein hopes to pass a healthy and viable throne on to his young son Ali (half Palestinian himself), then he must begin to accommodate pressures for change among East Bank Palestinians. In the end, a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, which promotes not only close ties between the two banks but a new sense of identity as well, offers Hussein one possible way to manage this problem.

Jordan and the PLO: Conflict and Coexistence

Also challenging Hussein to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem is the danger he confronts from a radicalized, irredentist Palestinian movement, elements of which are actively committed to his demise. For more than twenty years, Hussein and the PLO have lived in uneasy limbo — vacillating between tacit cooperation and outright polit-

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ical and military confrontation. The relationship has inevitably been one of intense mutual suspicion and hostility tempered by overlapping interests and coincident tactics during various periods. Indeed, while some of the PLO's constituent groups, such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) as well as Syrian-sponsored groups, have actively opposed Jordanian policies, Arafat and much of his Fatah organization have at times been forced to cooperate with Hussein. Even during these periods, however, the underlying antagonism remains: Hussein represents a potential threat to the PLO's ability to represent Palestinians, while the PLO constitutes a threat not only to the king's West Bank ambitions but to his authority and control on the East Bank.

From Hussein's perspective, the magnitude of this threat has increased dramatically since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Although the PLO's loss of an independent base, its de facto split, and its conflict with Syria have increased Jordanian leverage, these same factors have also spawned fears of a radicalized Palestinian leadership that could threaten Hussein's own kingdom. The king appears to believe that Israel's de facto annexation of the West Bank will ultimately force the Palestinian leadership to look to Jordan with its majority Palestinian population and long contiguous border with Israel as the next base of operations for the continuing struggle — or worse as an alternative Palestinian state.

Thus, the king has made the risky calculation that it is better to bring the PLO, or at least Arafat's truncated group, inside the tent rather than shut it out where it might fall under the influence of Syria or turn in on its own radical character. Hussein is probably under no illusion about the political and security threat that an entrenched PLO poses to Jordan and has no intention of allowing the Palestinians the kind of base or freedom of maneuver they acquired on the eve of Black September.

The real risk at present is the political boost Hussein's strategy has given to Arafat. Hussein is under no illusions about the dangers of giving Arafat a veto over Jordan's entry into the peace process, but he has apparently decided to pursue a strategy which accords the PLO a key role. As long as Arafat remains a credible factor in Palestinian and Arab politics, Hussein has calculated that PLO involvement in some form is the sine qua non for Jordanian entry into a peace process with Israel.

Hussein's need for PLO involvement is based on two elemental calculations that form the heart of Jordan's current policies. First, given the vicissitudes of Jordanian-Palestinian relations, even on the West Bank, Hussein knows he cannot alone enter negotiations on behalf of the Palestinians or make concessions for them. Certainly he does not want to place Jordan in the position of negotiating, let alone signing on to deal,

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much as Sadat did, that would later be criticized and attacked as an abandonment of Palestinian "national rights." Thus Arafat's role is to share the responsibility for negotiating with Israel and making the concessions that even Hussein must know are necessary. The Jordanians want Arafat inside the tent so that he cannot lead the opposition from the outside.

The second reason Hussein needs the PLO flows from the first. Unlike Sadat, Hussein does not have the political or military clout to ignore the Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue and to proceed unilaterally into a peace process with Israel. The February 11 framework agreement is still a bilateral accord between Jordan and Arafat and enjoys varying lack of enthusiasm in the Arab world. Egypt, the accord's most solid supporter, remains isolated within Arab ranks. And Hussein's backers in the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, are tightly constrained by Syrian opposition and not particularly enthusiastic about taking any position that polarizes the region. Stripped of any real authority to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians at Rabat in 1974, Hussein views a weakened PLO as a vehicle to get Jordan into negotiations in a central and legitimate manner. Cooperating with the PLO provides a way to defuse Arab opposition, protect himself from Syria, and perhaps to push key Arab fence-sitters such as Saudi Arabia onto his side.

The risks of Hussein's approach are obvious. Using a weakened PLO to gain cover for Jordanian-Israeli negotiations is theoretically a sound strategy, if Hussein were prepared to use leverage on the PLO to create a practical negotiating framework, and if Jordan were powerful enough to insulate itself from regional pressures. But in cooperating with Arafat and in trying to transform the PLO into a more moderate and acceptable negotiating partner for the United States, let alone Israel, the Jordanians have linked their strategy to the PLO's agenda and to the vagaries of inter-Arab politics. What began as an effort to maintain political dominance over the PLO — the Amman Political National Council meeting and the February 11 agreement — could end with the PLO playing an equal role in the relationship. In short, rather than circumventing the Rabat decision by forming a united Jordanian-PLO front, the Jordanians inadvertently end up helping the PLO maintain its position as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and limiting their own room to maneuver.

Disincentives

The bitter paradox of Hussein's Palestinian dilemma is that the same factors that challenge him to pursue a negotiated solution with Israel

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play a key role in blocking progress. These factors, particularly a majority Palestinian population on the East Bank and the need to defer to the PLO, combined with Jordan's economic dependence on and vulnerability to Syrian pressure paint a picture of a leader tightly bound by internal and external constraints over which he has little control. Unlike Sadat, Hussein is convinced that he is too vulnerable at home and in the region to shield Jordan from the pressures that would be generated by a solo initiative with Israel. As we shall see, the Jordanians believe that the key to their dilemma lies in gaining concessions from the United States, and ultimately from Israel, that would shift the political balance in their favor.

The presence of a million Palestinians on the East Bank and the importance the Palestinians, including West Bank residents, attach to the PLO are certain to restrict Hussein's flexibility should actual negotiations with Israel get under way. Even before Rabat, Hussein had been forced to accommodate Palestinian nationalism in a way that eroded his own influence. After Rabat, Jordan felt it had little choice but to work through the PLO rather than around it — a realization that foreshadowed almost a decade of tactical maneuvering and jockeying for position between Jordan and the PLO. This Jordanian-PLO relationship narrowed Hussein's options and subordinated Jordan's interests to the vagaries of inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian politics. Moreover, it allowed Syria, with its enormous leverage on the PLO, a direct way of protecting its own interests in the Arab-Israeli arena.

It would be unfair, however, to suggest that Jordanian policy was hostage to the PLO alone. Hussein was also a prisoner of the Hashemites' own mixed record on the Palestinian issue, which damaged Jordanian prestige among Palestinians on both banks of the Jordan. The Jordanians used their money and influence to court West Bank elites and to create a bloc of traditional supporters. But there was a legacy of mistrust and ill-feeling among Palestinians who felt ignored, patronized, and exploited by Amman. By the mid-1970s, the PLO gains at Jordanian expense were clearly demonstrated in the 1976 West Bank municipal elections which brought to office a group of young, nationalist mayors. While Jordanian popularity and appeal would ebb and flow as PLO fortunes changed, and as Israel's own occupation policies developed, an underlying suspicion of Jordanian motives remained. The desire to end the Israeli occupation remained the West Bank residents' primary concern. But few would wish to recreate the situation that existed before 1967 when the Jordanians subordinated West Bank interest to their own concerns.

A Palestinian majority on the East Bank further limits Hussein's options and presents another constituency that has to be carefully man-

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aged as he pursues his peace process diplomacy. Despite their tacit support for Hussein, many Palestinians in Jordan still feel insecure and ambivalent — torn between a PLO that they support and a Jordanian establishment to which they do not really belong. Hussein must consider his largest domestic constituency whenever he moves, even though Palestinians are not as vocal or as well-organized as the East Bank elites. He cannot move to the negotiating table with Israel, let alone make concessions that betray Palestinian goals, without risking serious problems at home. Should he attempt to buck this consensus, Hussein would face an increasingly restive Palestinian population, particularly those in camps and shantytowns who would be more receptive to external radical influence. Indeed, the king needs Arafat's PLO as much for domestic political consumption as he does to protect his flanks in the Arab world.

These Palestinian disincentives complicating Hussein's entry into negotiations are compounded by Jordan's economic, political, and military vulnerability in the Arab world. This exposure is most acutely reflected in the conventional and unconventional threat posed by Syria which has twice in the last decade and a half used direct military pressure against Jordan and is currently engaged in supporting terrorist activities against Jordanian interests in the region and outside. On a less sensational but equally problematic level, Jordan depends on its Arab neighbors for political and economic support, particularly on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. These relationships invariably limit Hussein's flexibility and keep his policy well within the parameters of an Arab consensus shaped by other states which do not necessarily share his agenda on a negotiated settlement. Thus for its own protection Jordan must seek other auspices and leverage — broad Arab support, PLO backing, and international cover for negotiations with Israel. Even more problematic, Jordan seeks assurances that the advantages of participation in negotiations will be worth the risks, a negotiating style that inevitably looks to pre-negotiation guarantees. All of this severely limits how far and fast Hussein can move with Israel.

Making Certain the Opportunities Outweigh the Risks

With this acute sense of balance, Hussein has weighed the prospects for negotiations with Israel over the past year. And with a keen appreciation of Jordan's limitations and weaknesses, the king has tried to find the least risky course to prepare the groundwork for possible talks. The incentives for trying to find a solution to the Palestinian problem and the risks of an unresolved conflict with Israel increased in the wake of

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the Israeli invasion. Hussein saw Israel's war in Lebanon as a dramatic demonstration of the potential power of the forces of Palestinian, Shia, and Israeli radicalism. Indeed the operation — masterminded by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, proponent of the "Jordan is Palestine" option — accelerated the forces of PLO and Shia radicalism and embodied the Israeli revisionist view that any solution of Israel's Palestinian problem must come at Jordanian expense. Moreover, the Jordanians saw Syria's influence and prestige strengthened and American credibility undermined.

The invasion also generated new opportunities, although they were not immediately apparent to the king. First, the Israeli invasion and expulsion of the PLO from Beirut weakened Arafat and exposed long-standing tensions with Syria. The combination of a PLO without an independent base and a rift between Arafat and Assad that went deeper than any previous confrontation increased the PLO's dependence on Amman and, thereby, Jordan's leverage. Moreover, despite his deep suspicions of the king's motives, Arafat would begin to see the Jordanian option as his only realistic course in the wake of the invasion.

Second, the Israeli invasion resulted in direct American involvement in Arab-Israeli issues and the formulation of a U.S. diplomatic initiative to address the Palestinian issue. Not only did the American initiative, outlined in President Reagan's September 1982 address, accord Jordan the central role in the future of the West Bank, but it indicated that the Americans were actively prepared to engage in an effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute — a key Jordanian requirement for a successful peace process. In fact, the king interpreted the Reagan initiative as an effort to move beyond the Camp David approach.

Thus, the invasion appeared to offer Hussein new opportunities to involve both the PLO and the Americans in his concept of a solution to the Palestinian problem. It was these two sets of relationships that Hussein sought to turn to his advantage in the years following the Israeli invasion. The king's objective was clear — exploit Palestinian legitimacy in the Arab world and American leverage over Israel to minimize the risks of a negotiation and to maximize the benefits. Tending to these two relationships, rather than cultivating direct ties with Israel, emerged as the focus of Hussein's regional and political strategy between 1982 and 1985. Although during much of this period the United States and the PLO were bogged down in Lebanon and vulnerable to Syrian influence, by early 1984 with Arafat's departure from Tripoli and the withdrawal of the Multinational Force from Beirut, the Jordanians saw new opportunities to push their strategy. Using the PLO and involving the Americans remains the key to Hussein's peace process strategy today.

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Dealing with the PLO

Arafat's December 1983 forced exit from Lebanon, the second in as many years, appeared to strengthen Hussein's leverage over the PLO. The circumstances under which Arafat departed Tripoli — under military pressure from the Syrian-backed PLO groups — appeared to widen the already sizeable gap between Arafat and Assad. More encouraging was Arafat's surprise meeting with Egypt's President Mubarak. Not only was the reconciliation certain to antagonize Assad, it raised Hussein's hopes that a new Egyptian-Jordanian-PLO alignment might be formed to pursue a more pragmatic line. Such an axis, although the Jordanians avoided the term, might also counter Syria and further moderate Arafat's own thinking. Hussein had no illusions about the difficulties of working with a PLO still embroiled in its own internal disputes. Moreover, with Israeli elections scheduled for July and with American presidential elections set for the following November, Hussein felt no urgency. He continued to keep his options open — pushing for an international conference, trying to avoid needlessly antagonizing the Syrians, and maintaining cordial ties with the Soviets.

The Jordanians interpreted the results of the Israeli elections — a virtual deadlock between Labor and Likud — as further evidence that Israel was not prepared to deal with the West Bank issue. Nonetheless, between the Israeli elections in July and the American presidential elections in November, Hussein initiated important steps that would help to lay the groundwork for possible talks with the Israelis in the Palestinian and Arab arenas. It is unlikely that Hussein had a detailed diplomatic strategy. Rather, the king seemed to be operating from a number of general principles designed to exploit any possibilities. Hussein's initiative centered on creating Arab support and a new relationship with Arafat as a prelude to convincing the United States to engage more actively in Middle Eastern diplomacy on Jordan's terms. Only if circumstances were favorable did Hussein probably contemplate negotiations with Israel. While Hussein's initiative was uncharacteristically bold, it was still gradualist and cautious, designed to expose Jordan to the fewest possible risks. Indeed, throughout the next year, Hussein would proceed carefully, keep all his options open, and burn no bridges.

Jordan's decision to restore formal diplomatic ties with Egypt in September was the first indication that Hussein was contemplating a more forward-leaning approach to Arab-Israeli issues. The move had its rationale in an Arab context and had been under consideration for months. Nevertheless, the fact that Jordan was the first Arab state to restore relations with Egypt — the only Arab country to have a peace treaty with

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Israel — could not be ignored. Hussein, the most likely participant in the next round of Arab-Israeli negotiations, was sending clear signals to Israel and to the United States that he was strongly committed to a negotiated settlement and was willing to take limited risks.

Moreover, Hussein's decision to host the PNC in Amman and Arafat's willingness to allow it to convene there in November ushered in a new stage in the evolving relationship between Jordan and the PLO. The Amman session did not represent a fundamental convergence of interests between the two men but a tactical coincidence of objectives. For Arafat, pursued by Syria and its Palestinian allies, convening a successful PNC had become a test of his authority and leadership. While Arafat had other purposes in mind, including demonstrating that he had a Jordanian option and buoying the hopes of West Bank residents, he did not necessarily intend that the PNC would be the first step in a major rapprochement with Jordan. Arafat doubtless calculated that he could use the Amman venue for his own purposes without subordinating the PLO's interests to Hussein's.

Hussein's perspective, though colored by similar tactical maneuvering, was different. For the king, convening the PNC in Amman — a development which made many East Bank residents nervous — was the first step in a campaign to work out a new relationship with Arafat that would give Jordan the lead in any future negotiations with Israel. Moreover, by hosting the PNC, Hussein hoped to achieve two other important objectives. First, the king doubtless recognized that an Amman PNC would reduce the already slim chances for a reconciliation between Arafat and Assad or a rapprochement with more hardline PLO groups. Second, the Amman venue gave the Jordanians an opportunity to take their message directly to the West Bank. In the presence of the PLO's supreme authority, the PNC, the king was given an opportunity to hammer home the message that negotiations with Israel had to be based on Resolution 242 and on the principle of territory in exchange for peace. Implicit in this message, which the king believed to be the only realistic basis for negotiations, was a choice for the Palestinians.

With the conclusion of the Arafat-Hussein framework agreement on February 11, 1985, PLO-Jordanian relations had clearly reached a new stage. Like the convening of the PNC itself, the February 11 accord represented a coincidence of interests between Arafat and Hussein, this time on a more formal level. The agreement, although vaguely worded on the key issues of Palestinian representation and final status of a settlement, represented a loosely defined framework within which Arafat and Hussein could develop a joint political approach. The accord obviously had more to do with Jordanian-Palestinian relations than it did

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with negotiating with Israel. Although it was never intended to provide a detailed strategy for negotiations, it did have significant implications for the Arab-Israeli peace process.

For Hussein, the February 11 accord was designed to formalize his relationship with Arafat in a way that would placate his Palestinian and Arab constituencies without alienating the United States. The American audience was particularly important in this regard. The accord was intended to establish Jordanian primacy on two key issues — who would represent the Palestinians in negotiations and what would they be negotiating for — all without undermining Arafat's credibility. Indeed, the Jordanians had no intention of cutting Arafat out or of negotiating by proxy. Rather, they appeared determined to include Arafat by transforming the PLO into an acceptable interlocutor, first for the United States and ultimately for Israel. While the accord did not explicitly refer to U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, the king stressed that Arafat's acceptance of the principles of land for peace was an implicit endorsement of the concept contained in 242 and, thus, a sign of his moderation. With proper inducement, most likely from the United States, Hussein doubtless believed that Arafat could be persuaded to move toward the American position on negotiations. The fact that the accord stressed the importance of an international conference and the need to bring the PLO to the negotiating table — positions both Israel and the United States opposed — were problems that the king hoped could be resolved along the way.

Attracting the United States

Hussein's peace process strategy was not conceived in a regional vacuum. Central to his calculations was the importance of involving the United States not only in matters of procedure — how to get to the negotiating table — but also in matters of substance — how to get a settlement most favorable to Jordanian interests. The central role that the Reagan initiative accorded Jordan left Hussein little doubt that he was a key factor in the American conception of a solution to the Palestinian problem. The key, in the king's mind, was how to translate this generally supportive American view of Jordan into concrete measures that would increase Hussein's leverage not only in the region, but ultimately with Israel. Strengthening Jordan's leverage during any negotiations would require a shift of American attitudes and policies on key issues such as the nature of Palestinian representation, international support, and the sale of sophisticated weapons to Jordan. If the king could use the Americans to help solve these problems, then he probably calculated that the risks of actually entering negotiations would be manageable. Jordanian policy

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over the past year has focused on trying to convince Washington of the importance of being responsive to these concerns.

The issue of Palestinian representation has emerged as the central focus of Jordan's peace process diplomacy. First, Hussein has tried to forge a new relationship with Arafat. The second dimension of this problem, however, focuses on finding a way to create and institutionalize a U.S.-PLO dialogue. Hussein's effort to get the United States to share responsibility for his "Arafat problem" has several objectives. First, a U.S.-PLO dialogue would be designed to convince the Americans that the PLO is a key component of any successful negotiation and, through Washington, ultimately to convince the Israelis. Second, the Jordanians probably calculate that an American relationship with Arafat will reduce Hussein's own vulnerability in the region and shackle Washington with much of the responsibility for the PLO's demands. Thus, if Israel says it will not talk to the PLO under any circumstances, Hussein can tell Arafat to ask the Americans for help with this problem or any of the countless others likely to flow from the PLO's participation. Third, a U.S.-PLO dialogue might offer the Jordanians a way to pay Arafat for staying away from the negotiating table — at least during the early stages of negotiations. According to this approach, in exchange for allowing Jordan and those Palestinians acceptable to Israel to negotiate, a U.S.-PLO dialogue would begin on a separate track. Presumably these two tracks would converge before the end of negotiations. Finally, even if direct negotiations did not result, the king calculates that a U.S.-PLO relationship might begin to shift the political balance in his favor, drive a wedge between Israel and the United States, and contribute to a more neutral American view of the problem. Hussein sees a meeting between the United States and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as the first step in this process.

The Jordanians are also banking on American support in finding a solution to Hussein's need for "international" backing. Hussein's problem is complicated by his own ambivalence about the kind of support he needs. On one hand, he has consistently expressed a preference for a formal international conference, including the Soviets and the Syrians, a course which his supporters claim is pursued only because he lacks forthcoming Israeli or American alternatives. On the other hand, the Jordanians have also talked about "international context" — a phrase which appears to open up other possibilities, such as working through the United Nations or the Europeans. Jordan's flexibility on the issue of international support will likely hinge on the degree to which Hussein's other concerns, such as Palestinian representation, are met.

Hussein is looking to the United States to address this problem. The issue of international backing, however, goes well beyond covering

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Hussein's entry into negotiations with Israel: it cuts to the core issue of how much leverage Jordan will have at the table once negotiations begin. The king doubtless reasons that his position on the eve of any negotiations will not be particularly strong. Israel's possession of the West Bank, the strength of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, divisions in the Arab world, and outright opposition from Syria place him at a disadvantage. In short, it will be extremely lonely at the negotiating table. One way of reducing this exposure and increasing his assets is to negotiate in the presence of others. Hussein is probably undecided about the kind of international event that would give him the support he needs. Including the Soviets and Syrians could paralyze the process and diminish Jordan's role, but it would increase Arab leverage against Israel and the United States. On the other hand, Hussein may feel that it is at least necessary to give Syria an opportunity to exclude itself from such a gathering. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine some of Jordan's Arab allies actively participating in or endorsing any negotiations with Israel that Syria opposes.

Hussein is also looking to the United States to provide the security and economic assistance Jordan needs. These issues of military support, specifically an arms package of fighter aircraft and air-defense equipment,, represent more than a simple bilateral issue. To the Jordanians, American willingness to supply advanced weapons to Jordan — something Washington has not done since 1978 — constitutes a test of U.S. credibility and commitment to Hussein. Selling these weapons will require Washington to resist not only domestic political pressure but to confront the Israelis as well. If the Americans are unwilling to risk the political capital to sell weapons to Jordan, Hussein reasons, how will they be prepared to use their leverage with Israel to produce a territorial compromise on politically explosive issues such as the West Bank and Jerusalem? Moreover, the king would like to be able to use an arms package to demonstrate to his Arab critics that his association with the United States is paying off.

Despite Hussein's conviction that a resolution of the Palestinian issue and an accommodation with Israel is crucial to the survival of the Hashemite kingdom, he will have difficulty entering into negotiations with Israel. The king's weakness and vulnerability have forced him to construct so many obstacles on the road to the peace table that it would take a master manipulator to negotiate around them. The king cannot afford the luxury of Sadat's central assumption that a peace initiative with Israel can only be launched by minimizing those factors beyond one's control. Instead, the king has maximized them. Indeed, the traditional Jordanian option — Jordan together with moderate West Bank residents moving into direct negotiations with Israel — is enticing because of its simplicity. But

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it was probably never a serious option in the king's mind. The problem with this alternative is not only political; in fact Hussein has credibility and leverage with respected West Bank elites. The difficulty lies in Jordan's own vulnerability, highlighted by its geography and demography. Hussein may want a settlement, but not at the expense of his throne.

Thus, Hussein has abandoned one extreme, the Jordanian option, for another. He has sought an approach which reduces the risks of negotiations by shifting the political balance of power in his favor before talks with Israel begin. To do this, he has tried to cultivate relationships with the PLO and the United States — Israel's erstwhile adversary and ally — to minimize the dangers of entering peace talks and to maximize the opportunities at the table.

Although the king's strategy would take care of his political needs should it succeed, the approach is complicated by two important factors. First, it depends on forces — the PLO and the United States and now, in light of his efforts to reconcile with Assad, Syria — which are subject to major influences beyond Hussein's control. Second, in preparing a relatively risk-free environment for himself, Hussein increases the risks and liabilities for Israel and discourages the very negotiating process that he is presumably trying to encourage. The road to the negotiating table is strewn with intervening events, such as an international conference which may or may not include Syria and the Soviets. Coopting Syria might afford Hussein the leverage he needs, but he might then be forced to accept Syria's terms for negotiations and final status — terms that the other parties might not be able to accept.

Even if the king does convince the United States to pursue his view of the process, the political fallout in Israel will complicate his approach to negotiations. While the classic Jordanian option does not sufficiently consider Hussein's political needs, it is likely, if a real peace process is to begin, that the Jordanians and PLO will have to lower their expectations somewhat. There are at least two possible variants of this approach. First, there is the longer-term alternative. The PLO, as the weakest of the parties in objective terms, makes a major concession by unilaterally accepting U.S. conditions for dialogue and ultimately begins the process of making itself acceptable to Israel. This king of accommodation involves the sort of sea change in attitudes and policies on both sides that are likely to take years. Alternatively, the PLO and Jordan could reach their own accommodation, thereby permitting Hussein to enter the process with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, and with those from the Palestinian diaspora who are acceptable both to the PLO and to Israel. The PLO would be intimately associated with the process but would not be a formal party to the negotiations. Its ultimate role and

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status would depend on an Israeli-PLO accommodation. In the interim, negotiations between Jordan, Israel, and those Palestinians with no formal organizational affiliation to the PLO could begin.

In the end, there are no perfect solutions to Jordan's PLO problem. Hussein cannot force the United States or Israel to accept Arafat as a negotiating partner. If the king wants to defuse a Palestinian problem that presents a long-term threat to Hashemite rule, he must be prepared to take short-term risks that are admittedly inequitable. Israel controls the West Bank and, through its own military power and its strong relationship with the United States, can resist pressure to cede it. Indeed, nations like individuals undertake risky endeavors only when there is sufficient inducement. In the short term, only a Jordanian offer to negotiate peace with Israel without declared PLO members at the table can induce the Israelis to consider a practical West Bank compromise benefiting the Palestinians. Whether Hussein is willing or able to begin this kind of journey remains to be seen.

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THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE NICARAGUAN INSURGENCIES, 1979-1985

by Michael Radu

The involvement of the United States in Nicaragua's current civil war threatens to obscure the indigenous sources of that conflict, pushing its nature into the shadow of domestic ideological and partisan debates. Arguments over Washington's, or Moscow's, role in Nicaragua have wildly distorted and grossly oversimplified the very complex historical and sociological antecedents of this war. This essay is an attempt to provide a fuller picture both of what is behind and what is at stake in the Nicaraguan civil war.

Like most civil wars, Nicaragua's is far bloodier than a conventional conflict between two regular armies under the control of national governments pursuing their separate interests. Nicaragua is a society tearing itself to pieces. Families are torn by conflicting loyalties which supersede blood ties while former comrades are murderously divided. Neither class antagonisms nor political history satisfactorily explains the Nicaraugan civil war — the political culture of Nicaragua and the circumstances of the revolutionary victory of July 19, 1979, serve far better. Indeed, while claiming to represent "the people" or "the masses" of Nicaragua, the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) comprises cadres whose origin is overwhelmingly middle or upper-middle class. Even a cursory examination of the background of the FSLN cadres demonstrates that "objectively, the Sandinismo of the FSLN proper . . . was never a lower class phenomenon. It was, instead, the ideology of a group of young people, mostly middle- or upper-class in origin. . . ."[1] The insurgents' political leaders come from a similar background. On both sides in this conflict, most followers are from "the people," i.e., from among the marginal urban youth in the case of the FSLN; from traditionalist peasantry in that of the largest insurgent group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN); or from the totality of the population in that of the

[1] David Nolan, *FSLN: The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution,* Institute of Interamerican Studies, Graduate School of International Studies (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, 1984), p. 22. There is an infinity of sources, including many FSLN documents, indicating the same phenomenon.

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ethnic insurgents of the Atlantic Coast. At first, then, the civil war represents an intra-elite leadership conflict and an urban-rural polarization among the rank and file.

Geographically, the membership of the insurgent forces is largely recruited among the peasantry of the north and north-west, in the departments of Nueva Segovia, Madriz, Esteli, Jinotega, Chinandega and Matagalpa. The FSLN popular base lies in the more heavily urbanized departments of Managua, Leon, Granada, Masaya, and Carazo on the Pacific Coast. These are traditionally the most politicized areas of the country, historically divided between the Liberal center of Leon and the Conservative party's Granada stronghold. The central and eastern departments of Boaco and Chontales, and particularly Zelaya and Rio San Juan, with small populations, tend either to be receptive to the insurgents, like the populations of the northern departments (the former two and Rivas in the south) or to be totally distinct from the rest of the country (Zelaya) in terms of population (ethnic minorities) and history. In a country whose population barely exceeds three million, such cleavages indicate a complex sociopolitical background, beyond the inadequate terminology of public discourse with its emphasis on "freedom fighters," "counter-revolutionaries" ("Contras"), Communist or democrats, Somocistas or revolutionaries. Recent, as well as more remote, history helps explain the origins and the trends in the development of the civil war.

The Collapse of the Anti-Somoza Coalition

The almost universal perception, in Nicaragua and around the world, was that the July 1979 victory over the Somoza regime seemed the result of an entire people rising against an isolated tyrant. Among the overwhelming majority of the Nicaraguans who fought Somoza, either with arms in hand or through strikes and propaganda abroad, the prevailing hope was that expressed by Ramiro Gurdian, a prominent private sector representive: "I thought that we were going to have a free society, with a free press, with elections, with a very good legal system."[2]

Moreover, as Gurdian and innumerable other non-Sandinista participants in the revolution have claimed, this optimism sprang largely from the apparent support of the Carter administration and Latin American democracies for the revolution. If the United States and Venezuela were against Somoza, the Sandinistas could not be committed Marxists-Leninists as Somoza had claimed.[3] When the post-revolutionary grand coalition

[2] Quoted in Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Random House, 1985), p. 185.

[3] Ibid.

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collapsed, the myth of the "betrayed revolution" was born and has resisted historical reality until the present.[4] The myth survives despite the FSLN's consistent, though not always public, decision to retain absolute control after victory: "we seek to conserve the political hegemony of the FSLN and in this way, as our platform signifies, we avoid the possibility of the bourgeoisie becoming the political leader of an anti-Somoza front. . . . We assign a tactical and *temporary* character to this front."[5] As a temporary alliance, the FSLN-non-Marxists coalition that triumphed in 1979 could not have lasted. Some non-Marxists realized this almost immediately; for others like Alfonso Robelo it took almost one year, and for some, the process was far longer. In December 1981, Arturo Cruz, who replaced Robelo in the National Reconstruction Junta in 1980, was still speaking out about "the supposed Marxist-Leninist leanings of the revolution" and hoping that "the Nicaraguan revolution can become a political model of internal stability and a stabilizing force in Central America."[6] By mid-1982 Cruz realized that "the moderates were also very useful for tactical reasons to those who already had the intention of making it [Nicaragua] a totalitarian system."[7]

By 1980 the unraveling of the grand anti-Somoza coalition became obvious to objective observers. From the first day of the revolutionary regime, the five-member junta, controlled by the three FSLN members (Daniel Ortega, Moises Hassan Morales, and Sergio Ramirez), received direct orders from the nine-member FSLN National Directorate. The National Guard was immediately replaced by the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS), and the only government institution not then under direct Sandinista control was the Council of State, a quasi-legislative body of thirty-three members, of whom twelve were open FSLN members. On May 4, 1980, the FSLN National Directorate decreed an increase in the membership of the Council of State to forty-seven seats, with the FSLN and its auxiliary "popular organizations" being allocated twenty-four seats.[8] Thus, fewer than ten months after the revolution, any policy-making role for non-Sandinistas was eliminated.

With the FSLN controlling the military, the police, the Council of State, the governing junta, all the key ministries, most of the media, and the economy by May 1980, Nicaragua's political pluralism lacked

[4] A typical articulation of this myth is found in Humberto Belli, Adolfo Calero, and Haroldo Montealegre, *Three Nicaraguans on the Betrayal of their Revolution,* The Heritage Lectures, 1985, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.

[5] Humberto Belli, *Breaking Faith, The Sandinista Revolution and its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in Nicaragua,* The Puebla Institute (Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1985), quoting Daniel Ortega.

[6] Arturo Cruz, "Nicaragua Needs U.S. Tolerance," *New York Times,* December 9, 1981.

[7] Cf. Christian, *Nicaragua,* p. 278.

[8] See Douglas Payne. *The Democratic Mask — The Consolidation of the Sandinista Revolution* (New York: Freedom House, 1985), p. 26.

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any content, resembling the "multi-party" systems of East Germany, Poland, or Hungary. Then, as now, the FSLN claimed that over half of the economy was in private hands; but the regime controlled the banks, foreign and internal trade, and currency exchange rates, making formal ownership largely void of content.

The Survivors of the Ancient Regime

Pushed from political power and at the mercy of the FSLN economically, growing numbers of the anti-Somoza activists of 1978-79 began to discover that the old regime had always been more than a one-family kleptocracy. While it is not surprising that foreigners, particularly hurried journalists, should have reduced the Somoza regime to the family of the dictator, it is amazing how many Nicaraguans did so, at least in the enthusiastic days of 1979, forgetting their own history and dismissing reality and common sense.

Although the accusations against Somoza of dictatorship and rule by greed cannot be doubted by any objective observer, it is clear that Somoza and the Liberal Party could not have ruled for more than four decades without a degree of popular support. Almost two generations of National Guard (GN) members had a profound impact on many communities, particularly in the northern departments, through family ties, a vested interest in a regime that favored them, and traditional Liberal loyalties dating from the nineteenth century. The numbers themselves are significant in this respect: according to some calculations, in 1978 one out of every 250 Nicaraguans was in the National Guard, or one out of every 166 was in the Guard, police, or Treasury Guard.[9] As late as September 1978, when Somoza defeated the first massive insurrection in Esteli, Leon, Masaya, and Chinandega, Nicaraguans were still attracted by service in the National Guard, which had increased its strength from approximately 7,000 to 15,000 by the beginning of 1979.[10]

The GN soldiers were reportedly attracted by the relatively high salaries,[11] but mercenary considerations fail to explain the loyalty of the military at the very last hours of the regime. Neither can money alone completely explain the success of the GN in establishing an extensive system of informers and local representatives, in attracting the loyalty of peasants in certain regions, like Nueva Guinea, or in denying the FSLN significant peasant support in most areas. These successes can be partially explained by the growing professionalism of the GN, its training and esprit

[9] Eduardo Crawley, *Nicaragua in Perspective* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 167.
[10] Adolfo Gilly, *La Nueva Nicaragua* (Mexico City: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1980), p. 112.
[11] George Black, *Triumph of the People, The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua* (London, Zed Press, 1981), p. 51.

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de corps, acknowledged even by its critics.[12] In turn, professionalism resulted in loyalty to the state among the rank and file, and support for the national security doctrine (developed initially in the Southern Cone armies) among the officer corps. Although the National Guard was not a fully professional army in 1979, it was close enough to be prepared to transfer its loyalties from the person of Somoza to his legitimate replacement as defined by the institutional interests, the perceived national interest, and the individual field commanders' decisions. As subsequent events demonstrated, such a replacement could even be anti-Somoza.

At its defeat in July 1979, the National Guard was top heavy with trained and experienced officers; some were relatively new to their senior positions, a result of Somoza's mid-1970s decision to retire entire graduating classes of senior officers (the last such mass retirement occurred in the fall of 1978).[13] Thus, there were two generations of relatively young, experienced anti-guerrilla commanders available to replace the casualties suffered in the civil war. Most of these commanders had received extensive training abroad, largely in the United States, Panama, Argentina, and Chile: between 1970-75, for instance, fifty-two Nicaraguans graduated from U.S. military academies, and 303 from the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone.[14] The GN elite anti-insurgency troops, the Basic Infantry Training School (EEBI, led by Somoza's son), were largely concentrated on the southern front, around Rivas, at the end of the war,[15] and were led by the army's best and most respected field commander, Major Pablo Emilio Salazar ("Bravo"). Not only did Salazar stop the FSLN's largest armed unit — by preventing its commander Eden Pastora from reaching Managua ahead of his colleagues, thereby decisively and permanently upsetting the balance of forces within the FSLN itself[16] — but he saved most of his force, transporting them by barge to El Salvador and Honduras.

At the time of victory, the FSLN claimed to have captured some 7,500 former GN members;[17] some 500 EEBI members were captured while fighting their way out of the country.[18] All these figures remain controversial, with the FSLN claiming to have freed 3,000 former guards-

[12] Crawley, *Nicaragua in Perspective,* p. 168; Black, *Triumph of the People,* p. 53.

[13] Black, Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[14] Ibid. A typical case is that of "Pecos Bill," a middle-level FDN field commander, who graduated from the Valley Forge Military Academy in Pennsylvania and the Americas' School in Panama, joined the U.S. Navy and received further training in Israel. See Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincón, *The Contras: Interviews with Anti-Sandinistas* (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984), pp. 189-90.

[15] See Eden Pastora's own complaints on the matter, in "Testimony of Eden Pastora Gomez," in Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Richard B. Schultz, Ernst Halperin, and Igor Lukes, *Hydra of Carnage, International Linkages of Terrorism: The Witnesses Speak* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 325-26.

[16] Ibid., p. 326, one of the few truly reliable claims made by Pastora.

[17] Christian, *Nicaragua,* p. 133.

[18] Crawley, *Nicaragua in Perspective,* p. 173.

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men,[19] while the unofficial Permanent Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission alleges that "during the first months, from July '79 until February 1980, the Sandinistas executed in jail no less than two thousand prisoners."[20] Referring to members of his own State Security services, Tomás Borge admitted that often they did hit prisoners or kill prisoners.[21] Conservatively, it appears that as many as 6,000 former GN members may have escaped abroad during the first year after the revolution, most to Honduras but many to Guatemala and El Salvador; a disproportionate number of these were former officers and elite troops.

Three major factors appear to have precipitated the reorganization of former GN members in exile. First, many experienced economic and family hardships in new jobs, such as security personnel in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; second, loss of friends, harsh treatment on the part of the FSLN's "people's tribunals," including often exaggerated data on secret killings of captured guardsmen galvanized action; and third, many felt the desire to return home or to avenge the loss of property and lifetime savings.[22] Although the government did not legally proclaim the National Guard to be "a criminal organization," it nonetheless treated GN members as criminals. Having abolished the death penalty, the government acknowledged the continued executions of former guardsmen. Thus, the capricious nature of FSLN justice only served to politicize and to unify most of the escaping former officers and soldiers. Personal fear of the long arm of the FSLN prodded many former GN officers into activity. In their opinion, as well as in the opinion of others, the murders of Pablo Emilio Salazar in Tegucigalpa[23] in October 1979 and of Somoza in Paraguay less than a year later bore the stamp of FSLN vengeance. In addition, simple friendship, the remaining esprit de corps and FSLN threats at home and abroad helped the most active among the emigré officers to attract their erstwhile colleagues and subordinates to the cause of counterrevolution.

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[19] This provoked general skepticism except on the far left, where the reaction was to accuse the Sandinistas of irresponsible weakness. See D. Fogel, *Revolution in Central America* (San Francisco: Ism Press, 1985), p. 199.

[20] See *The Voice of Nicaragua,* January 1986, p. 7, for Red Cross testimonies; other accusations of summary executions of captured guardsmen in Belli, *Breaking Faith,* p. 127; Christian, *Nicaragua,* pp. 132-34.

[21] Quoted in Belli, *Breaking Faith,* p. 121.

[22] "Pecos Bill," in Eich and Rincón, *Contras,* p. 189, as an example of the thirst for revenge. For the depth of the desire to return home and live a normal life and its role as a motivation for joining the insurgents, see the testimony of former GN Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Ramirez Zelaya, for whom "The actual goal is returning to Nicaragua." Ibid., p. 39.

[23] For details on the liquidation of Pablo Emilio Salazar, and the direct role played in it by Tomás Borge and then secret police chief Lenin Cerna (now ambassador to Bulgaria), see Christopher Dickey, *With the Contras* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 64-67. Most of the information was confirmed by this author's own research in San Salvador and Tegucigalpa in 1983.

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Although the number of GN members who managed to escape Nicaragua in 1979-1980 — before the Cuban-led and trained Sandinista secret police made escape extremely difficult — is almost impossible to estimate, it can safely be assumed that only some became politically active. Among these were a large proportion of officers, elite anti-insurgency troops (including many NCOs), and some regular soldiers. The latter were mostly new recruits (after the fall of 1978) from northern Nicaragua, and particularly from the department of Nueva Segovia, the GN's traditional recruiting grounds. Most important, since the northern departments were barely touched by the 1978-79 civil war and the FSLN had little support and even less recruiting success there, the traditionally strong family ties were undisturbed by the political polarization that unsettled the more modern Pacific Coast, semi-urban, or urban areas. The guardsmen's families helped their kinsmen flee to Honduras and often resented FSLN attempts to depict them as monsters and criminals in a war fought far away.

The first organizations were born in the three major concentrations of former GN members: Guatemala, Tegucigalpa, and Miami, in that order. One such group comprised about forty-five officers under Francisco Urcuyo Maliano, who had succeeded Somoza as president for forty-two hours. Maliano founded the Revolutionary Nicaraguan Front (FRENICA) in Guatemala immediately after his pathetic loss of power in Managua,[24] and similar small organizations were founded in Honduras and Miami. Most of these groups joined to form the "Legion of the 15th of September" (named after Nicaragua's Independence Day), which organized training — or retraining — camps in Honduras in 1980. The retraining was intended to transform an effective anti-insurgency force (the former GN) into an equally effective insurgent force. This process was made easier by the GN's ability to conduct small patrols that lived much like guerrillas. They also benefited from the experience of the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea (first guerrillas, then regular government army, and, since 1979, guerrillas again) and the pro-Portuguese forces in Mozambique and Angola (first anti-insurgents, then guerrillas).[25]

Leadership of the Legion of the 15th of September was in the hands of former senior officers of the Guard, such as Salvador Arguello, a former colonel, who ran a training camp in Florida through 1980, Emilio Echaverry (later known as "El Fierro"), and Colonel Ricardo Lau ("El Chino"). Funds came largely from wealthy Nicaraguan refugees in Miami, Guatemala City, and San Salvador, and from the wealthier members of

[24] "Pecos Bill," in Eich and Rincon, *Contras*, p. 187.
[25] Ibid., pp. 184-85.

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the Cuban exile community in Florida.[26] Cubans also helped retrain the members of the Legion and of another organization of exiled former GN military, the National Liberation Army (ELN). Although difficult to prove, it appears that the nationalist and "liberation" terminology of these groups came from their links with the Guatemalan National Liberation Movement of Mario Sandoval Alarcon, patriarch of the Central American far right. The total membership of the ELN, the Legion of the 15th of September and other small groups is best approximated at 600-800 men before mid-1981. Until then these nascent groups differed very little from the emigré groups of other times and regimes fallen to Marxism-Leninism — White Russians, Miami Cubans, and Kuomintang Chinese. Nor were their chances of having an impact any better. What changed their fate, and soon their structure, membership, and role, was the dramatic shift in Nicaragua's internal policies by 1980-81.

Politicians in Exile

By the end of spring 1980, the post-revolutionary fervor that had infected even normally level-headed politicians, prompting a Violetta Chamorro (member of the first junta after July 19 and owner of *La Prensa*) or an Alfonso Robelo to praise the Vietnamese "people's victory" or to scream "On to El Salvador,"[27] was clearly over. Both Chamorro and Robelo left the junta in disgust and disappointment. Robelo's Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) was persecuted and prevented from operating normally, while the two new non-FSLN junta members, Rafael Cordoba Rivas and Arturo Cruz, Sr. had no power base of their own (unlike Violetta Chamorro's *La Prensa* which was worth a party in its influence, or Robelo's MDN). Then, as now, Rivas was usually unwilling to criticize the Sandinistas, and Cruz was then harboring illusions over the ideological nature of the National Directorate. While both Robelo (until 1981) and Chamorro (to this day) remained in Nicaragua as the loyal opposition in the hope of free elections soon, other politicians, having decided on all-out opposition, fled into self-imposed exile. By late 1980, the most prominent of those was José Francisco Cardenal ("El Chicano"), a former deputy president of the Council of State immediately after the Revolution. Together with Edgar Chamorro, Mariano Mendoza, and Mariano Martinez, Cardenal founded the Nicaraguan Democratic

[26] *New York Times,* December 23, 1981; Eich and Rincón, *Contras,* p. 45.

[27] Edgar Chamorro with Jefferson Morley, "Confessions of a Contra," *The New Republic,* August 5, 1985, p. 19.

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Union (UDN) in Miami by the end of 1980.[28] At that time, the UDN wanted nothing to do with the former guardsmen, then already led by Enrique Bermudez Varela, leader of the Legion and a former Somoza military attaché in Washington. On the one hand, people like Cardenal, from one of the most famous families in Nicaragua, and Chamorro, from an even more famous (and equally divided) family, had close personal ties to many members of both the opposition and the government. On the other hand, Fernando Chamorro ("El Negro"), a veteran anti-Somoza fighter, left Nicaragua in 1981 and re-established his own "Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces" (FARN), a small but very effective and committed force totally loyal to "El Negro." FARN enjoyed some popular support in Managua and in the central departments of Chontales and Boaco.[29]

As a result of Nicaragua's political history, personalist armies or more often pseudo-armies mushroomed until 1985, with each self-appointed "leader" establishing his own "movement" and trying to distinguish it from all the others. Thus, a "Nicaraguan Liberation Movement," under Roberto Ponce Torres was proclaimed in Tegucigalpa in June 1984, claiming 2,500 fighters;[30] a "Third Way Movement" (M-3) under self-styled "commander" Sebastian Gonzalez, claimed to have started operations on November 1, 1983;[31] and Eden Pastora Gomez, the fallen deputy minister of the interior and then of defense had established a long record of attracting marginal opposition groups in exile ever since his defection in April 1982. To a large extent, this personalistic approach to resistance to the Managua regime appeared even among the ethnic minorities of the Atlantic Coast, despite their general status as small minorities, racially divided between black creoles and full-blooded Indians.

Ethnic Minorities

No other factor has so damaged the FSLN's carefully cultivated image as has their treatment of the Atlantic Coast populations: Miskitu, Rama, and Sumu Indians, and black creoles. The extent of the damage to their credibility abroad has even prompted prominent Sandinista leaders to acknowledge "errors" in handling the Indian question: Daniel Ortega

[28] Ibid., p. 20; and Eich and Rincón, *Contras,* p. 137, for the testimony of Pedro Espinosa Sanchez, leader of the FDN "internal front." Sanchez's testimony (while in captivity) is in doubt since he claims that it was José Fernando Cardenal, rather then the real José Francisco Cardenal (see also Christian, *Nicaragua,* pp. 176-77) who founded the UDN. That is a strange error for a person claiming to know Cardenal well, particularly in light of the latter's fame in Nicaragua.

[29] For the origins of FARN, see *Nicaragua Hoy,* August 10, 1985.

[30] *La Prensa Libre,* Guatemala City, June 23, 1984, p. 4.

[31] See *Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Latin America* (FBIS-LAM), November 21, 1983, p. P18.

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described the forced relocation of the Indians from along the Rio Coco at the beginning of 1982 as such an error, while Tomás Borge described the FSLN Indian policy as a series of "stupid errors" and concluded that "We have driven the Miskitu into the arms of the CIA."[32] As Steadman Fagoth Muller, the first prominent leader of the Miskitu resistance stated, for his people the issue that forced them into armed opposition was the preservation "of our identity, our customs, our traditions and our lives in face of ideological, political penetration by Marxism Sandinism."[33] Collision between Managua's nature and interests and the Atlantic Coast populations' history caused a rapid deterioration in their relations.

During the Somoza years the Atlantic Coast (Zelaya department) was largely neglected, with the exception of a number of timber and mining activities in the northern half of the region. These industries more often provided jobs than disruptions in the lives of the inhabitants. The Atlantic Coast populations, perhaps as many as 160,000 Indians (the large majority Miskitu) and about 70,000 black creoles, were culturally isolated from the rest of the country. They spoke English and Indian languages rather than Spanish, were Protestant (mostly Moravian), rather than Catholic, and they were historically distrustful of the Pacific Coast population. The Atlantic region was geographically isolated as well, with only one road linking the Pacific with the port of Bluefields, and economically oriented toward the Caribbean rather than toward the rest of the country. Somoza's benign neglect of the Atlantic Coast reinforced its particularism and established a de facto autonomy rarely disturbed until 1979. The civil war leading to Somoza's fall has barely touched Zelaya; extremely few Indians were involved in any way.

Once in power, the FSLN immediately initiated radical changes on the Atlantic Coast. Traditional leaders (councils of elders) and practices were scorned, and communal lands were often nationalized. The ubiquitous Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS), huge networks of informants rapidly growing on the Pacific Coast, began "mobilizing" the villagers, while the Moravian Church, historically uninvolved in the Christian-Marxism of "liberation theology" highly favored by the FSLN, was persecuted as a creation of North American "imperialism."[34] The "literacy crusade," begun in Managua as a mass indoctrination exercise, was imposed upon the linguistic minorities of the Atlantic Coast in Spanish, involving a heavy use of Cuban teachers. Thus, while "The metaphors and terminology of the campaign were purposefully military — 'The National Literacy Crusade: Heroes and Martyrs for the Liberation of Nicaragua,' 'The war on

[32] Quoted in Fogel, *Revolution in Central America*, p. 109.
[33] Steadman Fagoth Muller, "A Witness to Genocide," AFL-CIO, *Free Trade Union News*, March 1982, p. 3.
[34] Belli, *Breaking Faith*, pp. 106-17.

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ignorance,' 'the cultural insurrection,' and 'the second war of liberation'. . . ."[35] — the distinction between the campaign's symbols and substance escaped the blacks and Indians. Such misapprehensions were helped by the heavy presence of the EPS in the region — in contrast with the absence of military units throughout the Somoza regime and during the 1978-79 war — and by Managua's heavy-handed treatment of all Indian leaders, including those few, like Steadman Fagoth Muller, active in the anti-Somoza opposition before 1979.

In mass demonstrations in October 1980, blacks in Bluefields protested the presence and behavior of the Cuban teachers.[36] The violence that ensued was brutally quelled by the military and the leaders of the spontaneous uprising were jailed. Other than isolated forays by former guardsmen across the border from Honduras, the Bluefields uprising was the first major expression of violent opposition to the FSLN.

It should be pointed out that the Atlantic Coast minorities were not alone in their strong resentment of the presence of "internationalists" in their country. These internationalists — whether Soviet bloc and Cuban personnel, assorted free-lance revolutionary ideologues, or terrorists from Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Western Europe, and the Middle East — are often seen as alien invaders, caring little for local customs and sensibilities.[37]

By the end of 1979, under direct pressure from Daniel Ortega, the Indian organization ALPROMISU (The Alliance for the Progress of Miskitu and Sumu Indians), founded in 1975, was "sandinized" into MISURASATA (Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista Unity).[38] In September 1979, a Miskitu leader, Lyster Athers, was arrested and killed in the Puerto Cabezas jail by the authorities.[39] By 1980 communal forests had been nationalized as had communal lands around Puerto Cabezas. In light of the essential role played by Cuba in the survival of the Sandinista regime, the FSLN's strategic interest in securing the Bluefields, Puerto Cabezas, and El Bluff harbors on the Atlantic is consistent, as is Indian resistance.

[35] These are the words of former Jesuit Fernando Cardenal, Nicaragua's minister of education, in his "Nicaragua 1980: The Battle of the ABCs," in Stanford Central America Action Network, *Revolution in Central America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 450.

[36] Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, "Miskitus in Nicaragua: Who is Violating Human Rights?" ibid., p. 469; also see Payne, *The Democratic Mask*, p. 29.

[37] See for instance, "Sandinistas Attract a Who's Who of Terrorists," and "From Italy to the PLO, World's Leftists Find Haven in Nicaragua," by Juan Tamayo in the *Miami Herald*, reprinted by the Cuban American Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1985. There are consistent reports of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Costa Rican, and Chilean guerrillas participating in anti-insurgency operations against both the FDN and ARDE, and some were killed in combat.

[38] Fogel, *Revolution in Central America*, p. 93. It is highly significant that Dunbar Ortiz, a committed supporter of each and every action of the FSLN, as well as Fogel, a critic of the Sandinistas from the far left, had to acknowledge the mistreatment of the Indians, as did Penny Lernoux in *The Nation*.

[39] Fagoth Muller, *Witness to Genocide*, p. 2.

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By March 1980, the Indians began their exodus to Honduras, and it grew in proportions following the arrest, subsequent release, and escape to Honduras of Fagoth Muller. There, amid nearly 25,000 Indians, he established MISURA (MISURASATA without the Sandinista label); Brooklyn Rivera maintained his own faction, as well as the name of the organization, and fled to Costa Rica. In search of allies, both MISURA and MISURASATA entered into alliances with larger insurgent groups: the FDN and ARDE respectively. Subsequent squabbling among the Indian organizations, the apparent downfall of both Steadman Fagoth Muller, because of heavy-handed treatment of his followers, and Brooklyn Rivera, expelled for misguided and fruitless attempts to negotiate with Managua, did not diminish Indian determination to fight for autonomy. At least as many as 2,500 Indian fighters are now in Zelaya, posing a serious threat to Sandinista communications with the Caribbean coast, and preventing the exploitation of the mines and forests, while discrediting Managua's human rights claims. Although they are proportionally the most effective of the insurgents opposing Managua today, their small numbers and the isolation of their region prevent an Indian victory. Meanwhile, their experience with the Sandinistas both in war and in negotiations appears to preclude any large-scale acceptance of the amnesty offered them by the government.

Disgruntled Revolutionaries

On April 15, 1982, Eden Pastora Gómez, then deputy defense minister in charge of the formation of the Sandinista popular militias, and previously deputy interior minister, held a press conference in Costa Rica to announce his departure from the Nicaraguan government, and to accuse the members of the National Directorate of treason. Pastora denounced their betrayal of the revolution because of their Marxism-Leninism, and their betrayal of Nicaragua because of the dominant role permitted the Cubans and Soviet Bloc personnel. On September 23, 1982, Robelo's Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), then Nicaragua's largest and most prestigious non-Marxist party; Brooklyn Rivera's MISURASATA; Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro's Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces (UDN-FARN); and Pastora's own Sandinist Revolutionary Front (FRS) proclaimed the formation of ARDE, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.[40] From the beginning, ARDE differed from all other groups involved in the insurgency, in that it comprised former anti-Somoza activists, which distinguished it from the former ELN and the September 15th Legion. Their having taken arms

[40] Text in ARDE, *Propuesta de Paz en Nicaragua, para la Paz en CentroAmerica,* January 1983.

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against Somoza initially endowed FARN and FRS with a greater legitimacy than that of the opposition centered around José Francisco Cardenal's UDN. From the outset ARDE claimed to be *the* true Sandinista heir, Sandino's ideas having been betrayed by the FSLN. That both Pastora and Robelo have held high positions in the post-revolutionary regime, while Rivera and Fernando Chamorro both cooperated with the FSLN, demonstrated the depth of their revolutionary commitment, as well as their hostility to the ancient regime. However, the seeds of ARDE's destruction were sown at the beginning: the organization was little more than a convenient umbrella for four strong leaders, each with his own following, goals, and priorities. ARDE's main goal, proclaimed in its founding declaration as "the rescue of the original project of the Nicaraguan Revolution,"[41] was articulated in its slogan: "Without totalitarianism nor return to the past." ARDE's program was intended to attract all those anti-Somoza fighters who were disaffected after their coalition collapsed. The story of one of ARDE's first prominent recruits, Salvador Aranda Mairena, typifies the motives of those who joined the organization and illuminates their background:

> I joined the Frente [FSLN] during the last years of the struggle against Somoza. The contact was established through my two brothers, who were Sandinistas. . . . When the uprising began in 1979, I was actively involved in the takeover of the military posts at Malpaisillo, El Sauce, and Las Mojarras on the Rio Grande. . . . Even after July 19, I remained active in the CDS [Sandinista Defense Committees]. But that's when the problems began. . . . I had personal problems with some people who had been Somoza supporters before and now played the big supporters of the revolution. Some of them were given good positions — in the UNAF [Union Nacional de Agricultores], the CDS, and even the military. That burned me. Damn it, I had participated in the armed struggle, taken a clear position, and now I had to watch while the same people as before skimmed the cream off the top.[42]

Most of ARDE's recruits were veterans of Pastora's Southern Front against Pablo Emilio Salazar in 1979, Robelo's middle-class followers, including many students, and small cadres of committed supporters of Fernando Chamorro, as well as Brooklyn Rivera's small faction of MISURASATA.

ARDE began operations along the southern border of Nicaragua in 1983, taking advantage of Pastora's experience in the region. More important, ARDE exploited Pastora's and Robelo's extensive network of contacts within the establishment and the population of Costa Rica. However, ARDE never managed to establish a northern front from Honduras, chiefly because of Pastora's hatred for the FDN, whom he

[41] Ibid.

[42] See testimony of Salvador Aranda Mairena, in Eich and Rincón, *Contras*, pp. 107-108; for the role of former Somoza supporters in the CDS, see also Robet Leiken, "Nicaragua's Untold Stories," *The New Republic*, October 8, 1984, p. 17.

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has consistently accused of being "Somocistas," coupled with his own negative image among the Honduran military.

From the beginning, Pastora was the main protagonist of ARDE's military activities, and his errors and merits have largely decided the fate of the organization. After initial disappointments in the attempt to attract Sandinista military and militiamen to their side, ARDE became a rapidly growing force of about 500 by the end of 1983, and numbererd nearly 3,000 fighters by 1984.[43] However, by then the group was already rent by the conflict between Pastora's confused proclamations and Robelo's pragmatic approach to the FDN. The rift put a halt to recruiting and, by the end of 1984, resulted in a public break. Robelo and Fernando Chamorro's FARN joined the FDN, while Pastora tried to establish his own politico-military group, the Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS). By the end of 1985, after a year of continuous EPS pressure against ARDE and the latter's loss of its main bases at La Penca and Sarrapiqui, Pastora's forces numbered fewer than 1,000 fighters, his field commanders actively cooperated with FDN forces in the field,[44] and the FDN was actively recruiting entire ARDE units from the southern border areas. Even Adolfo Chamorro (exaggeratedly) defined ARDE, at the end of 1985, as "5,000 armed men who do not respond to any individual leadership or a single will."[45]

Pastora's military failure — not surprising, considering his lack of success as a commander of large forces in 1979 — and ARDE's perhaps fatal weakening do not indicate any lack of support for Pastora or, more important, for those center-left elements in Nicaragua and in exile who are unhappy with the FDN or at least with some of its field commanders. The list of organizations constituting the BOS is impressive, though most are in exile: the Union Committee of Nicaraguan Workers and Peasants in Exile; ARDE (under Adolfo Chamorro Cardenal); Unity of Nicaraguan Professionals in Exile; Association of Nicaraguan Professionals in Exile; The Christian Workers' Solidarity; and the Nicaraguan National Rescue and Conciliation Movement.[46] What makes some of these groups significant is less their strength in exile and their role in the insurgency, than their followings within Nicaragua (in the cases of Pastora, "Popo" Chamorro, Alfredo César of the National Rescue and Conciliation Movement), and their still extensive external connections with democratically minded Latin American governments, parties, and individuals.

[43] Pastora's deputy, Adolfo "Popo" Chamorro, made the implausible claim that ARDE had 6,000 combatants by the end of its first year, in Adolfo Chamorro, "Balance Militar del Frente Sur de Nicaragua," *Foco Centroamericano,* 2nd quarter of October 1985, pp. 1, 4.

[44] See the statements of Manuel Urroz, alias, "Julio Bigote," a Pastora lieutenant, in *FBIS-LAM,* December 15, 1983, p. P14.

[45] Adolfo Chamorro, "Balance Militar," p. 4.

[46] *La Nacion,* San Jose, Costa Rica, July 28, 1985.

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The "People" and the Insurgency

Both the Managua regime and the insurgent leaders claim to represent "the people" of Nicaragua against a "counterrevolutionary, Somozist clique" or against a "Marxist-Leninist clique" respectively. That the insurgents fight mostly against other Nicaraguans and are not yet close to winning — coupled with the flawed results of the 1984 elections — demonstrates that the Sandinistas still have significant support, albeit a minority and growing smaller. On the other hand, Managua's claims that the insurgents are "CIA mercenaires" and "Somozist gangs" have no credibility. Even Sandinista sympathizers in the United States are now forced to acknowledge that the "FDN and U.S. Government claims that the FDN is largely a 'peasant army' of Nicaraguans disaffected with their government are accurate."[47]

Simple arithmetic invalidates Sandinista claims that the FDN, with approximately 15,000 fighters, is made up of "National Guardsmen," of whom no more than 5,000-6,000 could have escaped in 1979. Moreover, all available evidence indicates that there are more former Sandinistas (twenty-seven, or 48 percent) than former guardsmen (thirteen, or 23 percent) respectively among the FDN regional and task force commanders.[48] In terms of the total membership, few argue that former GN members, although prominent at higher levels, make up an insignificant number overall (less than 2 percent) of the total FDN membership.[49] The main issue regarding the Nicaraguan insurgency relates to the motives of those thousands of peasants who join the FDN or smaller groups and risk their lives against the government's impressive army.

First, brutal government intrusion into property, authority and belief traditions, manifested by land seizures, forced cooperativization-collectivization of villages, repression of Indian elders or local peasant leaders in the northern areas, and persecution or exile of non-revolutionary priests has alienated significant numbers of the population. The mistreatment of Catholic clergy (other than "liberation theology" supporters) was at the root of the spontaneous uprising in the Monimbó district of Masaya in November 1982. That was the first urban uprising on the Pacific Coast and in the very place that has symbolized anti-Somoza rebellion since

[47] Reed Brody, *Contra Terror in Nicaragua* (Boston: South End Press, 1985), p. 133. It is an interesting fact that Brody and other pro-Sandinista accusers of the insurgents never try to explain why simple peasants would engage in atrocities against other peasants.

[48] *U.S. Support for the Contras,* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st session, April 16, 17, and 18, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1985), p. 358.

[49] Ibid.

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1978.[50] The protest spread to fourteen high schools in five cities, and resulted in people, mostly youth, being killed by the army.[51]

Second, the Sandinistas' Patriotic Military Service (SMP), a compulsory draft, helped focus resistance. While one might have expected draft evaders to be unwilling to fight, the FSLN polarization of the society actually forced many of those fleeing the SMP to join the insurgents. As one of them put it, "Sure, I have joined an army [the FDN] anyway, but at least that is of my own will."[52] Not only is draft evasion widespread,[53] it is epidemic in certain areas.[54] In Managua, half of the young private school students threatened by the SMP fled.[55] Most important, because of their multiplying effect upon the recruiting capabilities of the insurgents, are the reactions of the families of those drafted or threatened by the SMP. In the small town of Nagarote, an EPS recruiting drive resulted in open street fights with the population.[56] Clearly, it is among such furious and threatened groups that the insurgents find recruits and informers, while the FSLN only finds "counterrevolutionaries." To this phenomenon of potential draftees and their families joining the insurgents rather than fighting for the regime, are added recruits from among the newly arrived slum-dwellers of Managua, León, and Granada, and the almost 100,000 peasants from northern Nicaragua forcibly relocated by the military to "protect" them from the insurgents.[57]

As far as the Sandinistas are concerned, all insurgents are either hard-core "CIA mercenaries" and "Somozist criminals" or people under the influence of "religious sects" such as the Moravians, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, or Seventh Day Adventists.[58] According to Captain Roberto Calderon, commander of the EPS in the Fifth Region, the insurgents "use different methods in recruitment, such as involving kidnapped peasants in the crimes they commit . . . they recruit 13- to 15-year old children, who are subjected to a 'conversion' process to turn them into real beasts."[59] Nevertheless, Calderon admitted that "there are also elements who conscientiously help the 'contras,' particularly farmers who respond to counterrevolutionary propaganda. . . ."[60] Sandinista repression

[50] Humberto Belli, *Nicaragua: Christians Under Fire* (Garden City, Mich.: San Jose, Costa Rica: The Puebla Institute, 1984), pp. 49-51; see also Payne *The Democratic Mask*, p. 37.
[51] *Christian Science Monitor*, August 19, 1982; *New York Times*, August 18, 1982.
[52] *New York Times*, February 18, 1985.
[53] Ibid., June 26, 1984.
[54] Leiken, "Nicaragua's Untold Stories," p. 20.
[55] *New York Times*, August 31, 1983.
[56] Ibid., February 15, 1985.
[57] Ibid., February 18, 1985.
[58] See statement by Tomás Borge, in *FBIS-LAM*, July 16, 1982, pp. P9-10.
[59] *Barricada*, Managua, August 18, 1985, p. 7.
[60] Ibid.

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of Protestant churches has also provided many recruits to the insurgents[61] and in some areas, lay religious workers cooperating with the regime and its allies among the revolutionary clergy are favorite targets of the insurgents.[62]

Among the insurgents in general, and the FDN in particular, women are at least as numerous as they are among the Sandinista leadership, if not more numerous. The difference is that while the Sandinista women are almost exclusively middle or upper-middle class elements (such as Nora Astorga, Monica Baltodano, Leticia Herrera, Dora Maria Tellez), the insurgent women are peasant or working class in origin. Many of these women are seen by their male comrades as "stronger" than the men,[63] and their commitment is at least equal to that of the men. Some still fight, often in command roles, even when pregnant.[64] At least one woman reached the rank of FDN task force leader (and was killed in combat), and many, like Marta Luisa Martinez, arrested in Rio Blanco in August 1982, were actively recruiting other women to the insurgent cause.[65]

Despite Sandinista claims to the contrary and the labeling of all insurgents as "mercenaries," the overwhelming majority of recruits to both ARDE and the FDN receive no payment, and only a few leaders receive support for their families. Although some cases of forced recruitment, including kidnapping by the insurgents are well documented, most fighters join voluntarily. Thus, a government prisoner, Uriel Navarette Medrano of Chinandega, stated that only a dozen FDN guerrillas were needed to escort as many as 500 willing peasants into Honduras.[66] Testimonies of Sandinista prisoners affirm that guerrilla groups coming from Honduras swelled as they penetrated southward, mostly because of local recruits joining spontaneously. A minority of these recruits, like eighteen-year-old José Sarmiento, whose brother was in the EPS, joined because "It was more fun than going back to my family,"[67] but most joined for weightier reasons.

The high degree of motivation, almost ferocity, of the Nicaraguan insurgents was abundantly demonstrated from the start of military operations. On the one hand, real and alleged Sandinista atrocities against

[61] There are perhaps as many as 20 percent Evangelical Christians among the insurgents, a proportion far higher than among the general population, see *U.S. Support for the Contras,* pp. 297, 309.

[62] A fact much deplored by revolutionary priest Teófilo Cabestrero, a FSLN activist, in his *Blood of the Innocent, Victims of the Contras' War in Nicaragua* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1985), pp. 9, 15.

[63] See Eich and Rincón, *Contras,* p. 99.

[64] Ibid., p. 65.

[65] *Barricada,* August 24, 1982, p. 12.

[66] Eich and Rincón, *Contras,* p. 89, testimony of Emerson Uriel Navarrete Medrano.

[67] Ibid., p. 169.

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captured insurgents[68] are presumed to be real by the fighters in the field[69] and result in an extremely low level of captures by the EPS, even in the official claims. Thus, in January 1986, Captain Roberto Calderon claimed that 1,400 "counterrevolutionaries" were killed during 1985, but only "over 100" were captured.[70] On the other hand, there is little mercy on the part of the insurgents for Sandinista cadres, including CDS members, revolutionary priests and lay preachers, or government officials. As far as the insurgents are concerned, with the exception of ARDE, there are few prisoners taken, often because the guerrillas cannot guard, feed, or carry prisoners — but also because of the hatred involved.

Their military training and experience in small unit operations as counter-insurgency fighters made it absolutely necessary for former Guardsmen not only to belong to but initially to lead the incipient Nicaraguan insurgent groups. By 1982, due to the internal dynamics of the insurgency itself — particularly the successful recruiting of former Sandinista sympathizers — as well as the need to present a better image abroad, especially in the U.S. Congress, a massive purge of former senior Guardia officers occurred. At least three of the most important ones, chief of staff of the FDN Emilio Echaverry, intelligence chief Edgar Antonio Hernandez ("Abel"), and field commander Pedro Pablo Ortiz Centeno ("El Suicida"), were shot for atrocities against their own troops and civilians, and for rebellion or theft.[71] The removal of those elements, combined with the influx of non-guardsmen into the ranks of the FDN, and most of all the association of the fighters with such prominent, often liberal, and known anti-Somoza leaders like Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, or Adolfo Calero, all contributed to the growing recruiting strength of the insurgent organizations. Whether they will ever succeed in making active resistance fighters of all those Nicaraguans, in the country or abroad, who do not support the regime is unclear and probably depends on their ability to show they can win. On the other hand, FSLN policies, usually on purpose but sometimes by mistake, have resulted in the increasing polarization of Nicaraguan society. In the words of Mariano Montealegre, a former squadron leader in the Sandinista Air Force, who defected to

[68] "If fifteen [insurgents] are captured, two will be taken to Managua for debriefing, where they will be put on TV, and the rest will be killed. Often they are killed by stabbing, but there is also the 'vest cut.' In this, the prisoner's arms and legs are cut off while he is alive, and he is left to bleed to death. It is an old technique used by Somoza and Sandino." Miguel Bolanos Hunter, "Nicaragua: A View from Within," in Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal, eds., *Crisis and Opportunity: U.S. Policy in Central American and the Caribbean* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1984), p. 390. Bolanos was a member of the Sandinista counter-intelligence.

[69] See Eich and Rincón, *Contras,* p. 180.

[70] *FBIS-LAM,* January 30, 1986, p. P18.

[71] See Eich and Rincón, *Contras,* pp. 150-51; *U.S. Support for the Contras,* p. 318. The most detailed examination of "El Suicida's" execution, together with three of his lieutenants, is in Dickey, *With the Contras,* pp. 250-51.

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Costa Rica and joined ARDE in 1982, "There are only two options: Either you are with the FSLN or against it. . . ."[72] Since then, alternatives have further diminished and nothing remains to prevent an all-out war among Nicaraguans, with neutrals forced to take sides.

Conclusions

Steadily since July 19, 1979, and rapidly since 1981, the nature of the Nicaraguan state and of Sandinista rule have changed. The anti-FSLN opposition has also changed. The total politicization of Nicaraguan society, at full steam until 1980, created a self-perpetuating polarization. Each Sandinista crackdown on the opposition provoked more violent responses which were answered with escalating state violence, more crackdowns, and more responses. From an immediate post-revolutionary regime that included figures like Cruz, Robelo, José Francisco Cardenal, Pastora, and Steadman Fagoth, the beginning of 1986 has seen the regime accuse even Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo of being an imperialist agent, and has seen the still-legal opposition including Conservatives, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Stalinists, Trotskyites and pro-Moscow Communists — form a coalition, if not an alliance — directed against the FSLN.

The trend toward polarization and the translation of that polarization into more clearly divided armed camps has almost reached its climax in Nicaragua. As in many civil wars, polarization has a limit, after which the two sides are reduced to their hard core, immovable strength. Those Nicaraguans with a vital stake in the continuation of FSLN rule are well defined by now, and their fear of losing everything should the FSLN collapse will make them fight to the finish. It is equally clear that the insurgents will continue to fight irrespective of external factors, whether the U.S. Congress or the Honduran military. What does depend on those factors is not the continuation of the civil war, but its nature and duration. The Sandinista style of rule implies absolute control over the state apparatus, the military, and the economy, rendering any distinction between the party and the state meaningless. Therefore, every aspect of the state has become a natural target of the insurgent forces, because they are all mutually reinforcing and strengthen the FSLN's grip on the country. Thus, state-owned cooperatives, state-controlled or -dominated factories, the CDS, Fernando Cardenal's "literacy crusaders," and the revolutionary priests and their lay pupils, whether native or foreign, are elements of a single fabric — the FSLN's fledgling totalitarian system. The Christianity of the insurgents is incompatible with that of Fernando Cardenal or of

[72] *La Nacion,* May 7, 1982, p. 1A.

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Foreign Minister D'Escoto, just as their nationalism is incompatible with the FSLN's outspoken internationalism. Although political or economic differences between men can often be solved by negotiations, deep chasms between beliefs are seldom negotiable. As a prominent exile active in the insurgency leadership has defined it, the insurgent "is fighting for no other reason than to preserve his way of life, to protect his traditions from the voracious appetite of a Leninist vanguard determined to transform him — against his will — into a 'new man.' "[73] For this reason, there can be no optimism in respect to any solution of the Nicaraguan civil war other than all-out victory for one side or the other.

[73] Arturo Cruz, Jr., "Managua's Game," *The New Republic*, March 10, 1986, p. 19.

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DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY HISTORY

The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939. By Wesley K. Wark. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. 304 pp. $29.95. A first-rate study on the role of intelligence assessments in Britain's foreign and defense policies during the 1930s. By examining a mass of unpublished material in archival collections, Wark has skillfully reconstructed the intelligence pictures presented to British decision makers on German rearmament and foreign-policy intentions. The author effectively illustrates the synergy between faulty intelligence assessments provided to British policymakers and the disastrous policy of appeasement. For example, Wark describes the Admiralty's role in promoting the June 18, 1935, naval arms control pact with Germany — a mistaken diplomatic effort that received impetus from poor intelligence assessments. This study, then, is a cautionary tale of the problems and dangers associated with the formulation of intelligence assessments.

Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914. By William C. Fuller, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 321 pp. $39.50. Based in part on research conducted in the Soviet state archives, this important study examines the army's role in maintaining internal security during the reigns of the last two tsars. Fuller proposes that civil-military conflict intensified during the reign of Tsar Nicholas II and "represented one of the gravest weaknesses of tsarism, for it undermined the repressive efforts of the regime, politicized key members of the military elite, and seriously undermined Russia's ability to wage war." Chapters five, six and seven provide a thorough examination of the growing resentment and politicization of the Russian officer corps in the wake of their humiliating defeat in the war against Japan and the increased police duties assigned to them during the aborted revolution of 1905-1907. Despite major increases in military spending after that revolutionary turmoil, the dissatisfaction of the officer corps had not abated by the time Russia entered World War I.

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The Military Life of Frederick the Great. By Christopher Duffy. New York: Atheneum, 1986. 421 pp. $25.00. Christopher Duffy, a professor at Sandhurst and the author of several books on eighteenth-century military history, has written an old-fashioned account — filled with detailed tactical descriptions of battles — about the campaigns of Frederick the Great. While Mr. Duffy's approach to history is generally frowned upon by the liberal academic community of historians, his study is nonetheless an admirable and valuable addition to the fields of military history and strategic studies. The book provides a window on the way warfare was practiced during the eighteenth-century, as well as insights into the lineage of contemporary strategic and operational concepts. Frederick's use of maneuver and fortifications is a model for military planners concerned with the strategic problem of "fighting outnumbered and winning." More problematic is Frederick's use of pre-emptive strikes to begin his wars. The campaigns of Frederick were admired and closely studied by Napoleon and Clausewitz. Indeed, Clausewitz repeatedly referred to Frederick's campaigns in his writings, including *On War,* to illustrate his ideas about the nature of war. Duffy's account of Frederick's wars, alongside David Chandler's *The Campaigns of Napoleon,* is an important contribution to the study of the historical evolution of modern strategic thought.

U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History. By Norman Friedman. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985. 512 pp. $46.95. The latest book in Norman Friedman's series of design histories of U.S. warships provides a detailed history of the evolution of the battleship as a weapons system in the United States. Earlier in the century, battleships were the strategic systems of the great powers, and their expense was the entry charge into the dance of world politics. Technological innovation was a constant spur in the design of battleships, but by the end of World War II they had been rendered obsolete and impotent in their primary function of deciding battles on the world oceans. In recent years, however, the battleship has experienced a resurgence: the Reagan administration has undertaken to bring all four of the Iowa-class battleships back into service and already the *New Jersey* and *Iowa* are operational; meanwhile, the Soviet Union has gone to the great lengths of building two nuclear-powered capital ships of the Kirov-class. Students of arms control, American defense planning, and the role of technological challenge and response in the evolution of weapons systems will find a great deal of information in Friedman's encyclopedic study of U.S. battleships. Finally, the 200 photographs and 130 line drawings included in the volume are as much a delight to the eye as they are informative.

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Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939. By Alvin D. Coox. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985. Two volumes. 1,273 pp. $95.00. In his exhaustive study, Alvin D. Coox provides a highly readable interpretative narrative of the little-known war between Japan and the Soviet Union along the borders of Manchuria during the late summer of 1939. The climax of this limited border war was a stinging defeat for Japan's Kwantung Army at the battle of Nomonhan by Soviet forces skillfully led by Georgi Zhukov. Japan's defeat was of major importance in determining the course and outcome of World War II. Because of Nomonhan, Japanese decision makers rejected an advance on the Asian mainland against the Soviet Union and shifted their imperial ambitions south, toward the Pacific empires of the European powers. As for the Soviet Union, its victory lessened the likelihood of a two-front war in case of a showdown with Germany. Coox also provides an overall history of Japan's Kwantung Army, which was eventually annihilated by the Soviets during the August 1945 Manchurian campaign. **Nomonhan** will interest not only historians of World War II, but contemporary analysts interested in the Soviet strategic predicament in the Far East. So long as Moscow and Beijing remain at odds because of territorial disputes, the battle of Nomonhan will continue to provide insights into the potential shape of some future limited border conflict between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community. By Christopher Andrew. New York: Viking Press, 1986. 639 pp. $25.00. In this fascinating account, Cambridge historian Christopher Andrew provides an overview of the evolution of British intelligence operations from the Victorian era to the close of World War II. Despite continued restrictions on many files of the secret services, Andrew has drawn upon a large variety of unpublished sources — as well as the growing number of fine scholarly studies on British intelligence activities, such as Patrick Beesly's *Room 40,* the multivolume history *British Intelligence in the Second World War* by F. H. Hinsley and his collaborators, and his own earlier essays on the role of intelligence in Anglo-Soviet relations between the wars — to recount the successes and failures of British intelligence operations during the era of the two world wars. Throughout the book, Churchill stands out as an avid supporter of a wide range of intelligence activities and a ravenous consumer of its fruits. Andrew does a particularly fine job describing the organizational setting of British intelligence work, providing personality sketches of the colorful and often eccentric figures in charge of the intelligence services, and placing British intelligence operations within a larger political, social, and

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strategic context. The last chapter provides an all-too-brief, but thoughtful, account on British intelligence operations since 1945. This book will likely become the standard on its subject, and it is a handy companion for the study of Britain's foreign and strategic relations during the first half of this century.

The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. By Ian Kershaw. London and Baltimore: Edward Arnold Publishers, 1985. 164 pp. $13.95. The author, a modern historian from the University of Manchester, has produced an extremely useful survey, which is a bold attempt to synthesize and evaluate the complex historiography on the Third Reich. He has not only compressed an amazing number of references and viewpoints into a mere 150 pages of text, but in comparison to earlier historiographical surveys on Nazi Germany (e.g., volumes by Pierre Aycoberry and Klaus Hildebrand), Kershaw has also attempted an interpretation of several selected problem areas. The book sets out to explain the different ideological premises of historians approaching Nazism. It then deals with specific problems of the Nazi phenomenon, the relationship between politics and economics and, to some extent, the highly disputed process of "social revolution" under the Nazi dictatorship. However, the specific racial projection *(rassische Neugestaltung)* has been avoided from this perspective. Half of the chapters deal with Hitler, investigating his role as the "Master of the Third Reich" and his influence upon foreign policy as well as his responsibility for the holocaust. Each chapter contains a final evaluation with a summary of the main categories of interpretation. Although in most cases Kershaw succeeds in the difficult task of balancing the conflicting interpretations, in several places he leans toward the structuralist approach, as opposed to the intentionalist (i.e., related to Hitler as the central phenomenon of Nazism). The debate about the nature of Nazism is by no means closed. One could only agree with the author that "the moral outrage at Nazism . . . needs to be constantly reinforced by genuine historical scholarship and understanding." History teachers and students will find Kershaw's volume indispensable.

THE SOVIET UNION

Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula. By Mark N. Katz. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

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279 pp. $30.00. Recent civil strife in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Soviet Union's most deeply entrenched position in the Arab world, has drawn attention to Moscow's aims and activities toward all the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. This informative, well-researched study provides an up-to-date assessment of what we know about Soviet foreign policy toward the eight Arab countries of this region: in addition to the PDRY, there are the Yemen Arab Republic, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Each country's history, political setting, and attitude toward the USSR is recounted, with a brief evaluation of Moscow's influence (or lack thereof) by the author. The concluding chapter notes the USSR's generally limited penetration of the peninsula, discusses briefly a few possible lines of development, and suggests how the United States should proceed.

Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis. By Daniel S. Papp. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1985. 176 pp. $20.00. By examining the ideological basis of Soviet perceptions of the Third World, this study hopes to illuminate the policies the Soviets actually pursue in various regions of the developing world. Although alerting us to the difficulties inherent in differentiating between "real" perceptions and "propaganda" perceptions and in trying to locate the center of concerns that spawn particular policies, Papp never clarifies the analytical muddle. What results is a series of essays on "the evolution of Soviet attitudes toward the developing world," Soviet views of the world revolutionary process, and "a detailed analysis of Soviet perceptions of domestic affairs in the developing world; of the relationships between the developing world, on the one hand, and the developed West, on the other; and of the relationships that developing countries have with each other and with the socialist world." The high level of abstraction limits the usefulness of the work for policy-oriented analysts.

L'Afghanistan. Islam et modernité politique. By Olivier Roy. Paris: Seuil, 1985. 324 pp. Frs.120 (paper). Among the growing number of works on Afghanistan appearing since the Soviet invasion, Roy's book stands out as the most systematic and penetrating analysis of Afghan society under the dual impact of Islamic fundamentalism and guerrilla warfare. Between 1980-84 he completed five risky trips into Afghanistan, reporting extensively in *Le Monde*. Most striking are the originality of Roy's definitions, whether they are applied to various manifestations of Islam or to the typology of the guerrillas, and the richness of his thought-provoking observations. His brilliant analysis of the inevitable friction between the application of Islamic law (*shariat*) versus the tribal code

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(*pashtunwali*), is the most incisive in any language so far. It helps outsiders to understand the often incomprehensible behavior of Afghan tribesmen in the present war. A good half of the text deals with the religious, political, regional, and military components of the guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan. Roy is skeptical about the prospects of a political settlement as negotiated under U.N. auspices. One possible bleak scenario could be gradual acceptance of the growing geopolitical divide within Afghanistan between the non-Pashtun North and the tribal South; the former being incorporated step by step into Soviet Central Asia, the latter serving the Red Army as a no man's buffer to destabilize Pakistan. It is to be hoped that Roy's highly original study will soon be available in English.

Economic Relations with the Soviet Union: American and West German Perspectives. Edited by Angela E. Stent. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 182 pp. $20.00. Some of the most difficult issues in U.S.-West German relations have revolved around the question of trade with the Soviet Union, especially the transfer of advanced technology. These nine papers, originally prepared for a conference at Georgetown University, offer thoughtful, informed American and West German perspectives of the political, economic, and security dimensions of the general problem of economic relations with the Soviet Union. The asymmetries in outlook and interest are "the result of diverging historical and geographical situations, and of the United States' global international role versus the Federal Republic's regional role." Yet, the persistence of these differences could create serious political problems for the future stability of the U.S.-West German relationship, unless both sides demonstrate flexibility and understanding.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

The Other Walls: The Politics of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. By Harold H. Saunders. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985. 179 pp. $17.95 ($9.95, paper). Harold Saunders's experience in dealing with Arab-Israeli issues from inside the United States government (1961-1981) is probably second to none. Even if other experienced hands do not agree with all of Saunders's judgments, none of his arguments in this succinct little volume are facile, polemical, or insincere. Relative beginners in the study of the labyrinthine politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict

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will gain the most from this book because it sets forth crisply the relevant background, political constraints, and practical obstacles that forestall progress. More advanced observers, too, would do well to remind themselves of these basics, which are so easy to forget in the pelting of day-to-day details. One glaring omission from the book is Saunders's failure to mention the *bureaucratic* politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict within the U.S. government, something of which he no doubt knows a great deal, certainly enough to know how sensitive it is. Also missing, some will say, is the crucial explanation for all U.S. policy in this area — the omnipresent and omnipotent Zionist lobby. Saunders omits the Zionist lobby not because it is a sensitive issue, but because it is a non-issue. Many pro-Israeli groups have chastised Saunders for being pro-Arab and too solicitous of the PLO's views; perhaps this is so, perhaps not. But Saunders's defense of basic Israeli policy — that Israel cannot be expected to give up security assets in the absence of anyone on the Arab side with whom to negotiate — demonstrates how distended characterizations of him have been. Non-Jewish, non-Zionist U.S. policy makers in this area — Saunders, Quandt, Sisco, Atherton, Veliotes, Murphy, and others — are neither in the clutches of the Zionist lobby or of the PLO. This book ought to be particularly enlightening for those who think either one of those things is true.

Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. By Nadav Safran. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1985. 524 pp. $25.00. A detailed, inclusive, and skillfully woven volume on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Safran demonstrates well through his design of the book and in its writing that Saudi policy writ large *is* a security policy, and one that makes little meaningful distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. The book is perhaps best described as contemporary analytical history rather than common political science. And like many a historian, Safran has a huge appetite for detail. The advantage of such an approach is that the book will remain for many years a substitute archive of sorts for public policy analysts in search of textured accounts of seminal events, dates, and data of many kinds. The disadvantage is that the many policy-oriented implications of this 524-page work — and they are there in number — are not practically accessible to busy people who need to know them. As with previous efforts, Safran really needs to write two books from this mammoth research effort, the one here under review, and another of no more than one hundred pages for the policy community. No review of this book would be complete without noting the fracas at Harvard University over CIA support for Professor Safran's book. This is not the place to discuss the many issues involved here, but it is clear that

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there are certainly worse ways for the CIA to spend money than by supporting high-quality historical analysis — available to all — that will be of value for decades to come.

Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook. By Wolf Blitzer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 259 pp. $15.95. A surprisingly dull and largely superficial account of the inside workings of U.S.-Israeli relations by the otherwise superb U.S. correspondent for the *Jerusalem Post.* What is new in this book, by way of Blitzer's personal experience and history, rests almost exclusively in the portraiture of prominent personalities, not in new information and certainly not in novel or resonant interpretation. Here and there new historical detail is provided, but nothing so significant as to change our basic understanding of events past. The book positively glows over U.S.-Israeli friendship — and over Ronald Reagan — and is reluctant to criticize anyone or anything. Even the "bad guys" here, the Arabs and their sympathizers, are less criticized than dismissed. In short, this is an easy reading feel-good book for those who wish not to be reminded too much of serious troubles in Israel and inherent problems between Washington and Jerusalem. More casual readers can pick up some depth on recent history and some pleasant anecdotes; serious scholars need not fret over not having time for this one. There are no footnotes; there is no bibliography.

An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism. By Moujan Momen. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985. 397 pp. $25.00. There are dozens of English language sketches of Islamic history and theology, and in each some attention is given to the heterodox forms of Islam, notably Twelver Shi'ism, the dominant religion of Iran. However, Momen's book is the first volume devoted to Shi'ism as such. Contrary to its title, the book is much more than an introduction. In barely twenty pages, the author covers the life of Muhammed, the problem of succession upon his death, and the early days of heterodoxy in Islam. The next few chapters, provide a historical account of Shi'ism between the years 632-1900. Here Momen describes the vast transformation of Shi'ism from a tumultuous collection of extremist, cult-like sects to a more moderate, institutionalized religion, the official faith of Safavid Iran. The author then examines the concept of the Imamate and the doctrine of the occultation of the twelfth Imam, both central to Shi'ite theology. Sketches of doctrines, ritual practices, and "social transactions" are provided. Momen looks at Shi'i jurisprudence and the religious hierarchy of the clergy, and notes the marked differences between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam. He also discusses Sufism,

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the Shi'ite version of gnostic theology, and other schools within Shi'ism, a heterodoxy with a marked proclivity to spawn still more heterodoxy. Chapters 13 and 14, respectively, focus on the popular religion — here we come closer to modern politically relevant details — and contemporary Shi'ism, in a whirlwind tour of current Shi'ite demography and political predilections. In this latter chapter Momen discusses contemporary Iran, confirming that Khomeini's views of the political role of the clergy in an "Islamic state," while related to traditional principles, are both novel and controversial. There are appendices (chronology, Shi'i dynastic trees, biographies of prominent clergy), and an impressive multilingual bibliography. It is impossible to write a mere description of Shi'ite Islam, especially these days, so it would not be wrong to say that what Momen has given us is partly an interpretation. But this interpretation is written by an "insider" with "outsider" skills and perspectives, and its less controversial parts stand alone for the less advanced reader.

Israel: The Partitioned State. A Political History since 1900. By Amos Perlmutter. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985. 398 pp. $19.95. Though studded with data and detailed historical description, *Israel: The Partitioned State* is an interpretation of Israeli and Zionist political history rather than a text-type description. Where others have tread over similar materials (Safran in *Israel: The Embattled Ally,* Sachar in *Israel: A History,* Reich in *Israel: Land of Tradition and Conflict,* reviewed below, O'Brien, to be reviewed next issue) with scholarly caution, Perlmutter dances through the century twirling out judgments and sharp descriptions with alacrity. This is not to say that the judgments and descriptions are therefore wrong in any simple way (what constitutes right and wrong in such matters has, of course, spawned tomes in the philosophy of history), but they sometimes lose in nuance what they add in clarity. Perlmutter reveals some hitherto obscure or altogether unknown information in this book, for example, the revelation that had Yoseph Burg of the National Religious party thrown in his lot with Labor in 1981, he might have become prime minister. The author knew, or still knows personally, a goodly number of the main personalities and this, again, imbues the text with a vivid, if occasionally acerbic, quality. As the author examines more contemporary matters, especially the period between 1981 and 1984, the personal and even emotional features of the volume become ever more pronounced. Perlmutter labels Begin a failure and Sharon a fanatic. But in his drive to be sharp, he misreads aspects of U.S. policy in this period, notably the so-called strategic consensus policy of the Haig State Department where Perlmutter fails, as do most others, to distinguish declaratory from operational policy. In sum, this is an engaging, sometimes enlightening,

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sometimes annoying account of what is by any measure a fascinating subject. But because of its foibles, *Israel: The Partitioned State* is likely to be as dangerous for beginners as it is stimulating for older hands.

Israel: Land of Transition and Conflict. By Bernard Reich. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 225 pp. $28.00 ($13.95, paper). The thirteenth volume in Westview's "profiles" of the nations of the Middle East series. Like the others, this volume provides a sound, basic introduction to Israel for the student and general reader. Reich is a master of clarity and balance in writing for such an audience. Even in the most treacherous and emotional areas he conveys engagement and interest, without passion or cant. Most of the other volumes in the Westview series have no real peers, but this volume competes with existing texts by N. Safran, D. Peretz, and others. Of all, Reich's is the most appropriate for undergraduates.

Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955-1981. By William J. Burns. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985. 263 pp. $32.50 ($10.50, paper). Burns provides a detailed analysis of U.S.-Egyptian relations during the quarter century following the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms agreement using the aid relationship as an organizing principle. The "carrot and stick" policy of using economic aid to induce Egyptian support for U.S. policies in the Middle East is examined well in the context of the domestic and international concerns of both countries. U.S. policy over the Aswan Dam offer of the 1950s, food aid in the 1960s, and Sadat's "peace dividend" in the 1970s are given special attention. The author is quick to note complexities, slow to render judgment. The book is generally well written and makes use of new archival data for the period between 1950 and 1970. In describing the events of the late 1970s, however, Burns cannot resist the temptation to seize upon simplicities — erroneous ones at that — cooked up mainly at the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, which happens to be where the author now works. The conclusions are common-sensical but not particularly dramatic or novel, and little effort (two pages) is made to generalize the findings of the study. All in all, this is better than the standard academic fare, all the more welcome because of the curious paucity of volumes that deal with U.S.-Egyptian relations.

Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. By Ayman Al-Yassini. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 171 pp. $30.00. A concise, clear, and often insightful description of the religious components of the contemporary Saudi polity. Al-Yassini begins with synopses of the his-

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torical conflict within Islam between ideological rectitude and the reality of governance, and of the origins and essence of Wahhabism within the formation of the Saudi state. He then describes how religion works in the politics of a patrimonial society, religion as an instrument of social control, and the evolution of the ulema's role within the state administration. Al-Yassini is not impressed by arguments that modernization has already undermined the patrimonial character of the state and undermined the authority of the ulema. The arguments that do occur within Saudi society, moreover, have divided the ulema as well as others; it is not a matter of semi-monolithic elements of society fighting each other head to head. Things may not have changed that much yet, but there are choices to be made in the future. The state will not tolerate a defiant religious authority, but the two are so closely fused in Saudi society that the nature of any future divide is hard to discern. As prophet, rather than analyst, Al-Yassini is somewhat vague, but who can blame him?

Beyond the Green Line: Israeli Settlements West of the Jordan. By David J. Schnall. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 162 pp. $22.95. A rambling, anecdotal portrait of the politics, economics, and inner lives of Israeli settlements in the West Bank as told through conversations with settlers. In this sense only it reminds one of Amos Oz's recent book, *In the Land of Israel* (1983). The author, who holds both a Ph.D. in political science and a Rabbinical ordination from Yeshiva University, rather likes the idea of the settlements. He is not completely oblivious to the problems they cause; he states them, metaphorically scratches his head, and goes on. Schnall occasionally mentions the Arabs, the PLO, the Jordanians and their views; when he does, he is often incorrect. Nevertheless, this book is useful in two ways: it speaks to the details of the daily lives of Israelis living in the West Bank and without such human detail, political analysis is impoverished; and it reveals the great diversity of views and motives within the community of settlers, which many a reader will find both startling and edifying.

Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration. Edited by Halim Barakat. Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1985. 271 pp. $15.95. **North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns.** By Richard B. Parker. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 193 pp. $34.95. Two new books on a relatively neglected area, both with some merit and some flaws. The Barakat volume is not sure what it wants to be, and that is its main problem. There are twelve essays divided into three sections: "The Magrib: Between East and West," "Intra-Regional Conflicts," and "Structural Changes." Some of the essays

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within these labels are rightly categorized; others seem oddly out of place. Some of the essays are general and analytic; others are narrow and too pedantic. One, by A. Khatibi on the "decolonization of Arab sociology," is a sort of chic Marxism mixed with the obscurantism of modern French social criticism (the article was translated from the French) and the enthusiastic, baroque emotion of Arabic. John Entelis, J. William Zartman, John Ruedy, and John Davis provide better essays, but their best works can be found elsewhere.

Richard B. Parker's volume, intended as an introduction to North Africa, succeeds fairly well. Parker, former U.S. Ambassador to Algeria and Morocco, has written previously only on Islamic architecture; this effort, though clear, lacks style. It reads like a combination of an undergraduate research paper and a departmental briefing tome. Parker presents nine chapters, one an overview of the Magrib, one chapter each on Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, one on the Islamic revival, one on the problem of the Western Sahara, one on North Africa and the great powers, and one on U.S. policies. This last chapter reads like the State Department line on the area: rather general and filled with diplomatic equivocation. Still, on balance, the Parker volume is a better choice than the Barakat volume.

The Middle East and Africa: African Independence. The First Twenty-Five Years. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984. 364 pp. $29.95. This book consists of fourteen essays written by highly qualified analysts of African politics and economics. Their insights provide a wealth of knowledge and understanding of the most crucial issues that independent African states have faced during their formative quarter century of independence. The contributors attempt to investigate a series of issues such as: What has independence done for these countries? What are Africa's major problems and successes? What are the major political lessons and trends? What does the future hold for these countries? Specific topics covered include the colonial heritage, the United Nations, ethnicity, regionalism, the military and politics, agrarian malaise, urban growth and rural development, aid, the conflict between ideology and technology, and the relations with the world system. In addition, there is a major bibliographic essay. In all, this is a comprehensive and informative volume for those concerned with Africa's future.

NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa. By Christopher Coker. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 302 pp. $32.50. The out-of-area problem con-

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tinues to plague NATO members: how should they respond to challenges in regions lying beyond the scope of the Alliance, but which have far-reaching implications for all its members? This study attempts to approach the problem comparatively, but no data are available for systematic analysis. Nor does the treatment of the Warsaw Pact members as a unitary actor really shed much additional light on what we know of Soviet behavior in Africa. The assessment of NATO's attitude(s) and actions is useful, serving to provide historical perspective on what the Alliance has done and why it has not done more. While noting the Soviet Union's mixed record in its penetration of Africa, the author emphasizes that by the 1980s almost 80 percent of Africa's imports of weapons were from the Soviet bloc. Overall, Coker is undisturbed by Soviet involvement in Africa; in any event, he sees little likelihood of NATO revising its charter to permit greater intervention outside of Europe.

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

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